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Introduction 
According to one of the most important assumptions of economic theory humans are 
motivated by self-interest (Williamson 1985). People in various situations would like to 
increase their perceived utility basing their decisions on increasing their profit without 
caring for the profit of others – or in other words the ‘vast forces of greed’ (Arrow 
1980) is put into the focus of the explanation. The self-interest hypothesis gives accurate 
descriptions and predictions of pure economical situations where interpersonal 
interactions do not occur. 
In reality, however, behaviour differs from that. If this kind of behaviour would be 
common and exclusive among people, then cooperation would not be able to emerge 
(Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), there would be no punishment for free riders – those not 
participating in producing public goods – (Bowles and Gintis 2003; Fehr and Gächter 
2002) altruistic behaviour – unselfishness – wouldn’t be rewarded (Trivers 1971), trust 
would not be produced (Sobel 2005) and we wouldn’t experience fairness (Rabin 1993). 
The preferences which guide people to act this way – caring about the costs incurred on 
or benefits enjoyed by others – may be denoted as other-regarding preferences (Stout 
2001). 
Laboratory experiments have already proved the existence of non-selfish behaviour, 
and showing that pure self-interest is usually not observed in non-anonymous 
interactions. Cooperation was observed most strikingly in public good game 
experiments (Dawes and Thaler 1988; Bowles and Gintis 2003; Fehr and Gächter 
2000a; Fehr and Schmidt 1999) – even though defection pay always better. People are 
willing to punish free riders or unfair behaviour even when punishment is costly and 
may not provide a direct payoff (Fehr and Gächter 2000b, 2000a; Bolton and Zwick 
1995; Bowles and Gintis 2003; Boyd et al. 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2002). The same 
was observed for rewarding behaviour (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). People even think 
that others would behave this ‘irrationally’, people trust each other as shown in the 
experiments with trust games (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Ho and Weigelt 
2002)). 
A research direction of social psychology categorizes people based on their 
behaviour into ‘social value orientations’ (first to publish the theory were Messick and 
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McClintock 1968), an intrinsic motivation existing in individuals. The social value 
orientation theory states that people have an orientation based on their attitude towards 
the payoffs of themselves and others. Different orientations correspond to different 
‘ratios’ of these payoffs.  
Despite being a sound theory with robust results, social value orientation lacks the 
ability to fully take into consideration the behaviour of other participants of an 
interaction and to explain equilibrium formation in sequential games1.  
In other words social value orientation is a rather ‘self-centred’ theory to explain 
individuals’ behaviour in personal exchanges. It assumes that one’s orientations are 
constant towards everybody and that the given orientation determines behaviour 
regardless of the identity, behaviour or any other property of the others participating in 
the interaction. Some of the aforementioned non-selfish behaviour – punishing, 
rewarding and trust building – are quite difficult to describe accurately using social 
value orientations, as there are other factors influencing choices in some situations – as 
pointed out by Doi (1994). 
From the perspectives of behavioural economics2 the explanation of choices in 
personal exchange also includes the influence of others’ behaviour. To investigate the 
importance of these effects, the experimental games used in behavioural economics 
usually involve situations where the players have to react, or anticipate other players’ 
behaviour. However the approach of behavioural economics neglects that people 
differentiate in their behaviour between people – in fact one of its most important rules 
is the anonymity in most of the experiments.    
The tools commonly used in laboratory experiments researching dyadic interactions 
were taken from game theory3. The simplest tools of behavioural economics are the 
ultimatum and dictator games (Güth and Tietz 1990; Güth, Schmittberger, and 
Schwarze 1982). On one hand, the ultimatum game models a one-turn bargain of two 
players with one player offering a split of a pool of goods, which may be accepted 
                                                     
1
 Although we have to note that Van Lange found that behaviour of people with ‘pro-social’ orientation 
tend to set their cooperation level according to the partner’s willingness to cooperate while people having 
other orientations acted with much less regard to the partner.  
2
 Behavioural economics is usually referred to a the current stream economics, which incorporates the 
finding of psychology to increase the explanatory and predictive power of economics (Camerer and 
Loewenstein 2003). 
3
 In the following I’ll refer to a participant of an interaction as “player’. 
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(payoffs according to the offer are given) or rejected (zero payoff to both parties) by the 
other player. On the other hand, the dictator game models simple sharing in which a 
proposer can voluntarily share a given pool of goods with another player. 
 Based on numerous experimental sessions (Forsythe et al. 1994) various theories 
were born regarding the evolution, occurrence and importance of non self-interested 
behaviour. Some researchers also suggest that besides the norms transferred in the 
society the ‘instinct’ for non self-interested behaviour is also genetically inherited (this 
approach was proposed by biologists and geneticists) (Wilson 1975). Experimental 
evidence shows that the assumption that this kind of behaviour emerges solely because 
of long term self-interest has been falsified. 
Non self-interested behaviour was found to be emerging especially in case of the 
interactions of genetically related people. The theory of kinship based altruism says that 
the level of altruism is proportional to the level of genetic similarity – kinship (Hamilton 
1964a, 1964b). People are generally more altruistic with their kin than with 
acquaintances and particularly with strangers. As it will be shown, this difference is 
striking particularly in sharing situations. This theory was examined using experimental 
methods as well (Madsen et al. 2007).    
Sociologists recognized that our behaviour is not only different towards family 
members, but we also tailor our behaviour towards friends, colleagues, and 
acquaintances. Human behaviour is embedded in the social structure. In numerous 
situations a certain social relation exists between the individuals in an interaction. They 
may only see each other, they can meet on a regular basis interacting during work, or 
they may be close friends. Neither of these theories, nor the experiments deals with the 
effects of being embedded in the same social network with the person we’re interacting 
with (Granovetter 1985), thus in some sense they lack the sociological insight into these 
processes.  
Some studies were done in different fields taking into account the effect of kinship 
and friendship on behaviour in trust games  (Vollan 2008), and in public good games 
(Peters et al. 2004; Haan et al. 2006). Existing relationships facilitate cooperation, trust 
and fairness, but also increases expectations – punishing gets more frequent in 
friendships, but not when family ties exist. Also other studies were conducted using 
with dictator games to show that people give different amounts to kin than to others 
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(Ben-Ner and Kramer 2010). They found strong altruism when people were playing 
with their kin; not simply higher tendencies for equal sharing but more players gave 
everything to their kin, than players keeping the total pool of goods. However these 
experiments did not go beyond this observation – which has been already found in other 
research – to examine the level of reciprocity exhibited versus strangers and versus kin 
(of course since altruism is higher in case of interactions with kin, punishment would be 
harder to observe). 
The goal of the studies mentioned here was to prove the existence and importance of 
these factors, by showing that people behave differently when interacting kin, friends 
and strangers. They succeeded in this, but did not go further, did not attempt to describe 
this behaviour from the modelling perspective.  
The aim and structure of this thesis 
The motivation of this research was that previous research conducted dealing with 
fairness neglected the embeddedness of the situations where fair/unfair behaviour may 
occur. Embeddedness is a crucial notion in sociology as it emphasizes the importance of 
being in a network in the scope of institutions and behaviour (Granovetter 1985). 
Interactions in social networks are capable of explaining macro phenomena through 
micro processes (Takács 2001; Buskens and Raub 2002) – in other words agents 
embedded in social networks and atomistic agents behave differently. The fact that the 
social networks change the behaviour of agents gives embeddedness a very important 
role in sociology.       
The purpose of my work is to research the effects of embeddedness on fairness. 
Being in a network is essential in social life and it is included in various norms forming 
our behaviour. It is assumed in this work that fairness norms are one of them. Much 
research was conducted examining these norms, yet the role of embeddedness was 
neglected. Experimental methods applied in earlier research were anonymous and thus it 
was unable to account for that interactions involving fair behaviour are always 
embedded in a network context. People acting fairly or unfairly do so with some 
existing tie, sometimes they are in the same network. My approach in this thesis aims to 
fill the existing gap between economical and social psychological approach. 
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The main assumption tested in this thesis is, that the degree of altruism in sharing 
situations signals the strength of the tie between two people. Thus it is assumed that the 
altruism exhibited in an interaction provides information about that relationship itself. 
Further stressing this assumption we may also conclude that different levels of altruism 
in interactions involving more than two parties can be explained by the differences in 
the relationship.  
I have formulated these assumptions into hypotheses and tested them in my research 
using experimental methods. I also discuss this question from an analytic modelling 
point of view. I give a quantitative definition of the strength of the tie by a new utility 
model based on the model of Fehr and Schmidt (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Tie strength 
definitions vary across literature mostly depending on what is being examined. Usually 
it is modelled by some quantifiable properties (interaction frequency, duration etc) 
which are limited in their meaning and apply in the scope of the specific research 
question.   
The tie strength is introduced here is a single constant in the discussed model, which 
is proportional to the split perceived as ‘fair’ in sharing4 situations. This yields that in 
sharing situations more is given to those whom we’re close related to, while towards 
others we’re much less altruistic. The same argument can be formulated in terms of 
punishing and rewarding behaviour (reciprocity) – namely this interpretation of fairness 
also implies that we’re more willing to retaliate and reward those whom we’re closely 
related to. This serves to maintain and reassure the present relationship.  
In this sense this definition of the strength of the tie addresses an internalized norm – 
fairness – in a quantifiable way and thus it is a broader definition. Of course the 
definitions given by Granovetter explain much more phenomena than the tie strength 
definition proposed here, but those ‘ties’ (strong and weak) are not quantifiable, they’re 
rather categories of ties. Using the experimental methods introduced here it’s also 
possible to quantify, ‘measure’ tie strength. The tools of behavioural economics haven’t 
been used earlier in exploring networks and embeddedness in this depth. Also besides 
introducing the model and defining tie strength the effects of fairness are investigated 
                                                     
4
 In this thesis I use the term ‘sharing situations’ for ultimatum games and dictator games. These games 
involve sharing a pool of goods on a voluntary or bargaining basis – as described before.  
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using experimental methods and different behaviour is analytically deducted from the 
proposed model as well. 
So this research approaches fairness norms and embeddedness in a new perspective 
emphasizing their interaction. Neither fairness norms, nor embeddedness was examined 
in this perspective, thus the results and methods introduced here give a sociological 
context to fairness it does not currently have. The measure of the strength of a tie 
suggested in this work opens this approach to social network analysis as well – as it 
provides a new way of describing the ties –, but this direction is not thoroughly explored 
in this thesis.    
In the first section I review fairness theories; fairness modelling and the social 
network analysis from both theoretical and experimental aspects. I discuss and analyze 
existing models of fairness and experimental results. Models describing fairness are 
analyzed focusing on their descriptive power of behavioural paradoxes and their 
experimental background. Experimental results on the other hands are analyzed mainly 
on their representations of specific behavioural patterns such as altruism, reciprocity and 
the effects of relationships of players. 
I introduce a new model of fairness in the second section. The model is a utility 
based fairness model (IFN), which explicitly includes the strength of the ties. The model 
is thoroughly analyzed in this section showing that it describes the observed behavioural 
phenomena (some of which was not described by previous models). Also the model is 
examined in terms of the hypotheses introduced in the second section. The experimental 
methods – somewhat different from earlier techniques – are discussed in detail. Since 
the methods include violation of basic rules of experimental game theory some 
explanation is given to the reasons of this unconventional approach. 
In the third section I introduce my hypotheses to be tested in this work. The first 
hypothesis assumes that the relationship (reported as friendship or kinship) between 
players has a strong and significant effect on behaviour in sharing situations.  The 
second hypothesis describes that people specifically differentiate between others based 
on their relationships (even when two people are reported to be friends). This hypothesis 
generally says that the relationship of people can be investigated based on their 
behaviour in experimental games, thus the experimental games can be used as a test and 
as a sociometric method for quantifying or comparing relationships. The third 
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hypothesis deals with norms. According to this hypothesis people have a general 
attitude towards being better or worse off than others in a given interaction. The general 
attitude is modified with the relationships between people (this explains why we get 
jealous of our rich neighbour, but feel much less envy towards an unknown rich firm 
director). Finally the fourth hypothesis describes that people are willing to retaliate even 
against friends, when a third party is being treated very unfairly. 
The fourth section deals with the experimental results. A general experimental result 
is shown in comparison to the existing data, and also some specific groups are analyzed. 
General experimental results are used to test the hypotheses, while group and individual 
level results provide a test of the IFN model’s application. Due to the sample constraints 
of this research these results may not be used to fully evaluate the hypotheses, but rather 
to investigate them further and improve them. As it will be shown most of the statistical 
tests were significant, but still the low number of cases does not allow a thorough test of 
the hypotheses. Still the results show that the experimental design may be used well in 
investigating these hypotheses. 
Finally a summary of the thesis is given in section five. The summary focuses on the 
fundamental results of this research rather than on the tests of hypotheses. It is 
concluded that based on the model proposed the strength of a tie between people can be 
objectively measured, so it enables us to research social networks in a different 
perspective.    
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1 Theories and results – fairness and social network analysis 
1.1 Fairness, reciprocity and altruism – a summary 
Early economic modelling describes humans as purely selfish actors, as homo 
economicus (Mill 1836; Persky 1995), which model was quite soon questioned 
(Drucker 1939; Marsden 1986). Numerous economists have pointed out that people 
have other-regarding preferences, which means people care for others’ well-being in 
certain situations (Smith 1761; Becker 1976; Samuelson 1993; Sen 1993, further 
references in Janky 2005; Hausman és McPherson 1993).  
Researchers conducted numerous experiments since the end of 70’s to analyze the 
behaviour unexplained by self-interest5. These experiments proved that altruism, 
reciprocity and fairness – behaviour patterns that had their more explicit definitions 
thanks to these experiments – play a significant role in behaviour of individuals (Güth et 
al. 1982; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Roth et al. 1991; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, 
and Riedl 1993; Forsythe et al. 1994; Roth 1995), but also pointed out that people 
guided entirely by self interest indeed do exist. For a summary on these experiments and 
the behavioural economics in the early 80’s see (Rabin 1993). 
The alternative preferences to self-interest – taking into account of well-being of 
others – can be summarized with the term: other-regarding preferences. These 
preferences are ‘the many ways in which we act as if we care about the costs borne and 
the benefits enjoyed by others.’ (Stout 2001).6 
Three behaviour patterns emerged as the observed alternatives for selfish behaviour. 
They are fairness, reciprocity and altruism. Before going into the in-depth analysis of 
the experimental results and tools, clarification and explanation is required regarding 
these behaviour types7. 
                                                     
5
 A summary is given on experimental results in a latter section. 
6
  pp. 3. 
7
 For a summary on fairness theories and experimental methods see (Gulyás 2007). 
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1.1.1 Fairness, reciprocity and altruism –other-regarding preferences 
Fairness 
When discussing fairness, the literature available does not really offer a strict 
definition. Fairness is usually referred to as an abstract concept used in its everyday 
meaning. Some use it to refer to an attitude, a ‘concern for fairness’; while in some 
context it is also used as a kind of behaviour, ‘fair behaviour’. I neither will attempt to 
give a strict definition to fairness, nor do I think that it is necessary to give one. 
Literature describes fairness as a combination of different behaviour patterns and thus 
explains it sufficiently from both behavioural and normative side.  
Source Definition Emphasis 
(Varian 1974) 
pp. 63. 
‘Consider the problem of dividing a fixed amount of goods among a fixed 
number of agents. If, in a given allocation, agent i prefers the bundle of 
agent j to his own, we will say i envies j. If there are no envious agents at 
allocation x, we will say x is equitable. If x is both Pareto efficient and 
equitable, we will say x is fair.’ 
Distribution 
perceived as fair 
(Binmore, 
Shaked, and 
Sutton 1985) 
pp. 1178. 
‘Subjects tend to seek a ‘fair’ outcome to bargaining problems. The thrust 
of the inquiry is then to determine what the subjects will regard as fair in a 
given situation’ 
Outcome 
perceived as fair 
(Rabin 1993) 
pp. 1281. 
‘... Yet psychological evidence indicates that most altruistic behaviour is 
more complex: people do not seek uniformly to help other people; rather, 
they do so according to how generous these other people are being. 
Indeed, the same people who are altruistic to the altruistic people are 
motivated to hurt those who hurt them. If somebody is being nice to you, 
fairness dictates that you be nice to him. If somebody is being mean to 
you, fairness allows – and vindictiveness dictates – that you be mean to 
him. ...’ 
Rewarding and 
punishing others’ 
behaviour 
(Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999) 
pp. 819 
‘…in addition to purely self interested people, there is a fraction of people 
who is also motivated by fairness considerations ... We model fairness as 
self-centred inequity aversion …’ 
Inequality 
aversion 
Table 1.1 Definitions of fairness in the literature 
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The earliest, most clear definition to fairness is given in a game theoretical context 
by Varian (Varian 1974). Such formalization can be denoted as distributional fairness 
as it deals directly with the distribution of outcomes. This thesis deals with 
distributional fairness, so in the following I’ll refer to distributional fairness, the set of 
distributional norms simply as ‘fairness’. Also Varian’s fairness definition may be 
interpreted as: an outcome is fair for a person, if it yields the same utility to him as the 
perceived utility to everybody else. Of course this incorporates the subjectiveness of 
perceiving utility.  
There are also less exact explanations for fairness with the same background 
assumptions. For example the definition of Binmore, Shaked and Sutton means that the 
maximum of a player’s utility function is determined by what is perceived as ‘fair’ in a 
given situation (Binmore et al. 1985).. In this aspect fairness is either a psychological 
barrier or it is an internalized attitude.  
A similar, but more exact definition is used by Fehr and Schmidt (Fehr and Schmidt 
1999). In their work – discussed later in details – the authors stress that fairness means 
pursuing equality, or avoiding inequality. They usually omit the use of the term 
‘fairness’, but use the term ‘inequality aversion’ instead, since this term corresponds 
better to the behaviour formulated in their model. This convergence on equality is a 
robust assumption as it explicitly defines the internalized norms and also does not limit 
behavioural patterns, but defines their goal.  
Rabin defines fairness as a set of behavioural patterns which describe the reactions to 
others’ behaviours – in this sense this description is less self-centred. This clearly 
indicates that fairness is hard to describe as a certain behaviour type or certain norm set. 
In the first sentence Rabin refers to the followings to as ‘altruistic behaviour’, which is 
in turn not only about altruism, but also about reciprocity. The fact that in such an 
important paper – nowadays mentioned as a milestone in fairness research – these 
notions are discussed so unclearly indicates that the notion of fairness requires further 
examination both on its normative meaning and its meaning as a collection of 
behavioural patterns. 
On the normative side fairness is a certain set of behavioural patterns which 
describes adequate reactions to one’s actions and describes sharing certain goods in an 
acceptable way. These two cases are quite different and that’s why giving one exact 
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definition to fairness is problematic. Fair behaviour regarding sharing is different in 
many cases, depending on the context, the participants of an interaction, or the cultural 
background8. 
The behaviour types associated with fairness are different types of reciprocity and 
altruism. These require additional explanation and literature gives numerous examples 
on both. The meaning of these behaviour patterns is independent of cultural background 
and context.  
Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is an ‘adequate reaction’ to others’ behaviour, or in more common terms: 
‘tit-for-tat’. Reciprocal behaviour means ‘be nice to those being nice to you and be 
mean to those who were being mean to you’.  
This includes two behavioural patterns as reactions: punishing and rewarding. Being 
nice to someone after being treated well is practically a ‘reward’ for that nice behaviour, 
while hurting somebody after being treated badly is a ‘punishment’ for that bad 
behaviour. Despite being quite clear and distinct, these are not the only criterions to 
classify reciprocity on its nature (rewarding/punishing). 
One possible way is discussed by (Fehr and Gächter 2000b). They classify 
reciprocity as positive/negative reciprocity based on being good or bad with the other, 
or in other words as rewarding and punishing. Another way to classify reciprocity is its 
occurrence. Gintis classifies reciprocity as strong and weak reciprocity (Gintis 2000). 
Strong reciprocity may be observed in experiments even if it’s costly, while weak 
reciprocity is not observed in this case. Usually both punishing and rewarding is costly 
for the individual. If the cost of either punishing or rewarding is not high, then this 
behaviour becomes more and more frequent (Leventhal and Anderson 1970; Janky 
2005). In the behavioural sense strong/weak classifications are more consequential and 
thus more widespread than the simple positive/negative classification.  
Reciprocity may be classified also by how it is exhibited. In this sense we may speak 
of two types of reciprocity: direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity. 
                                                     
8
 In a latter section I’ll review experiments which exactly show the effect of cultural background and 
everyday habits on fair behaviour (Henrich, Boyd, and Fehr 2004). 
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Direct reciprocity Indirect reciprocity 
 
 
Table 1.2 Types of reciprocity 
Direct reciprocity means that the individuals participating in a dyadic interaction 
punish or reward each other. This is the simplest form of reciprocity as here the player 
punishing/rewarding the other player does so after interacting with the other player. 
This type is easily fits into both positive/negative and strong/weak reciprocity 
classification.  
Indirect reciprocity means that if multiple actors are interacting with each other an 
actor punishes or rewards another actor with whom he did not interact. The simplest 
example for such reciprocity is the Kula ring (Malinowski 1920) which indirect 
reciprocity works as a trading system. In the Kula ring the participants of trade are 
trading in a closed ‘chain’. There trading is not an exchange between two parties, but a 
party giving goods to another, but receiving goods from a third party. Indirect 
reciprocity assures trade in this case. 
Another approach was given by Trivers, who formulated the so called ‘general 
altruism’, where the return is directed to a third party (Trivers 1971), which was then 
extended and denoted as indirect reciprocity by Alexander (Alexander 1979, 1987). In a 
broader sense indirect reciprocity means that cooperation is channelled to the 
cooperative members who are expected to pass on this cooperation to other members in 
the society. Those who are not likely to cooperate with others would not experience 
cooperation themselves.  
The first analytical model of indirect reciprocity was given by Nowak and Sigmund, 
who introduced ‘image scoring’ (Nowak and Sigmund 1998). People decide on 
cooperating based on the image score of others (basically determined by perceived 
behaviour). The introduction of the image scoring was followed by numerous 
theoretical and experimental studies (Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Leimar and 
Hammerstein 2001; Milinski et al. 2001; Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002; Berger 2011) – their 
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further review is not in the scope of this thesis. Considering the models above, 
reputation can be interpreted as a result of indirect reciprocity, which also serves as a 
tool to facilitate cooperation.  
As shown here, reciprocity is important in numerous aspects. Negative/strong 
reciprocity assures that norms are upheld (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004), facilitates 
contract fulfilling and thus increases trade gains (Fehr, Simon Gächter, and Kirchsteiger 
1997), so it is important as a control mechanism. Positive/weak reciprocity facilitates 
trust (Berg et al. 1995) and cooperation.  Reciprocity is found to be vital in many social 
interactions and it is important even in social policy issues (Bowles and Gintis 1998; 
Fehr and Gächter 2000b). However reciprocity emerges only when there is a previous 
action to react to: a self-interested or an altruistic one.  
Altruism  
Altruism was first used by Comte as a totality of all other-regarding sentiments 
(Comte 1854). There are different definitions to altruism in different scientific 
disciplines. For example Axelrod formulated a definition in biology: ‘sacrifice of fitness 
by one individual for the benefit of another’ (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981); Becker gave 
a definition in economics: ‘an altruist is willing to reduce his own consumption to 
increase the consumption of others’ (Becker 1976). Altruism can be defined as true (or 
pure) altruism9, or reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971). Pure altruism means giving 
without regard to any benefit (unconditional giving, it is related to the emotion of 
empathy), while the reciprocal altruism in an interactionist approach emphasizes the 
importance of experienced or future benefit. 
But also altruism can be described from a purely interactionalist perspective. Three 
types can be distinguished in this approach: egoistic, egocentric, and altercentic altruism 
(Khalil 2004). 
Egoistic altruism means that the altruist expects future benefits as a result of the 
altruistic act – so despite its name, egoistic altruism is more reciprocity than altruism. In 
this sense this behaviour is related to the ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy (Axelrod and Hamilton 
                                                     
9
 Batson gives a deep insight into this type of altruism although he did not denote it ‘pure’ altruism 
(Batson and Shaw 1991)  
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1981), so altruism is related to social exchange (Blau 1986; Homans 1958) as well. This 
approach is similar to ‘reciprocal altruism’ in biology as well (Trivers 1971). 
The egocentric approach was introduced by Becker in an economics perspective; it 
means that the consumption of others is explicitly included in the altruist’s utility 
functions (Becker 1976).  Khalil argues that this approach is rather problematic, because 
it does not give an explanation to not free-riding; altruists share resources even when 
they can’t enjoy the pleasure of giving and that it altruists are masochists as well (Khalil 
2004).  
The altercentric approach is different from both egocentric and egoistic approach as 
it assumes that people are ‘built’ with a pro-social gene. According to the altercentric 
approach altruistic behaviour is totally intrinsic, so there’s no differentiation between 
actors. This is a drawback of the altercentric approach.  For further arguments on the 
interactionist approaches to altruism see Khalil (2004). 
The analysis of Khalil is restricted mostly to the interactionalist approach. A more 
brief, but certainly more complete summary on altruism theories was given by Szakadát 
(Szakadát 2009). 
Despite that altruism is a norm, it may be handled as a preference in economics, 
directly influencing utility (Frank 2009). In this sense fairness (distributional) has the 
effect of making indifference curve ‘move’ to produce maximal utility at non-selfish 
outcomes.  
Under some circumstances punishing or rewarding behaviour may be explained by 
altruism instead of future benefits. Such was the case modelled by Fehr and Gächter by 
regrouping players in experiments (Fehr and Gächter 2000a). The same condition holds 
if the situation involves a group and only one person bears the costs of punishing norm 
violating behaviour for the good of the other group members. Such behaviour is denoted 
as altruistic punishment. Altruistic rewarding is similar in this aspect as it describes 
behaviour when people give costly rewards without direct future benefit. These 
behaviour patterns may be interpreted as reciprocity, but since this behaviour is not a 
reaction to an observed behaviour, not an experienced one and the effect of 
punishment/rewarding does not apply to the punisher/rewarder these behaviour patterns 
are more akin to altruism. These two altruistic behaviour patterns were investigated in 
public good games (Fehr and Gächter 2000b, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). After 
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the brief introduction of experimental games these two behaviour patterns and the 
experimental results will be further analyzed in this section.  
As shown here ‘fair behaviour’ is characterized by both altruism and 
positive/negative reciprocity. Fairness is discussed in the terms of distributional fairness 
in the following, so deeper analysis of altruism and reciprocity is not in the scope of this 
thesis. Kinship on the other hand has substantial effect on altruistic and reciprocal 
behaviour and is very important in this research, so it is reviewed later in this section. 
Testing fairness –simple games and rules 
The test of fairness, altruism and reciprocity was done mostly in real experiments by 
using experimental games10. To understand these tests and the results regarding these 
behavioural patterns a short description of these experimental games is required. There 
are basically four types of games which are used in fairness research: dictator game, 
ultimatum game, public good game, trust game. This research focuses on ultimatum 
games and dictator games, but the other two experimental games are also very important 
in explaining certain behavioural patterns. 
The games reviewed here point out irrationality in human behaviour. In these games 
the players may maximize their certain payoff and thus treating others badly, or may 
choose to treat others nicely, but that does not guarantee high payoff. So in game 
theoretical terms the solution of these games is unfair (or bad) behaviour, placing 
individual interest above all. Yet the experimental evidence reviewed later will show 
that people do not act so. 
The term ‘experimental game’ refers to abstract games defined by the researcher and 
undertaken with human subjects11. The subjects are denoted as ‘players’ in game 
theoretical terms (and will be referred to as players in this thesis). The rules of the 
games are given to players in various forms starting from a simple explanation to an 
abstract table of values. The choices in the games are made by players, and as a result 
each player gets a certain monetary payoff – putting it short, the games are with real 
                                                     
10
 There are of course exceptions, where surveys were used not real experiments, for example see (Fehr et 
al. 2003; Güth, Schmidt, and Sutter 2007). 
11
 The game is usually planned using the tools of game theory. Many kind of situations can be modelled 
by abstract games; rules defined by the experimenter. 
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stakes. Thus the actions of the players clearly determine their ‘payoff’ in a given game 
and in the experiment. During the game the players are usually kept anonymous to 
counter some biases. This is very important as the revealed identities introduce other 
norms into the games which distort the results. Even revealing the names of strangers in 
such games has an important effect (Charness and Gneezy 2008). 
Experimental games may be single-shot or repeated games. The former are used to 
investigate one-shot interactions, while the latter is used to examine repeated 
interactions. In case of repeated interactions also learning and trend effects may come 
into play so the application of single-shot/repeated games may influence the 
experimental results dramatically depending on the game being played. 
In terms of fairness repetition of games with the same players is crucial, because it 
can act as an enforcement of fair behaviour through reciprocity. If somebody is treated 
unfairly, repetition allows that player to punish the other, or the other way, if somebody 
is treated nicely, he’s given the possibility to give it back. Note that direct reciprocity 
occurs only if the game is repeated with the same players. If the players change, then 
repetition only means that players learn what other behavioural patterns may exist 
besides their own. For example if there’s a group of unfair players, then a newcomer to 
the group would learn that behaviour from the others if the game is repeated.  
Four experimental games will shortly be introduced in this section: the ultimatum 
game (UG), the dictator game (DG), the public good game (PG) and the trust game 
(TG). All of these games may be played in a single-shot or in a repeated version; 
anonymity is kept in case of the UG, DG and TG, while the PG is partially an exception. 
The players may be aware of each others’ identity (may be in the same room), but their 
actual decisions are kept hidden. So we can’t say that the game is perfectly open, or that 
it is anonymous. 
In this research only the ultimatum and dictator games were used as a tool of 
research, but to be able to shortly review the results on altruism and reciprocity – the 
two behavioural patterns contributing to fairness – the public good and trust games are 
important.  
 
The simplest of these games are the dictator game (DG) and the ultimatum game 
(UG). The basic types of these games are two person sequential games. In both games 
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the players are in the rule of the ‘proposer’ or the ‘responder’, which also describes the 
game turn sequence. In both of the games there’s a certain amount of good (determined 
by the experimenter) to be shared among the players.  
The ultimatum game (UG) 
The Ultimatum Game - first proposed by (Güth et al. 1982) – can also be interpreted 
as a one turn bargaining. The first step in the game is a proposal given by the Proposer. 
The offer consists of specifying the amount of goods kept and given to the Responder. 
The pool of goods is common knowledge to both the Proposer and the Responder. 
Following the Proposer’s offer, it is told to the Responder. Then the Responder is 
given the choices of accepting or rejecting the offer. If it is accepted, then the goods are 
split accordingly, both players get the payoff. If the Responder refuses the offer, then 
neither of them gets anything. 
 
Figure 1.1.: Ultimatum game (UG)  
So while the proposer is being asked for a split, the responder only has to make a 
choice. If the offer is thought to be unfair by the responder, then it will be rejected. In 
other words rejection is a costly punishment for the proposer being unkind. The cost of 
punishment is the split for the responder, while the amount of punishment is the split for 
the proposer. If the punishment is too costly for the responder, then he/she will accept 
the offer. 
An alternative to this type of UG where players may give any offer is the discrete 
UG used by Falk et al., where players are given a fixed number of choices from certain 
splits (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2003). The results of such UGs are easier to interpret 
– also other norms may be triggered if the available choices are limited.  
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The dictator game (DG) 
The Dictator game – first proposed by (Hoffman et al. 1994) – in turn is much 
simpler; it can be interpreted as voluntary sharing. In this game the Proposer’s task is to 
decide how to split a pool of goods among them. The responder does not have any 
means to reject the offer – in other words no means to retaliate. In this game the real 
‘choice’ for the Proposer is to give anything to the responder at all. If the Proposer 
decides to share the goods with the responder, then – if the responder is a PS – the 
Proposer’s allocation is guided by the internalized fairness norms. 
 
Figure 1.2.: Dictator Game (DG) 
These two games capture the emergence of fairness versus self-interest. If we return 
to the self-interest hypothesis we can draw interesting conclusions. In the UG a 
perfectly selfish Proposer would seek to offer the smallest offer accepted by the 
Responder. If a purely self-interested Responder is assumed, then he’ll accept every 
offer bigger than zero, because – simply put – getting something is better than getting 
nothing. If the Proposer is aware of the Responder’s line of thought, his offer would be 
the smallest offer possible, which should be accepted by the Responder.  
The DG is even simpler, because the Proposer does not have to take anybody else’s 
action into account when calculating the split. He’ll just have to go for the highest 
utility, the highest payoff. This would just result in not giving anything to the 
Responder.  
The public goods game (PG) 
The Public goods game (PG) models the provision of public good, or simply put: 
cooperation. Unlike the UG and DG this game can be played by any number of players. 
In the simplest case (below) each player gets an initial endowment of y, what he may 
contribute gi to produce a public good – or pay to a common fund etc. Each player 
makes this decision independently. After the contributions have been made, the 
common fund is multiplied by a and a return of r is paid to all players regardless of the 
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contribution. The amount returned is determined by the ‘production function’, which is 
linear in the following case. 
 
Figure 1.3.: Public goods game with 4 players (PG)  
In this game the payoffs are the following providing that 
n
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=
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: 
Contributors: rgy ii +−=pi  
Non-contributors: ryi +=pi  
As it was described by Olson the dilemma of the public goods is that it pays well to 
avoid contributions (Olson 1971). In game theoretical terms defection – or non-
cooperation – yields more payoff than contribution does, so that is the dominant 
strategy. But if there are many contributors, then this difference is smaller and smaller, 
as the contribution of the others increases the return (Granovetter 1978; Oliver, 
Marwell, and Teixeira 1985; Heckathorn 1988).  
The public good game is a very simple model of public good provision and 
production of individual benefit. Deeper analysis of public goods is not in the scope of 
this thesis. It’s important to note here though, that public good provision is much more 
complex. For example the ‘production function’ of the public good also influences 
cooperation (Oliver et al. 1985), or also if information spreads in the group unrestricted 
a given ratio of co-operators may trigger cooperation of others depending on their 
‘behavioural threshold’ (Granovetter 1978). 
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There were numerous studies conducted with this type of public good game (Haan et 
al. 2006; Peters et al. 2004; Ledyard 1993; Fehr and Gächter 2000a) and different 
treatments – some of which will be analyzed later. 
The trust game (TG) 
The trust game (TG) or investment game is used to examine trust among people 
(Berg et al. 1995). In this game the truster is given an initial endowment i from what 
any amount can be transferred to the trustee (c), at whom this amount gets multiplied (a) 
and he can send back any amount (r) to the truster. 
 
Figure 1.4.: Trust (investment) game   
In this game the trust of the truster can be rewarded in by giving a non-zero r to the 
truster. This return can be interpreted as a ‘reward’ of r>c as in this case the truster gets 
r-c ‘extra’ from the trustee above the initial endowment i. The TG is used to investigate 
the extent of trust, and positive (or weak) reciprocity – rewarding (Berg et al. 1995; Barr 
2004; Buchan, Croson, and Dawes 2002; Fehr et al. 2003)12. 
Testing altruistic punishment and altruistic rewarding 
As mentioned briefly before, punishment and rewarding can be interpreted as an 
altruistic act, if it does not yield direct gain for the actor (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). 
Altruistic punishment occurs if somebody punishes another to sanction a violation of 
a norm not committed against him – thus punishment does not yield direct benefit. 
                                                     
12
 There’s also a simpler version of the trust game: the Lost Wallet game. In this game the Truster can 
send only its whole endowment to the Trustee (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000). 
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Sanctioning means costly punishing and the effect of the sanction will increase not the 
sanctioner’s well-being but someone else’s. This is also called third party punishment, 
but due to its importance in altruism, it’s usually referred to as altruistic punishment 
(Fehr and Gächter 2002; Fowler 2005; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004).  
In three player experiments by Fehr and Fischbacher – where the third party was an 
observer of the interaction of the other two, but could punish one of the players – it was 
shown that the altruistic punishment was indeed important. More than that Fehr and 
Fischbacher also investigated beliefs about punishing and found that those who have 
been dealt unfairly had higher expectations about third party punishment than those who 
haven’t been. Also they extended their studies to Prisoner’s dilemma games - taking a 
step towards analyzing cooperational norms – and found that third party punishment of 
non-cooperation is observed (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004).  
We can conclude that in the provision of public goods altruistic punishment plays an 
important role as well. In this case the punisher punishes non-cooperators on his own 
costs to prevent future detections and thus increase the public good. In sequential public 
good game experiments this has been proved – in case of punishers in the group average 
contributions to the public goods have increased (Fehr and Gächter 2000a, 2002). 
In their experiment also the learning effects were observed. In case of the 
punishment option the contribution has steadily increased from the first round, while the 
lack of punishment came with a decrease in average contributions. This also showed 
clearly how punishment serves as an enforcement of cooperation. 
Besides experimental evidence, substantial evolutional evidence was also uncovered. 
When engaging in altruistic punishment people not ‘hurt’ by the cost, but feel rewarded 
instead (de Quervain et al. 2004)! It was even shown in a recent model that a population 
of people willing to punish altruistically is evolutionary stable (Fowler 2005). 
As seen from these studies altruistic punishment is an important foundation of human 
sociality and it could not have evolved if altruism would not be able to emerge. But 
cooperation is not only enforced by altruistic punishment, it is also encouraged by 
altruistic rewarding.  
Altruistic rewarding means that somebody gives some of his goods to another as a 
reward for certain behaviour. This is often experienced in situations which involve trust 
– for example non-contractual sequential exchanges, doing favours etc. Altruistic 
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rewarding is tested by the trust game (Berg et al. 1995). Altruistic rewarding in this case 
is exhibited by the trustee who can send back any amount to the truster as a reward for 
sharing the initial endowment. Although altruistic rewarding varies between cultures 
(Buchan et al. 2002; Fehr et al. 2003), we can generally conclude that altruistic 
rewarding per se is also is a characteristic feature of people – even though more rare 
then altruistic punishment. 
1.1.2 Kinship and friendship effects on altruism and reciprocity 
As mentioned in the introduction the purpose of this research is to investigate the 
effects of social relationships (being in networks) on fairness. In previous studies the 
investigation of the effects of embeddedness focused mostly on kinship as a relationship 
type and altruism and reciprocity as behavioural patterns. 
 Altruism was discussed in evolutionary terms in earlier research since the most 
ambiguous type of relationship is kinship. This relationship is genetic, so in a sense it is 
also external. When investigating altruism in an evolutionary perspective the focus of 
the research is on the subsidence of this behavioural pattern, this strategy. The 
efficiency of a strategy is measured with the ‘fitness’ of the individual, assuming that 
the fittest survive. 
It is especially difficult to explain altruism in this aspect, since it means acting for the 
good of another being sometimes even with a direct cost of the individual. The first rule 
to give an adequate explanation for the subsistence of altruism including genetic 
relationship was ‘Hamilton’s rule’ (Hamilton 1964a, 1964b).  According to this rule, 
altruism will evolve in a population if rB>C where C is the cost to the individual; B is 
the benefit of the subject; r is the probability that they share common genes (have 
common ancestors). Hamilton’s rule specifically points out the importance of perceived 
kinship in acting altruistically by giving an evolutionary motivation to altruism – 
assuring of the survival of our genes. 
Relationship between altruistic acts and kinship has been shown in various real-life 
situations, for example cooperation between farmers (Berté 1988; Hames 1987); 
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inheritance (Smith, Kish, and Crawford 1987) and child care (Bereczkei 1998)13. These 
situations are rather complex, so side effects may not be excluded either.  
Experimental analysis of altruism has reported various phenomena. Hamilton’s rule 
was specifically tested in case of humans (Madsen et al. 2007) in three experiments. The 
experiments involved games where the individual could raise goods for others by 
paying significant costs – pain. In the games subjects exhibited more altruism towards 
their relatives than towards non-relatives. Also note that a linear trend was shown 
between altruism and genetic relations. 
Rachlin and Jones had similar results in their experiments (Rachlin and Jones 2008). 
They investigated the relationship of altruism, social distance and kinship and found 
that people favour relatives versus non-relatives and are ready to forgo more money in 
their benefit.  
The trust game – described in the previous section – provided another tool of 
examining the effects of kinship on altruism. Interesting results were provided by Peters 
et al. about public good production within a family (Peters et al. 2004). Their primary 
focus was public good production14 if the group consisted of family members only, or it 
included strangers as well. Also note that in their study Peters et al. included children as 
well (an important argument in their study). The experiments consisted of three 8 turn 
public good games. The 8 turn rounds were played within family or with strangers – 
thus two treatments were defined depending on the players in the turns: family-stranger-
family and stranger-family-stranger treatments. 
Their first general observation was that parents contribute more to the public good 
and that contributions within the family are significantly higher than when playing with 
strangers. A very important conclusion of the authors is that the general attitude of 
altruism really matters. Those more altruistic in the family treatments are more altruistic 
in stranger treatments (with the correlation of 0.55)15. In terms of the current research it 
means, that even though people tend to behave more altruistically towards family 
members, general attitudes should be considered as well.  
                                                     
13
 For more examples see (Madsen et al. 2007). 
14
 They’ve used public good games, but denoted them as ‘VCM’: voluntary contributions mechanism. 
15
 The authors noted that there may be problems with the sample – high educational families etc. 
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Haan et al. conducted a similar research with public goods game where the 
experimental groups consisted of students from the same class (with a mean age of 15). 
Thus two types of relationships were analyzed: ‘classmateship’ and ‘friendship’.   
The authors were in contact with the experimental groups, so they did not examine 
friendships with surveys – but using their experiences with the group when determining 
friendship ties. In their experiment they have made four person groups (from the total of 
102 subjects) who played a simple public good game16.   
Their results have replicated previous public good game experiments with an average 
contribution of 40-60%, and they also found significant statistical evidence that friends’ 
and classmates’ contribution is different17. It is clearly seen in Fig 1.6 that the 
contribution of friends is above the contribution of classmaters in each round. Two other 
observations were that – while other studies for example (Fehr and Gächter 2000a) 
found that there are declining trends through the game rounds and that there is a strong 
last round decrease – the trends were increasing and also there was a sharp increase in 
the last round when friends were playing. The latter argument is even stronger as 53% 
of the ‘classmates’ did not contribute anything in the last round and 73% of ‘friends’ 
contributed their entire initial endowment. Also gender effects came into play, female 
players being much more altruistic.  
So the results of Haan et al. mostly concern last round behaviour, but their results are 
important for classmates and friends as well. In their study the subjects knew each other, 
so they must have had experiences on cooperating and that may give a possible 
explanation to the rising trends. 
A recent study dealing with the dictator game (voluntary sharing situation) found 
direct evidence regarding the kinship effects in dictator offers (Ben-Ner and Kramer 
2010). They ran dictator games with a relatively big sample size (N=222). Their result 
is very important as it shows that giving in the dictator game is influenced by social 
relationships. 
 
 
                                                     
16
 They used the methodology of setting up such an experiment suggested by Holt (Holt and Laury 1997). 
17
 When analyzing individual rounds though the difference is significant only in round 5 and 8. 
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Mean giving to 
  kin collaborator neutral competitor 
Mean 4.91 3.4 2.49 1.99 
Std. Dev 3.59 3.3 2.97 2.61 
No of dec. 790 2918 7105 3760 
Table 1.3 Giving in the dictator game (Ben-Ner and Kramer 2010) 
Classification of a subsample of the players (74) was done by using a survey and one 
of the purposes of the analysis was to investigate how much is given to these players. 
As Table 1.3 shows, the kinship effect was very strong, it was more important than the 
behaviour of the other party.18  
The results briefly introduced here show that there’s a positive relationship between 
altruism and kinship. Significantly higher altruism is exhibited towards kin, than 
towards non-kin. This was experienced in all experimental settings – in sharing 
situations (DG), cooperation (PG), and in situations involving trust as well (TG).   
Reciprocity – unlike altruism – may be easily explained, especially when the 
reciprocal behaviour is punishment (Bowles and Gintis 2003). Also as one would expect 
kinship may have important effects on reciprocity as well. Kinship would increase the 
importance of the other’s (kin) well being, so it would strengthen the other-regarding 
preferences of the individual – it may also be interpreted as an obligation to care for the 
interest of the other. This would mean that we can expect higher cooperation rates 
among kin and in terms of reciprocity hurting a kin would require a strong incentive to 
punish.  
Also the option of punishment works in a different way. Kinship means a long-term 
relationship which yields repeated interactions. In this relationship cooperation is vital, 
but punishment comes also at an emotional cost and rewarding comes at an emotional 
gain. The positive emotional effects of positive reciprocity were shown in an early study 
examining the relationship and emotional state of elderly and their care-giving children 
(Dwyer, Lee, and Jankowski 1994). Subsisting punishment as reciprocity was found in 
and among street gangs where gang members were getting status to their gangs through 
reciprocating violence (Papachristos 2007). In this extreme example the murders were 
                                                     
18
 Ben-Ner and Kramer controlled for several personality variables as well, but the results found are out of 
the scope of this research.  
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to be considered as negative reciprocity on one hand versus the group, but they were 
also the tools of attaining and sustaining the social status of the gang – and in this 
manner a public good for the gang members. 
The extent of reciprocity and trust effects can be investigated by using trust games, 
or sequential UGs and DGs. In a recent paper Vollan studied trust game behaviour and 
third party punishment among family members and strangers (Vollan 2008). The trust 
game was a bit different than from the one shown in Fig 1.4. The truster could choose 
between an equal payoff structure, and giving decision to the trustee. The trustee than 
could choose between an equal payoff structure (twice the payoff than in the choice of 
the truster), and a very unequal offer (advantageous for the trustee).19 Reciprocity was 
tested by introducing third party punishment into the game. The third player got a fixed 
endowment and could spend any amount from that endowment to punish either player 
(with the cost multiplier of 5).  
Third party punishment was very important as it increased the probability of trusting 
behaviour from the truster in case of family members (from 0.64 to 0.78) and friends 
(from 0.52 to 0.75); and reciprocity from the trustee in case of family members (from 
0.37 to 0.61) and friends (from 0.46 to 0.63).  When taking into account kinship effects 
Vollan found that the lack of altruistic behaviour is punished with the same intensity for 
family members than for friends. But unfair behaviour is punished much more severely 
in friendship ties than families.  
In-group and out-group effects on third party punishment can also be observed. In a 
study featuring a gift giving game20 it was observed that when subjects were grouped 
and punishment was available to certain players, the in-group punishment was more 
frequent than the out-group punishment (Shinada, Yamagishi, and Ohmura 2004). Also 
what is even more spectacular is that the amount of punishment was higher for in-group 
                                                     
19
 Note that in a recent study Bicchieri, Xiao and Muldoon concluded, that trustworthiness is a norm, but 
trusting behaviour can’t clearly be classified as a norm (Bicchieri, Xiao, and Muldoon 2011)  
20
 Groups of four are formed from the players. Three in a group are assigned to be ‘traders’, the fourth is 
an ‘observer’. Each trader gets a certain amount of good and he or she may transfer it to another trader, 
and then is given money from the third trader. The transferred sum is doubled. In this game giving gifts to 
each other is a public good, group members getting information only about the decisions in the group. 
The observers are given the information of the decisions of all players (not only those in their own group) 
then may randomly get the opportunity to spend from its own income on punishing players from either 
group (both own and the other groups). 
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punishment, than for out-group punishment. This was explained as the punishing of 
group members being considered as second order cooperation21.   
 As seen from the studies introduced in this section, existence of social relations 
between players has a significant influence on behaviour in experimental situations. Fair 
behaviour, altruism and reciprocity are all determinants of human behaviour and also 
the effects of existing social ties cannot be neglected. So following some experimental 
evidence it is important to analyze some existing models for these behaviour patterns. 
1.1.3 Modelling behaviour with other-regarding preferences – fairness, altruism, 
reciprocity 
Besides describing the nature and evolution of fair behaviour, modelling such 
behaviour is also important. Models provide deeper insight to economic and 
interpersonal interactions; they may be used to describe and explain and to predict 
behaviour. Hence the predictive capabilities of a model may be used to explain social 
and economic phenomena.  
As written before, fairness concerns have a crucial role in various types of 
interactions, so prediction of behaviour under such conditions helps decision makers 
and gives further insight to human behaviour. Here I refer to behaviour as the 
(consistent) choice between different actions in different situations, and the reasoning 
behind the choice can be explained by a common notion in microeconomic theory: 
utility (Bentham 1789). According to utility theory the individual wishes to maximize a 
subjective measure of his/her well-being during making choices; to maximize the 
‘utility’ experienced by the given choice22 (for a summary on utility theories see 
(Fishburn 1968, 1970). 
When creating utility models for certain behaviour types, it’s vital to describe the 
background motives of people resulting in a specific behaviour. In this case it’s 
necessary to make a distinction between altruism and fairness. In simple utility models 
the individual’s utility is measured by a certain amount of profit gained by making a 
                                                     
21
 Also shown by Fehr and Gächter (Fehr and Gächter 2002). 
22
 On a comprehensive description of this approach see Coleman (Coleman 1990). His work extends 
rational choice theory (Homans 1961) in a formal way more closely related to economics. 
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choice. In models of fairness and altruism however, something else is included in the 
utility model. 
An altruist always cares for the well-being of others, so practically an altruist’s utility 
function includes the well-being – the utility – of others (Khalil 2004): 
),( jii UUU pi=         (1-1) 
Fair behaviour however incorporates norms, which give preference sets to the profit 
distribution in a certain situations. That is giving a ‘fair amount’ to the others in an 
interaction. So in fairness models the others’ well-being is not included explicitly, but 
their ‘share’ is included instead. 
),( jii UU pipi=         (1-2) 
Fairness models reviewed in this section however do not restrict themselves so these 
constraints. In certain models other personal incentives and properties are included, 
which are supposed to describe an individual’s attitude towards fairness, or equity.  
 
Modelling fairness became the prime topic of various researchers. The first analytical 
model of fairness was published by (Rabin 1993) and modelled fairness with the 
‘concern for intentions’. This model was followed by (Fehr and Schmidt 1999), where 
fair behaviour was perceived as ‘inequality aversion’. Quite similar to this model, a 
model without a strict analytical expression was formulated by Bolton and Ockenfels. In 
this model the individual’s inequality wasn’t compared to every other person in the 
group, but to the average payoffs of the player’s group ((Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).  
Another model by Charness and Rabin describes fairness by reciprocity and 
‘maximin’ preferences (Charness and Rabin 2002).23 Using these models the outcome 
of certain interactions, emergence of rewarding and punishing behaviour can be 
predicted. In this section the models by Rabin, Fehr and Schmidt, and Bolton and 
Ockenfels will be thoroughly reviewed as those are the most important models to this 
research, while the other models are only briefly introduced. 
Fairness modelled with intentions – Rabin (1993) 
                                                     
23
 That means maximizing the minimal payoffs in a certain situations – helping the one worst off. 
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The first utility theory based fairness model was introduced in (Rabin 1993). Utility 
theory dictates that the individuals make their choices to maximize their utility. To take 
account for fairness concerns, one has to include the well being of others into his/her 
own utility function. In Rabin’s model the utility function was extended with a term, 
which described the other player’s well-being weighted by the individual’s ‘concern’ 
for the other player’s well-being. In this regard the concern could mean the player’s 
social value orientation, but in Rabin’s model it means the ’intentions’ of the players – 
the ‘kindness’ functions. 
The model states, that if player i thinks that player j bears good will towards him/her, 
then being nice to player j increases utility. If player j bears ill will towards player i, 
then hurting player j. would increase player i’s utility, if player i would normally want 
to be nice to player j. The model also says if player i. has ill will towards player j, then 
player i. is indifferent of player j’s intentions. So this model is partially based on player 
i’s perception of player j’s intentions. This kind of approach is closer to psychology, 
than to economics or sociology. It has significant theoretical explanatory power, but this 
model is very hard to test in laboratory conditions. The model has the following 
analytical form: 
[ ]),(1),(~),(),,( jiiijjjijjii bafcbfbacbaU ++≡ pi    (1-3) 
The first term in this model corresponds to the payoff of player i. given the choice 
combination of ai and bj, the former by player i, the latter by player j as perceived by 
player i. In the second terms the functions denoted by f(.) are the aforementioned 
kindness function. If they are greater than 0, they reflect good will – kindness – while 
being below 0 means ill will – unkindness. The first kindness function describes player  
i’s beliefs about j’s kindness, while the second shows player i’s kindness itself.  
As per utility theory the player wishes to maximize the utility, which is influenced by 
the second term in the main model, since payoffs are given. If player i thinks that player 
j wants to be unkind then it’s rational to be unkind to player j. On the other hand, when 
player i thinks that player j will behave nicely towards him/her, then player i will 
maximize his utility by being kind to player j.  
This model is rather psychological as it is based on the perception of the other 
player’s good will. In this sense the model’s explanatory power is very good, as it 
concentrates on what lies behind acting fairly or unfairly, it does not only describe 
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observations. But since perception is hard to be measured in games, the model values 
can’t be checked by experimental tools, so its validation is problematic and its 
predictive capabilities in practical situations are quite limited. Rabin’s model is a good 
example on the game theoretical approach on fairness as he describes strategies played 
in games by the parties – also supplying a theoretical background to it in his article.  
Fairness modelled with inequality aversion – Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) 
Inequality aversion was (and currently is) accepted as one of the motives for 
reciprocity and altruism. Two other very important models emphasizing this motive are 
the models by (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).  
In the model by Fehr and Schmidt the individual’s utility is determined by the 
individual payoff and the payoff advantage or disadvantage to the other players simply 
modelled with the difference. The model has the following analytical form for dyadic 
interactions:24 
}0;max{}0;max{ jiiijiiiU pipiβpipiαpi −−−−=    (1-5) 
This model explains inequality aversion in the terms of payoff difference. As per the 
model player i’s utility decreases when the other player is better (second term) or worse 
(third term) off than player i. When participating in an n person game the player 
compares him/herself to every other player in the interaction and if there’s any 
difference between his/her payment and the others, the utility decreases. 
Inequality aversion means that only the equal split is considered to be ‘fair’ in any 
interaction. For each negative effect (being better or worse off than others) the player 
has a certain attitude, or in other words the emotions associated with being better (guilt) 
or worse (envy) off than others are important in different ways, they damage well-being 
differently. Two constants αi, and βi denote these effects in the model.25 
                                                     
24
 The model may be formulated for n person interactions as well, see (Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt 1999) 
25
 These coefficients were associated with the feelings of guilt and envy. Essentially the same coefficients 
were found in the model of (Charness and Rabin 2002), but they were concerns for the other player’s 
payoff versus the own. In the (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) model these concerns stood for the situation of the 
individual player compared to the other player. In that sense the Fehr and Schmidt model was more 
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Essentially this model suggests, that ‘utility is not damaged, when equal split is 
given’. The most important message of this model though is that equal splits do not 
necessarily mean the highest utility for the players. Simply put, the model says that 
acting unfairly in certain situations can be explained by concerns for utility. 
If the concern of guilt is not strong (the value of β in the model is lower than 0.5) 
then players will prefer completely selfish behaviour over splitting equally. Hence this 
model gives two predictions in a dictator game: fair splits or completely selfish splits – 
this being an important drawback of the model. 
As the experimental results have shown there are many other offers in the dictator 
game, so in this sense this model can’t be used to predict dictator game behaviour. 
However the authors give a valid description of ultimatum and public good game 
behaviour. Just as in the case of the model by Rabin the descriptive capabilities of this 
model are good, but its predictive capabilities are not as it relies on ‘intrinsic’ constants 
for the strength of guilt and envy, and these constants are difficult to approximate.   
  
Bolton and Ockenfels modelled fairness with concerns for the difference from the 
‘average’ (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). Also the Bolton and Ockenfels model wasn’t a 
utility model. They modelled ‘motivation’ rather than utility. Unlike the models 
mentioned before, the Bolton and Ockenfels model does not have a strict analytical 
form, but there are conditions for the form of the model. This model was used to explain 
some existing experimental results (Roth et al. 1991; Forsythe et al. 1994), but there 
were no experiments conducted to specifically test model predictions.  
The model describes a so called ‘motivation function’, in which regard this model 
can’t be classified as a utility model. The authors denote this function as a ‘special class 
expected utility functions’, which are stable on the short run. The elements of the 
motivation function are the payoff of the individual and the average payoff. 
Even though there’s no fixed analytical form of this function, the authors still give 
some constraints, for example continuity, concave shape and its maximum being near 
the equal shares – accepting the latter would result in a similar approach as the (Fehr 
                                                                                                                                                           
egocentric, while the model introduced by (Charness and Rabin 2002) was closer to the social value 
orientation theory. 
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and Schmidt 1999) model. The lack of the fixed analytical form set many boundaries of 
this model. First of all, the underlying process is not well-defined analytically – it is 
only stated that people compare their payoff to the average. So its predictions are highly 
dependent on the function used which makes this model usable only for description, but 
not for prediction. Also it is more proper to mention ‘fitting’, as the function is fitted to 
the observations.  
Since the basic notion of both of these models is inequality aversion, they can be 
compared directly. In their studies Engelmann and Strobel focused on comparing these 
two models and evaluating inequality aversion in general (Engelmann and Strobel 
2000). They found that the Fehr-Schmidt model performs significantly better in their 
simple experiment (choosing form distributions) than the model proposed by Bolton and 
Ockenfels. Their other main finding was that efficiency (highest total payoff) also plays 
a crucial role in deciding between choices which is neglected by both models. In their 
later experiments they found that besides efficiency concerns the maximin preferences 
(see later) are also important, and the effects of perceived intentions are to be 
considered as well (Engelmann and Strobel 2004). Neither of these effects is accounted 
for in neither Fehr-Schmidt nor Bolton-Ockenfels models. 
1.1.4 Modelling behaviour with orientations to others – social value orientations  
Following these robust models of fairness also other related social preferences were 
represented in modelling, these will be discussed in the next section. First the general 
models of social value orientation will be discussed and then two fairness models based 
on social value orientation – one by Charness and Rabin (2002); and one by Cox, 
Friedman and Gjerstad (2007) – will be introduced briefly. These models describe 
another types of fairness preferences: the quasi-maximin preferences. 
Social value orientation (SVO) is a model of a person; it refers to how much one 
cares for the other’s well-being. In a sense SVO describes the utility of a person just like 
fairness models do. In the simplest framework of the SVO the person is willing to 
maximize his own payoff as well as the other player’s payoff and the ‘social orientation’ 
is determined by the weight of these payoffs. So SVO is an additive model (Schulz, 
Albers, and Mueller 1994; Doi 1994; Liebrand and McClintock 1988; Liebrand 1984): 
21i bxaxm +=         (1-11) 
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This model can be described in a Cartesian coordinate system. Note though, that 
a
2+b2=1 holds for this expression to retain the explanation of the ‘orientation’ and in 
order to assign the same ‘magnitude’ to every person.   
 
Figure 1.5.: Social value orientation – based on (Liebrand 1984) pp. 219.  
Also the orientation can be described by using the angle θ to avoid the problem of 
scaling entirely. Based on the values of θ the following orientations can be formalized. 
θ interpretation mi maximizing (or minimizing) 
90° altruism yi other's payoff 
45° cooperation 
2
yx ii +
 sum of own and other's payoff 
0° individualism xi own payoff 
-45° competition  
2
yx ii −
 difference of own and other's payoff 
-90° aggression -yi (minimizing) other's payoff 
Table 1.4.: Simple orientations (Doi 1994)   
Besides these simple orientations there are other preferences not accounted for. For 
example the attitude towards the difference in payoff should be taken into account. This 
attitude was assumed in many fairness models as seen in the last section (Rabin 1993; 
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999). As behavioural patterns this can 
be interpreted as either a preference for equity or as maximin (difference minimizing) 
preference:  
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2121i xxcbxaxU −++=       (1-12) 
So table 1.2 can be extended with two more orientations which include c, namely 
with egalitarianism (a=b=0; c=-1) and maximin preferences (a=b=1; c=-1).  This 
approach defines orientation in ‘3D’ rather than two.  
Measuring these orientations may be realized by making individuals select from 
different choices, with each choice representing one given orientation (Liebrand 1984; 
Liebrand and McClintock 1988; Schulz et al. 1994). Such a choice consisted of the 
payoff for the ‘self’ and the payoff for the other player, e.g.: (150; 20). This method is 
called ‘Ring Measure’ or ‘pair comparison’, in which each subject gets a given number 
of pairs of choices. The preferred choice is to be selected for each pairs. Then the model 
can be fit to the answers of the individual. This task is quite simple when using (1-11), 
but gets rather complicated in case of (1-12). The other method applied by Schultz et al. 
is the ‘ranking’ method, where the subjects simply had to determine the preference 
order of the choices. 
In their study Schultz et al. made a two round experiment. They used 15 choices 
representing various orientations in both rounds and provided real payoff to the subject 
at the end of the experiment. The first turn consisted of a computer survey with the pair 
comparison of all possible choice pairs (105), followed by a simple ranking of the 
choices.  
In the second turn they introduced a slight interdependence of players into this setup 
by the means of having subjects influence each others’ payoff slightly. The subjects 
were facing the pair comparison experiment again, but this time their choice determined 
another subjects’ payoff and vica versa. In the model fitting they assumed the following 
orientation types: individualism (I), cooperation (C), competition (K), egalitarianism (E) 
and maximin (M)26. 
Their results have shown that the assumption of such multiplicity in social 
orientations is indeed valid. But before analyzing their results the methods are still to be 
judged. In the results the majority of the players did not make choices according to a 
strict orientation. In the ranking task roughly quarter of the subjects were producing 
results according to strict orientations, while in the pair comparison task, this number 
                                                     
26
 They also used aggression (AG) and altruism (AL), but neither of these orientations was frequent. 
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was below 10%. This only shows the imperfectness of this experiment – not necessarily 
the method.  
As it was written the subjects had to choose between pairs 105 times. This takes a 
long time, so besides being exhausting, subjects are tempted to give rash answers only 
to ‘get through’ with the experiment. If the length of this experiment would have been 
reduced, the results may have been more valid. Also note that there were many similar 
choices which degrade the overall results, which may also contribute to seemingly 
‘stochastic’ results. 
Fitting the model on experimental data produced the following distribution of 
orientations: 
Class I K E C M 
Ranking27  48.5% 22.4% 7.2% 6.5% 15.9% 
Pair comparison 45.7% 21.8% 5.6% 9.8% 16.9% 
Table 1.5.: Results – orientations (Schulz et al. 1994)   
So the ratio of individualistic orientation is huge followed by competition and 
maximin orientations. In the fairness point of view this means that mostly people do not 
care about others at all, or would not be willing to pursue equality. This contradicts the 
previous assumptions of fairness. 
On the other hand this method does not focus entirely on fairness as in some cases 
one had to select between pairs where he had very low payoff compared to the other in 
one case, and a very high one in the other. Sometimes one just cannot be fair. Also the 
authors noted that the sequence of the recording methods could have had a transfer 
effects as well, but statistical evidence does not show that.  
Following pair comparison a ranking experiment was done by ranking a number of 
choices. The results were not different for pair comparison and ranking. The authors 
concluded from the contingency table that the connection is significant and strong28. 
When comparing these results with other earlier studies, one can conclude that the 
results are similar with around half the subjects being individualistic, somewhat less 
competitive and cooperative, with even fewer egalitarian and altruistic subjects.  
                                                     
27
 Note that 0.7% of the subjects were judged as altruistic (AL) in case of ranking 
28
 Having a Cramer’s V of 0.651 with p<0.001 significance level. 
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Another approach to social orientation was presented by van Lange. In his study van 
Lange used less orientations and tested subjects with methods closer to those used in 
fairness research (Van Lange 1999). The starting point of this research was that by 
using a slightly different classification; much less orientations were assumed: pro-
social, individualistic and competitive. Pro-social orientation included the concern for 
cooperation and egalitarianism. 
Van Lange defined similar models to pro-social orientation as (1-12) and tested them 
in three studies. In the first study the subjects were tested twice (N1=1728; N2=2360; 
N12=805 – participated at both times) first using a ‘triple dominance measure of social 
values’ (TDM) then pair comparisons. In the TDM they were tested about their 
orientation (Prosocial, Individualistic and Competitive) and their behaviour in the pair 
comparison (fitting the model) was interpreted depending on that.  
Model: 
213
2211
xxw
xwxwu
−+
++=
 
Prosocials Individualists Competitives M 
Weights Time1 Time2 Time1 Time2 Time1 Time2 Time1 Time2 
Outcome for self 
(w1) 
0.66 0.59 0.78 0.84 0.8 0.67 0.7 0.68 
Outcome for other 
(w2) 
0.13 0.3 0.09 0.02 -0.09 -0.34 0.11 0.14 
Equality in 
outcomes (w3) 
0.19 0.32 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.2 
Table 1.6.: Study 1 results, model parameters (Van Lange 1999)   
Based on the statistical analysis of this data the author found, that it supports the 
proposed model of social orientations.29 
The second study was closer related to fairness research as it involved sequential 
prisoner’s dilemma games and it investigated the reciprocity of subjects with different 
orientations. In this case the sample size was smaller (N=135), and each of them went 
through the TDM to determine their orientations. As a result 49 prosocials, 38 
individualists, and 31 competitors were identified (17 unclassified). Their behaviour in 
the sequential Prisoner’s dilemmas was consistent with their orientations (prosocials 
being the most cooperative followed by individualists and the competitors).  
                                                     
29
 The author refers to this as ‘social value orientations’. 
  
47 
 
Besides this result an interaction was shown between the reciprocity and the social 
orientation of the subject. The prosocials were the most influenced by the partner’s 
cooperation in the games, while individuals and competitors were reciprocated less.   
The third study further stressed the issue of reciprocity as in this study simultaneous 
single shot games were played. Even though the authors claimed these to be Prisoner’s 
dilemmas, there were important differences. In these games people had to choose of 
splitting a pile of four chips between themselves and the other player. The chips kept 
worth 25 cents and those given to the other worth 50 cents. In this sense this game is 
more like a trust game, where trust is given ‘simultaneously’. The stakes in this game 
were direct, as the goods worth actual money.  
In this study around half of the participants (N=196) were identified as pro-social 
around third as individualistic and less than ten percent as competitive. Compared to the 
other experimental groups, there were substantially more prosocial orientations in this 
group. The authors analyzed the ‘offers’ of the players and concluded that prosocials 
were expecting reciprocal behaviour the most, and were expecting less for themselves 
than the others – individualists or competitives.  
So as a conclusion of van Lange’s study we can say that the primary orientation 
types – pro-social, individualistic and competitive – can easily be distinguished both by 
their preferences and their behaviour. Also it’s quite clear that the distinction of these 
three orientations is sufficient to describe people. From the studies of Doi it was very 
clear that pure altruism and aggression – caring only for the other’s well-being in some 
way – is very rare, so it was omitted in later studies.  
Following the research of van Lange, van Dijk et al. tested the ultimatum game – 
explained in details in the next section – from an SVO perspective (van Dijk, De 
Cremer, and Handgraaf 2004). They conducted two experiments to investigate how 
fairly people are willing to behave in ultimatum bargaining situations. Just like van 
Lange they’ve analyzed the experimental orientations within the group before the actual 
experiment. They worked with groups consisting of many prosocials – unlike Doi and 
van Lange –, somewhat less individuals and a few competitors.  
In the ultimatum games a player has to offer a split among himself and the other 
player. Then the other player may accept or refuse the offer, which determines their 
payoff. Van Dijk et al. also introduced information asymmetry into this game by not 
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letting the second player know if the offer was fair. So this situation can be exploited by 
individualists. In their first experiment they found that while proself (individualist or 
competitive) players did in fact adjust the offer, prosocials were unaffected by the other 
player’s informedness. Since van Dijk et al. could not uncover some background 
motivations (motivations behind fair offers), a second experiment was conducted.  
In the second study – after assessing the orientations – van Dijk et al. manipulated 
the information about the second player decision. It was given to first players with a 
given probability only. After the games the subjects had to fill a survey dealing with 
motivations (prosocial, individualistic or competitive). They found the same as in the 
previous experiment – proselfs were adjusting their offer to induce acceptance, to 
maximize their payoff.  
So based on their experiments van Dijk et al. concluded, that proselfs (individualists 
and competitive subjects) are ‘using’ fairness strategically to maximize their own 
payoff.  
Besides the ultimatum game another important experimental tool was the dictator 
game – simply put it’s a game of voluntary sharing goods with another player. This was 
investigated by Cornellissen et al. (Cornelissen, Dewitte, and Warlop 2007). In their 
research they’ve assumed that SVO and interpersonal fairness generally influence the 
volume players are willing to share in such a situation.  
So interpersonal closeness itself is not sufficient to explain giving, but the social 
orientation of the player also determines the amount offered in the dictator game. The 
third element of the model ‘deliberation’ meant applying strategies in the decisions. To 
counter this, an extra cognitive load was introduced – players had to remember an 8 
digit number.   
Cornelissen et al. have found that when the cognitive load was introduced, the pro-
socials were indeed more generous. But when there was no cognitive load, they gave as 
small offers as did pro-self players. Also note that the games were individual, so 
‘interpersonal relations’ had a limited meaning here – it was important as the subjects 
were of the similar group (undergraduate students).  
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Fairness models based on SVO 
The previously introduced results clearly show that SVO is a quite attractive 
approach due to its simplicity, and its robust results. The drawback of the SVO 
approach is that it assumes ‘intrinsic’ and constant orientations. The same orientations 
work regardless of with whom the interaction takes place and without any regard to the 
action of others’ in the interactions. 
Fairness addresses these two properties of behaviour so combining the simple robust 
approach of SVO models and the ability to ‘react’ of fairness models leads to interesting 
results. Two models will be shown further here based on SVO: one of the models 
describes another fairness preference – quasi maximin preference (Charness and Rabin 
2002)  – and the other incorporating emotional status – a more complex and ‘economic’ 
style model of Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad (2007) 
The maximin preference wasn’t particularly emphasized in the previously introduced 
SO models as the authors found only a few people with such preferences. However the 
maximin preferences shouldn’t be neglected. Charness and Rabin constructed their 
model to take into account a ‘quasi-maximin’ preference. Quasi maximin preference is 
defined by Charness and Rabin the following way: ‘An alternative model of 
distributional preferences, related to the ideas discussed in (Yaari and Bar-Hillel 1984)) 
and (Andreoni and Miller 2002), assumes that people don’t dislike differences in 
payoffs per se, but care more about helping low payoff people than high-payoff people. 
Combining the assumption that people are motivated to maximize the payoff to the 
minimum-payoff person with the desire to increase total payoffs yields what we shall 
call ‘quasi-maximin preferences’. Such preferences do not induce Pareto damaging 
behaviour.’ (Charness and Rabin 1999)30 In this sense the ‘inequity aversion’ is 
expressed differently versus lower and higher payoff players, so the fairness concerns 
work differently in their case as well – which is closer to reality then inequality aversion 
only.  
Charness and Rabin formulated the following model for two person games (Charness 
and Rabin 2002): 
                                                     
30pp 3.; Also note that the original citation refers to a working paper of Andreoni and Miller with the 
same title as the referred paper . 
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( ) ( ) ( ) BABAB qsr1qsrU piθ−σ−ρ−+piθ+σ+ρ≡pipi ,    (1-13) 
In this expression pi denotes the payoff, r=1 if B is better off than A (r=0 otherwise); 
s=1 if A is better off than B (s=0 otherwise); and q=-1 if A acted unfairly (q=0 
otherwise). This model differs from the previous model in the sense that it includes the 
other player’s payoff explicitly – it is more similar to social orientation models 
discussed in the next section. Different preferences can be described using different 
coefficients with this model. For example for a competitive person σ≤ρ≤0 – practically 
assigning negative weight to the other player’s payoff regardless of their relative status. 
The difference aversion (inequity aversion) can be described by σ<0<ρ<1. Simply 
taken this model is similar to the basic SVO models in the sense that it describes the 
‘weights’ of the individual’s and the others’ payoff in the utility of the individual. 
The most important feature of this model compared to the other SVO models is the 
consideration of others’ behaviour. In this sense this model is not self-centred: while 
other SVO models include constant payoff multipliers – real ‘orientations’ –, here the 
other-regarding preferences depend on the behaviour of the other player giving way to 
reciprocity as well. So this model steps out from the boundaries set by SVO theory. 
The further analysis of this model is omitted here, as the most important findings of 
the authors concern their experimental results. The authors find that positive reciprocity 
is not as frequent as it was observed before and that most of the people follow quasi 
maximin preferences, when reciprocity is not involved (Charness and Rabin 2002). 
Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad followed a different path in their model, as they started 
from a rather economic point of view in their paper (Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad 
2007). They developed their model from the simplest SVO model (u=p1+mp2), which 
included the abstract notion (m) of the emotional state. This multivariate function 
depended on the ‘reciprocity motive’ and the ‘status motive’. These two motives make 
this model dynamic and differentiative as well – reciprocity is dynamic and status 
differentiates between players.  
Their complete model was developed to describe the marginal rate of substitution 
between an individual’s and another player’s payoff.  
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In their reasoning they derive this model from a constant elasticity of substitution 
utility function, as it holds for homothetic preferences. They show that their model 
describes convex preferences with the conditions given and it also holds for negative 
emotional states (θ) as well – also in some conditions the model describes maximin-like 
preferences as well. 
The authors then introduced their method of fitting the model for DG results to 
explain altruism. The fixed pool DG data can be written in a payoff space where 
indifference curves can be drawn and the point where the DG choice touches the 
indifference curves would correspond to an individual’s utility. They used a similar 
method to describe model behaviour for reciprocal behaviour in duopoly games – not 
discussed in this thesis – and UGs as well. 
The main advantage of this model is that it operates with terms widely used in 
economics, yet it explains behaviour unaccounted for in classical economics. Their 
hypothesis about the effects of the emotional status in behaviour also introduced 
dynamism into an SVO-like approach which was proved using empirical data.  
  
Social value orientation – as introduced here – is another approach in modelling 
human behaviour from a behaviouralist perspective. The main difference between 
fairness and SVO is that according to SVO people have a general attitude towards their 
own and others’ well-being. Fairness on the other hand formulates ‘reactions’ to others’ 
behaviour and also explains such costly reciprocal actions (rewarding and punishment) 
what SVO is incapable of.  
Still the findings of SVO are interesting in the fairness aspect as well. They highlight 
the fact that people’s utility can be maximal even in case of highly unequal payoffs.  
Also recent studies have shown that despite the ‘fixed’ orientations defined, the 
orientations are indeed related to fair behaviour – pro-socials placing emphasis on 
fairness and cooperation, and pro-self type orientations (individualist, competitive) 
lacking this attitude.   
We can also have to note the similarities between the modelling aspect of fairness 
and SVO. For example we can compare the parameters in the Fehr-Schmidt model to 
the simplest SVO model. The parameters reflect a general attitude of a person, similarly 
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to social orientation; and depending on the values of the parameters one will make 
either a fair or unfair decision in some situations.  
But also one can take further steps to close the gap in SVO and fairness models. Such 
successful attempts were shown in the latter two models. Their main advantage – 
though not really emphasized in the sources – was that they have introduced fairness 
into models based on earlier SVO models and thus their general approach is not as self-
centred as the SVO models. This alone can explain a huge variance in human behaviour 
and thus the experimental results. 
1.1.5 A short summary on fairness models 
As this section showed there is a variety of fairness models currently applied. They 
differ in their approach, in the mechanisms assumed and in their purposes.  
Source How it models fairness Strength Weakness / Critique 
 Rabin (1993) Intentions, 
kindness 
Good explanatory power   Rather psychological, 
very hard to validate. 
Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000) 
Inequality 
aversion 
Flexible model structure The predictive power is 
low 
Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) 
 
Inequality 
aversion 
The model structure and 
assumptions are very clear 
Inequality aversion 
neglects many factors.  
Liebrand (1984)  SVO (not 
fairness) 
Robust and simple  Excludes reciprocity and 
differentiation 
Cornelissen (2007) SVO included 
in fairness 
Includes orientations and 
interpersonal relations 
Very narrow field of 
application (the model is 
not analytic) 
Charness and Rabin 
(2002) 
SVO and quasi 
maximin 
preference 
Combines important 
assumptions, the structure 
is clear  
Complex model, it 
includes reactions, so it’s 
hard to use it for 
prediction and is hardly 
verifiable. 
Cox, Friedman and 
Gjerstad (2007) 
SVO and 
economic 
approach, 
includes 
’emotional 
states’ 
Economic model, but 
includes the notions 
unaccounted for in 
classical economics, high 
explanatory power 
The economical 
approach narrows the 
applications and also the 
’emotional states’ 
decrease the robustness 
of the model. 
 Table 1.7.: Fairness models 
Generally these models aim to explain observed behaviour, but the prediction of 
behaviour is not always in their focus. In terms of explanation most models do a good 
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job in including many interesting aspects – models using SVO perform particularly well 
in this sense due to the richness provided by the SVO theory. 
But the experimental investigation of these models is quite narrow at some models – 
this is a main weakness of the SVO models. It is clear that the more factors are included 
in the model, the narrower the field of application gets. Models concentrating on simple 
descriptions of fairness – inequality aversion and intentions – were tested with in much 
more experimental contexts than SVO based models. The basic tools of these tests was 
the UG, and the DG (PG in some cases as well), hence in the following I’ll review the 
experimental results with these games.    
1.1.6 Experimental results in fairness research 
In the following I review experimental evidence in fairness research using 
experimental games. The experimental literature on this field is extensive, so only a 
select few studies are relevant to this research are discussed in detail here. As it will be 
shown in section 4 the games used in previous studies reviewed here are appropriate for 
investigating the relationship between fairness and friendship. So the results shown here 
serve as a baseline for the evaluation of the experimental results of this research. A 
comparison between the experimental results of the current study and earlier studies will 
also be given in section 4. 
In fairness research, experimental games are used where players interact with each 
other, and are given the choice to act fairly or unfairly. Four games were introduced 
earlier: the ultimatum game, the dictator game, the public good game, and the trust 
game. The results of the latter two were already briefly discussed, so they’ll be omitted 
in this section as they are not included in the methods used in this research. 
The ultimatum and dictator games are in the focal point of this thesis as they are 
explicit expressions of sharing, the distributional fairness of people. Acting fairly is 
mostly against the assumption of profit maximization. In the UG for example the 
Responders should accept any non-zero offers as they are better off than getting nothing 
– this conclusion can also be drawn from an economist’s point of view (Frank 2009). 
Keeping this in mind, the Proposers should always propose the smallest amount 
possible. Following the same logic, we should experience only zero offers in the DG – 
as the Proposer maximizes his own payoff this way.  
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As it will be shown in this section however, reality proves to be quite different. The 
results described in the following concern many variables – e.g. gender, stake size, 
culture. In some cases some of these variables may not be controlled, but the 
experimental context in behavioural economics has its limits. Also the studies 
introduced hereafter investigated various phenomena concerning fairness and have used 
various methods. Hence the comparison of their results is somewhat problematic as here 
we concentrate on fairness in general and not on the individual phenomena analyzed in 
the individual studies. Thus for the purposes of this thesis, the easiest way to compare 
these results is the comparison of the offers in both DGs and UGs and the rejection rates 
in the UGs. These three quantities will be in the main focus of our analysis, but other 
factors will not be neglected either. 
Experimental two person UG and DG results 
The ultimatum game was proposed first by Güth (et.al) and was denoted as 
‘ultimatum bargaining’ (Güth et al. 1982). The first experimental results were already 
robust and they falsified self-interest assumption in personal exchanges. Among the 
offers those lower than 20% of the total sum were quite rare, and were rejected. The 
modal offer was the equal split (with a pool of 4DM and 10DM), but the mean was 
~0.37. The experiment was repeated with the same subject one week later – a small 
decrease in mean offers was observed (~0.32), but in this case only two Proposers gave 
an equal split. Rejection rates have also increased among the experienced players as the 
offers decreased. 
UGs games were replicated following these studies with more subjects later to arrive 
at similar results (Kahneman et al. 1986). In their first experiment (with university 
students from the same class) they found that the majority of the offers were an equal 
split (for three groups the mean offers were 4.21$; 4.47$; 4.76$ with the pool of 10$) 
and some positive offers were rejected. The second stage of the experiment was a 
simple rewarding-punishing (costly) decision. Students generally chose to punish those 
giving unfair offers and their behaviour was consistent. This stage was similar to a DG, 
but the Proposer was to choose between different possible payoffs (sharing $10 with a 
player who played fairly before, or sharing 12$ with one who didn’t). 
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These initial studies of the UG and the DG(-like) sessions have clearly falsified the 
game theoretic predictions. It was clearly shown that the subgame perfect equilibrium 
does not occur in case of UGs in either role, nor does it always observed in case of DGs. 
So the question of the existence of behavioural difference from the self-interest 
hypothesis was answered by these studies, but the extent of this difference and other 
factors were yet unclear. As it was mentioned there were some experiments done with 
higher stakes as well, but the homogeneity of the experimental groups left ample room 
for doubts.  
Culture was one of the first possible factors examined (Roth et al. 1991). In their 
study the authors conducted repeated UGs with random pairing and random role 
assignment in Israel, Japan, Yugoslavia and the US. Besides the comparison of the 
results of multiple cultures, they also used various stakes in different UGs, and they let 
players ‘learn the game’ by letting them play multiple rounds. The latter has yielded 
interesting results.  
In each country, the low offers became less frequent. In the US (Pittsburgh) and 
Yugoslavia the modal offers were at 50% (though much more equal splits were 
observed in the US). The players in Japan and Israel on the other hand moved away 
from the equal split, the modal offer was 40%. The highest change was observed in 
Japan in the standard deviation of the offers, where even ‘overfair’ offers were 
observed. The rejection rates have also decreased due to less low offers. The differences 
were striking in Israel as well. There were a considerable amount of low offers in the 
first turn – and many rejections due to that –, but it decreased to the 10th round – along 
with the rejection rates. The total rate of rejections were 22-28% in all the countries, but 
a very interesting result was that generally ‘low offer’ countries have lower rejection 
rates. 
These results indeed indicate that culture plays an important role in making decisions 
in UGs – such effects may probably be observed in DGs as well. Each of the 
experiments described above had players play multiple games in succession of two 
stage games. It is also interesting to examine behaviour on a broader time scale.  
Such an attempt was made in another extensive study on ultimatum and dictator 
games (Forsythe et al. 1994). This study specifically focused on DGs as well and their 
purpose was to investigate the effect of fairness concerns. Their hypothesis was that 
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fairness concerns drive proposers when making their offer. They tested if the offers in 
UGs and DGs were similar. The experiments were conducted in 1988, 5 months distant 
(April and September). Besides exploring Proposer behaviour differences in UGs and 
DGs the differences between behaviour at the two experimental sessions were 
examined. The same group participated in both of the experiments. 
Each experiment was conducted with ‘pay’ and ‘no-pay’ treatments. They also 
attempted to control for the stake sizes, but since their experiments were conducted only 
with 5-10$, no conclusion can be drawn from their experiments in this range. The 
following figure shows the pooled results of Forsythe et al. including the results of two 
experimental sessions (April and September).  
 
Figure 1.6.: Offers in dictator (left) and ultimatum (right) games using the pooled data of Forsythe 
et al. (1994)31  
As the results show the difference between the pay and no-pay treatment offers is 
huge in case of the DGs, but not so relevant for UGs. In the DGs the modal offer 
jumped from 50% to 0% if real stakes were present, but in the UG only the ratio of 40% 
and 50% offers changed significantly. The rejection rates were very low in the UG, only 
7% of the total paid UG offers were rejected (3 rejections in total), they were offers of 
20% (1$) and 40% (2$).  
Time also played an important role here, especially in the DGs with pay. In these 
games it was quite surprising, that Proposers were more generous in the second session 
– quite the opposite what could be expected. It was also statistically shown that the 
experiments – except for the no-pay UG – can be pooled so that April and September 
results can be analyzed together.  
                                                     
31
 The source of this data may be found in the appendix B of Forsythe et al. pp. 365 
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The authors conclude that fairness as an exclusive motive does not explain proposals 
in the games, and that payment matters in the DGs. The authors also analyzed the no-
pay treatment results as well, but were unable to draw ambiguous conclusions. This 
further supports the rule that people have to play with real stakes.   
Roth showed that a relatively small rate of people do prefer equal distribution in DGs 
(Roth 1995). In his experiments fifth of proposers preferred the equal split in the game, 
while the rest preferred splits between 90%-70%, with a mode at the 70%-30% split. 
This also contradicts both pure self-interest and pure fairness.  
Motivations in the DGs influence behaviour. Motivation is mainly determined by the 
context and the instructions given by the experimenter. For example if the DG is 
depicted as a charity, the proposer behaviour changes dramatically (Eckel and 
Grossman 1996). With a charity treatment the average contribution increased to 30% of 
the goods as opposed to the 9.2% from the experiments of Hoffman et. al. – still the 
mode was at keeping the total pool of goods. 
Obviously, many other factors are influential in these experiments. For example, the 
perceived status difference between players also has an influence (Ball and Eckel 1998). 
Even just by assigning a ‘star’ sign to some players in the group, the UG behaviour 
changes. The authors used two treatments (low and high pay) and have shown that in 
the low pay treatment Proposers were more generous with Responders having a ‘star’. 
In high pay scenarios this effect was not observed.  
Gender effects were investigated in a DG experiment as well and it was found that 
women are less selfish than men (Eckel and Grossman 1998). In their experiments of 
splitting 10$ in a DG (N=120) ~86% of men gave 0$ or 1$, while only ~56% of the 
women did the same. Also note, that 15% of women gave 5$ while only ~3.3% of men 
did so. The statistical analysis of these results also supports that there is a gender effect. 
UG refusals were most thoroughly examined by Slonim and Roth in their study 
(Slonim and Roth 1998). They have analyzed UGs with various stakes starting from 
relatively small pies (60 Sk) to substantial amounts (1500 Sk). 
They found – see pp 582. in Slonim and Roth (1998) – that rejection thresholds tend 
to change with the stake size. In effect they found that two thirds of 0.75-0.25 offers 
were rejected in case of smaller stakes, but in case of high stakes half the rejections 
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were experienced. The difference is even more spectacular in case of very unfair splits 
(10%), where in case of 1500 Sk, 40% of the offers were accepted!  
For a thorough description on bargaining experiments see (Roth 1995) and (Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999). A brief overview of the actual experiments was given by Fehr and 
Schmidt as well, see appendix 7.1 for the corresponding table. 
Later Güth and Tietz pointed out, that in the UGs being a Proposer by chance does 
influence decisions, thus they introduced an auction for the positions before the game 
(Güth 1995). The resulting behaviour was different from the game theoretic predictions 
and they did not observe equal splits (2/3 was the most common demand). Note that in 
this case the position was ‘bought’, so economical incentives played a key role in the 
decisions.    
Note that there were other factors in the games. The amount of money to split did 
have an effect on offers and reactions and also the real stake (paid/not paid) does have 
an effect on behaviour (Dawes and Thaler 1988; Rabin 1993; Forsythe et al. 1994). It’s 
always important to examine the experimental methods when interpreting experimental 
results. 
 
The two person experiments briefly described in this section have demonstrated the 
multiplicity of the factors influencing UG and DG behaviour. Summarizing the two 
person UG and DG behaviour we can find the following factors: stake size, playing with 
real stakes, gender, repetition, game assessment.  
Stake size did influence responder behaviour much more than proposer behaviour. 
Responders were less forgiving in case of smaller stake sizes; punishment costs are 
smaller in this case. Real stakes make people less ‘altruistic’ in DGs but more ‘inequity 
averse’ in the UGs. A strong gender effect was also observed; women were generally 
more altruistic. These effects may be emerge even more emphasized if the game is 
repeated – players can gather experiences and ‘update’ their behaviour. 
Besides the simple two person games, there are more complicated situations though. 
These games can be played with three people to complicate things further and let even 
more complicated behaviour emerge. 
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Experimental results of three-person DGs, UGs, and TGs. 
When two people play the UG or the DG their motivations are quite clear in these 
two games. In case of DG we can speak about voluntary sharing on the Proposer side, 
while in case of the UG the Proposers ‘outguess’ the Responders’ behaviour to get the 
best possible payoff. However when a third person enters the game, the situation gets 
more complicated. 
In three person DGs (further denoted as DG3) not much changes when introducing a 
second responder. In this case the Proposer gets to decide if he wants to share or not, if 
he differentiates between Responders, or not. The UG can be changed more 
dramatically though by introducing a third player. In the three player UG (denoted as 
UG3) the second responder is always introduced as a ‘hostage’, or ‘passive’ player, only 
one of the responders has the opportunity to make a choice. Its role consists of only 
being there in the game without any possibility of directly influencing his payoff. There 
weren’t many experiments ran with the ‘classical’ DG3 setting32.   
In UG3 the first Responder (denoted as Responder in the following) has the choice of 
accepting the offer. The real difference between the two and three player UG lies in the 
fact that the fairness of both Proposer and Responder is tested. The second Responder 
(denoted as Passive player in the following) is another person towards whom the 
Proposer can be fair, or unfair. Also the Responder’s behaviour is different. In his role 
the ‘fairness’ of an offer is not only determined by the share he gets from the 
interaction, but also the share the Passive player gets. It also depends on if the 
Responder cares for the Passive player at all. So while in the two person game the 
fairness of the Proposer is tested, in the three person game, also the Responder’s 
fairness can be examined.  
One of the newest studies pointed out, that inequality aversion indeed was observed 
in the experiment (Johansson and Svedsäter 2009). The players were presented with 
choices of splits in the DG3. It was shown that players were willing to choose more 
                                                     
32
 The first three person games similar to dictator games – but played in a different context – were 
conducted by Engelmann and Strobel as a test of fairness models developed in the 90’s (Engelmann and 
Strobel 2004). Those games could be hardly compared to the dictator game as the player faced a different 
context, so their analysis is omitted. 
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equal payoffs in two thirds of the games – nearly 40% of the players have preferred 
equality and only nearly 15% of the players were completely selfish.  
The first UG3 experiment was conducted by Opperwal and Tougareva (1992) where 
they included a third player into the UG who got a fixed proportion (10%; 50%; 90%) 
of the offer in case of acceptance (Oppewal and Tougareva 1992). Note that in their 
experiment the ‘fairness’ towards the Passive player was not really investigated as the 
treatments were fixed -  so the Proposer did not really have the opportunity to act fairly 
or unfairly towards the Passive player.  They have found that the addition of the third 
player (also the proportion) did in fact influence the offers. But they did not find any 
difference in the rejections regardless of the proportion given to the Passive player or its 
presence. This can be explained by the fact, that there could be no acts of unfairness 
committed towards the Passive player due to the fixed share of the offer. 
Güth and Van Damme in a later UG3 experiment investigated the effects of 
information asymmetry (Güth and van Damme 1998). In their treatments the Responder 
was informed about all the proposed payoffs; only of his own payoff; or only of the 
Passive player’s payoff. Their results have shown that the Passive players were mostly 
ignored, they got very low shares, and there weren’t many rejections. The authors 
concluded that the Proposers were ‘gamesmen’. They weren’t really driven by fairness, 
but rather by trying to appear as being fair.    
One of the most relevant (concerning this thesis) UG3 experiments dealing with the 
preferences towards equity were conducted by Kagel and Wolfe based mostly on the 
setup of Güth and Van Damme (Kagel and Wolfe 2001). In their setup both Responders 
are asked to decide about the acceptance/rejection of the offer of splitting 15$ among 
three players, but only one decision is picked randomly. Thus neither of the players may 
be perceived as Passive. The Proposer had to give a satisfactory offer for both of the 
Responders. They further complicated their setup by providing a ‘consolidation’ for the 
randomly assigned Passive player upon refusal. This varied between treatments, but the 
authors found that it does not have a significant influence on acceptance. 
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Figure 1.7.:.The game setups used in the UG3 experiments described   
The rejection rates in this experiment weren’t surprising, however the ignorance of 
the ‘consolidation’ paid to the Passive player upon refusal was significant. The players 
played multiple rounds and while there was a sensitivity towards the amounts of 
consolidation (the more consolidation, the more the Proposer wished to keep) in the first 
rounds, it diminished (or even turned around) to the last rounds.  
In their results the equal splits were usually accepted, and the ‘limit’ where the 
rejection ratio went over 50% was only at a very unfair offers (11$, 2$, 2$). The median 
offer in this experiment was (7$, 4$, 4$) where they experienced a rejection ratio of 
11%. It shows that in three player settings the Responders were considering their 
positions when they made their decisions, but Kagel and Wolfe’s experiment lacked the 
possibility of ‘unfairness’ between the decision maker and the other Responder. The 
same constraint can be put to the results of Güth and van Damme, as they manipulated 
information, which created again an entirely different situation. 
The idea of ‘consolidation’ for the Passive player was employed in another way in 
the study of Schupp et.al. (Shupp, Schmitt, and Swope 2006). In their experiments they 
gave a fixed payoff to the third player upon acceptance, and 0 on rejection (the contrary 
to what Kagel and Wolfe did). This changed the punishment suffered by the Passive 
players upon refusal. Due to the fixed payoff of the Passive player its presence did not 
have significant effects; the offers were similar to what has been experienced in UG2s. 
Also the rate of rejection was low in their experiment (~10%) compared to others, but 
the sample size wasn’t very high (N=30 in each treatment). The authors also gave an 
explanation including fairness – they explained the low rejection rates in the 5$ and 10$ 
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fixed Passive player payoff treatments with fairness. Refusals in the 15$ treatment were 
explained on the other hand by what in the Fehr-Schmidt model denoted as envy.  
The three person UGs have shown, that the more complicated situations triggered 
similar reflexes from the Proposers and also ‘appearing’ fair was an important drive of 
their behaviour. Surprisingly the presence of the Passive player did not have a very 
strong influence on the rejections, only the threshold of acceptance of Responder 1 
decreased. But in some cases there Passive player was simply ignored. This was 
partially due to the experimental methods (the treatments), but it has shown their low 
influence in some cases.  
Also it’s to be noted here that the trust game was also played as a three-player variant 
(Buskens 2003).  In this study he found that the findings of two person trust games 
applies in the three person game, and the presence of a second truster only had an effect 
if information was shared among the trusters. In this case their trust was indeed 
influenced by the information available and the trustees behaviour. The role of 
embeddedness in the three person TG will be discussed later (Buskens, Raub, and van 
der Veer 2010). 
Another interesting study was ran by Sheremeta and Zhang introducing a third 
person to the TG and combining it with a three person DG (Sheremeta and Zhang 
2009). In their multi-level TG the first player was a truster for the second player (the 
transferred amount tripled); the second player then was a truster to the third player (the 
transferred amount tripled), and the third player could decide on how to share the 
money between the three of them. So the third player could act as if he were in a DG. 
Communication was not permitted during the game. Their basic findings were in line 
with earlier two player TG results, players in the role of player 1 and 2 have sent 
substantial amounts, and have gotten back much from the third player. When 
communication was introduced though, the level of trust has increased at either party. 
Reputation in the trust game was proved to be very important as well. In their recent 
studies Boero et al. found interesting results (Boero et al. 2009b, 2009a). Their general 
finding was that introducing reputation information into trust games increased 
cooperation as it ‘encapsulated’ trust. The reputation treatment in their experiment was 
realized by introducing a third party whose job was to evaluate the players, that 
evaluation being distributed in some treatments. This is quite similar to real life in the 
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sense that often interactions are evaluated by people not being in the actual interaction 
themselves. The strong effects of reputation found by Boero et al. also highlight the 
even minor changes in the game context may influence the application of norms 
(trusting and trustworthiness in their case).  
As these results show the TG differs from the UG and the DG in the three player 
setting as well. The most important conclusions of these studies were that the effect of 
information (communication/reputation) does have a significant effect in TG behaviour 
– yet these treatments were not introduced in UGs and DGs. This öeffect will be 
analyzed in a later section in details as embeddedness is to be taken into account as 
well. 
Based on these experimental studies we can conclude that the general behaviour 
patterns observed in two player interactions apply in the three-player setting as well.  
The presence and role of the third player changes the game context, but still, general 
predictions on behaviour hold. But most of these experiments were always played with 
anonymous players, so they were substantially different from real-life interaction. In 
section 4 a new game treatment will be introduced in which anonymity is violated, but 
still the fairness concerns are not overruled by simple distributional norms. Playing such 
games with two players gives information on the effect of simple interpersonal 
relationships, and having three players in such a situation gives information about what 
happens if a social interaction is embedded in a more complex network. 
1.2 Games beyond the dyad –games embedded in a network 
In the previous section mostly two player games were introduced to investigate the 
effects on fairness. Life, of course, has much more complex structures for social 
exchange processes. Every person is embedded in some kind of a network and thus 
every action and interaction shall be interpreted in the aspect of embeddedness as well.33 
The simplest version of the networks is the dyad – such dyadic situations were 
examined earlier. 
                                                     
33
 For a thorough summary of the corresponding literature on the multiplicity and importance of the 
embeddedness aspect see (Takács 2010). 
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The next step which introduces huge complexity in these situations is the 
introduction of a third person into the dyadic interactions, making them a triad. Simmel 
studies the different roles in the triads extensively in his works (Simmel 1967). 
According to Simmel the individuality of a person in the dyad is endangered by the 
addition of the third person. As the games in the previous section have shown 
introducing a third player into whichever game requires a much more complex set of 
rules and will redefine the roles, motives and viable strategies for all of them.   
Simmel defines three types of ‘third person’ of which only one may be of any 
interest to this research. Due to the methodology taken from game theory the third 
person does have only a limited set of strategies, so he will not be able to take the role 
of neither non-partisan, nor arbitrator. That leaves only one type of role, the ‘laughing 
third’, the tertius gaudens. Indeed in some of the interactions outlined there is a player 
‘laughing’ at the end, but the ‘extension’ of the games with the third person rarely 
makes that person the tertius gaudens. So while Simmel’s theory is very relevant on the 
functions the triad, the current research can’t utilize his views as in the three-person 
games introduced later, the strategies of the players are very limited compared to what 
Simmel discussed.  
A point what Simmel did not address is the quality of the ties within a triad. He 
assumed strength of ‘positions’ rather than ties, but here we have to remark that the 
choice of strategies (and even the set of strategies) depend on what ties are there in the 
triad. Does the third person favour one of the dyad, does he like/dislike them both? This 
is a very important question, which allows us to refine the findings of Simmel as well – 
but that is not in the scope of this thesis. Putting it short: the strength of the ties 
influences everything in a network. 
1.2.1 Defining and measuring the strength of tie in a network 
The relationship, or connection between the people is a rather important, yet the most 
difficultly described feature of a network. The importance of relationships is usually 
emphasized in the discussion of the connection between micro and macro processes34, 
which were only partially explained with other methods. The simplest description is the 
                                                     
34
 On the network analysis paradigm see (Tardos 1995). The basic literature on network analysis is also 
reviewed. 
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existence or non-existence of a tie, this is a dichotomous description. All the 
aforementioned measures are quite simply determined in this case. When the connection 
between the nodes is more complex, measuring its strength is necessary to describe the 
network adequately and to calculate the quantitative measures.  
The most fruitful approach to network tie strength was given by Granovetter defining 
tie strength: ‘a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the 
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which 
characterize the tie’.35 In this concept the ties were classified as strong or weak 
according to the time spent together, mutual trust and cooperative attitudes (emergence 
of reciprocity). The strength of a tie ranges from shallow acquaintance to close 
friendship or kinship.36 (Granovetter 1973, 1983) 
This classification served multiple purposes. According to (Granovetter 1973) the 
weak ties are vital in connecting dense networks of strong ties. It means that two groups 
of close friends are connected by acquaintances. These weak ties between the groups 
serve as potential source of information, new ideas, which is vital in many processes – 
labour market processes, thus mobility, fashion spreading, attaining social status, etc. 
Granovetter however notes that the bridging weak ties are the most important in this 
regard.       
A great example further emphasizing the importance of weak ties was presented by 
Lin, Ensel and Vaughn (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981). The authors drawn a sample 
from working age men and investigated how they got their current job and how they 
attained their social status. The authors assumed that job seekers used their social 
resources – accessible through network ties – to get their job. The focus of this study 
was on investigating the tie to the contact person and the status attained through getting 
the job. They found that the weaker the tie to the contact gets, the more importance the 
contact’s and the hiring firm’s tie has. Also utilizing high-status contacts depend on 
family background and also the weak ties (Lin et al. 1981). This work gave a 
subsequent proof that the classification of the ties as strong as weak is well based in 
these situations.  
                                                     
35
 The definition is found in pp 1361, Granovetter (1973). 
36
 Granovetter’s main hypothesis in this work was regarding network formation. Namely the weak ties 
can  form “bridges’ between networks of people with strong ties more likely, than strong ties.  
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The main finding of Granovetter was further investigated in other studies as well. For 
example Friedkin’s study – just preceding Granovetter’s ‘revisiting’ of the strength of 
the weak ties hypothesis – concerned information in and within companies and found 
that information spreading is influenced by both strong and weak ties, and the real 
strength of the weak ties lies in their numbers (Friedkin 1982). Another study by 
Weimann dealt with spreading through ‘conversational’ weak ties (Weimann 1983). In 
conclusion Weimann emphasized various influences of weak ties: public opinion, 
innovation spreading, etc.   
This strong/weak classification is principally functional and has considerable 
explanatory power in some situations, but its measurability and interpretation of the 
strength of a tie is somewhat problematic due to its multidimensional nature. Based on 
Granovetter’s work the strength of a tie can’t be defined clearly. One can narrow the 
multiple dimensions of tie strength, but that would result in an incomplete definition. 
For example using the frequency of interactions alone is not necessarily practical 
(Szántó and Tóth 1993). 
Granovetter’s tie classification was widely used, but there were many other 
assessments of network tie strength. In a recent study Pabjan studied micro processes in 
several prisons in Poland and classified tie strength – social relations – on normative 
and interest-based dimensions (Pabjan 2005). The study also showed the dynamic 
effects of network change on the changes in the normative system. 
A much simpler – yet fundamentally also important – approach of network ties is 
discriminating only between positive and negative relationships. This approach is used 
to research emergence of certain structures, and structural balance. The earliest formal 
theoretical use of positive/negative relationships is the balance theory by (Cartwright 
and Harary 1956) – a formalization of Heider’s theory, more thoroughly explained in 
(Heider 1958). This approach was very productive thanks to the structural balance 
theory, but it is not in the scope of this thesis. 
The use of more complex indices to assume tie strength is practical in the research of 
personal relationship and social support. Also social relations – unable to be described 
by only a simple sign – are crucial in economic actions as well (Granovetter 1985). 
There were many attempts to capture the complex nature of social relations using 
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multiple-item indices. For example (Lund 1985) uses scales for love, commitment and 
investments in close personal relationships.  
Determining network tie strength is a problematic task for network sampling, as 
people often refer to different notions, different concepts. Marsden and Campbell found 
that the best measure for tie strength was the closeness or intensity in a research of best 
friend ties (Marsden and Campbell 1984b). Also duration was more important in this 
regard than kinship and frequency was weakly associated with duration or closeness. In 
a study of searching for jobs Wegener determined some aspects of tie strength: 
intimacy, formality and leisure (Wegener 1991). Closeness, duration and frequency 
were strongly related to intimacy, what should be the most consequential property of 
social ties. 
An extensive study on tie strength and effect on social support was conducted by 
Wellman and Wortley propose six explanations for the interpersonal provision of 
support: strength, access (contact), structurality, kinship, positional resources (capital), 
and similarity/dissimilarity (Wellman and Wortley 1990). They also defined multiple 
dimensions of social support, but that is currently not in our scope. 
‘Strength’ in their research was described by three factors: social closeness, 
voluntary communication and interaction in multiple contexts. This type of ‘strength’ 
excludes various factors as it only classifies a tie ‘strong’ if it involves social closeness 
(in line with Granovetter’s strong tie) – so it may be adequate for given tie types only. 
Contact to each other was found important as well because frequent contact may 
present support in itself and that may not depend on the strength (in the sense discussed 
in the last paragraph) of the actual tie (Marsden and Campbell 1984a). Weimann and 
Wortley haven’t found association between tie strength and face-to-face contact 
frequency; telephone contacts were more associated with strength (but still very 
weakly). This can easily be explained by the difference in the cost of a face-to-face 
contact and a phone call.  
Kinsip was twofold in the importance of social support depending on the degree. 
Companionship was more important in this aspect as the authors found that 
companionship was formed rather with non-kin than kin (some subjects specifically 
expressed their dislike for making friends with relatives). The main reason for that was 
that the kin had different values and common values were found to be rather important 
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in companionship. (This may point that tie strength is influenced by values shared.) 
Similarity and dissimilarity in other variables also has an influence on social support, 
but that’s not in the scope of this thesis. 
So generally the study of Weimann and Wortley highlights that ties have many sides 
and different forms of social capital (emotional or practical support) is generated from 
their interaction. Also this shows that it’s necessary to be cautious when creating tie 
strength definitions as in some cases measured variables may be off the mark. The data 
of Weimann and Wortley shows for example that the similarity measure do classify 
subjects, but examining social support solely on this basis would lead to incorrect 
conclusions.   
As seen from this brief review plenty of approaches exist in defining tie strength. The 
explanation for this lack of consensus in the definition is due to the complex nature of 
relationships between people, and the fact that different types of research take into 
account different properties of networks. Using the term ‘strength’ is quite unfortunate 
in this regard, but in the network perspective ‘strength’ describes a feature of a tie that 
describes its importance, effect in certain processes etc. 
The strength can be an objective or a subjective measure of a tie. Some approaches 
assigned objective measures – frequency, duration etc. – while some assigned subjective 
measures – closeness, emotional intensity – to the tie, as a tie strength. The advantage of 
objective measures is that they can be explicitly determined, they can be compared, and 
their changes can be monitored. Their disadvantage is that they don’t provide 
information about many interesting features of social relations – applied norms, likes 
and dislikes, etc. Subjective measures on the other hand provide information about 
personal properties of the ties. Emotional intensity, types of occurring emotions, 
closeness etc. are also very important features in some regards – social activities, social 
capital formation etc. – while they’re marginally important in spreading of information. 
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Objective measure Subjective measure 
Existence Love 
Duration Commitment 
Kinship Closeness 
Frequency Intensity 
Reciprocity Intimacy  
 Formality 
 Leisure 
Fairness concerns, fair behaviour 
   Table 1.8.: Objective and subjective measures of network strength  
Measuring the strength of a tie also depends on if it is an objective or subjective 
measure. Objective measures are measured by the researcher explicitly, while subjective 
measures are reported by people being in the network. Objective measures are relatively 
easy to obtain and they can be compared for the nodes and ties. On the other hand 
subjective measures are sometimes hard to interpret. They’re collected using surveys, 
which have their limitations ((Marsden 1990) gives a summary on these problems) and 
thus give subjective opinion, or ‘subjective strength’. 
The purpose of this research is to give an objective measure of strength containing 
subjective components of the individual. This measure is the degree of how much 
somebody cares for someone else’s well-being. It can be explicitly measured by 
experiments and contains the norms internalized by the individual. It is an objective 
measure, since the measurement is done indirectly – because it is a result of an 
experimental game played by someone else, not a survey, or questionnaire. It is also a 
subjective measure in the sense that the motivation to behave certain ways is influenced 
by subjective factors – namely the internalized fairness norms of the individual, and the 
relationship between the players. 
We can conclude that the extent of fair behaviour is different in these aspects as it 
contains subjective judgement of a tie as well as the internalized norms. But – opposed 
to other subjective measures – the extent of fair behaviour can be measured. One of the 
aims of this thesis is constructing a framework to determine the ‘strength of a tie’ based 
on the extent of fair behaviour. 
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1.2.2 Embedded games 
The review on ties shows the multiplicity of views and effects of being in 
relationships. This makes networks especially important in the scope of this thesis, since 
emphasis is on the fact that social interactions take place embedded in a network. As 
described before the rules in experimental economics aim to decrease the effects of 
existing relations, but then do the games really trigger real behaviour? There are plenty 
other critiques of applying experimental economics (Binmore 1999; Loewenstein 
1999)37, but here I would only like to emphasize a very important object in the framing 
of the games: that real situations are usually embedded in a network. 
Embeddedness made its way to economics and the social sciences through the work 
of Károly Polányi discussing the formation of the contemporary economic system in 
England (Polányi 1944). He argued that the economic processes depend on certain 
social and institutional conditions. Processes present in nowadays economy 
(redistribution, reciprocity, exchange) have been the parts of everyday life, they were 
embedded in certain social institutions (cultural and/or religious institutions and 
sanctions; and kinship – markets in case of the exchange). Despite that Polányi stayed 
close economics in his argument, his approach has placed him closer to anthropology. 
He used historical examples to show that the market exchange was guided by the 
aforementioned processes rather than the rigid rules of modern markets. Of course 
embeddedness should not be stressed too far either.  
Granovetter formulated an extreme argument of ‘embeddedness’: ‘the behaviour and 
institutions to be analyzed are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe 
them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding’ (Granovetter 1985).38 He 
emphasized with this sentence that narrow-minded self-interest and over-reaching 
interdependence are two sides of the coin. He strongly argues to accept embeddedness 
as an influential property in economic actions, but also warns about its overestimation. 
Granovetter separates two aspects of embeddedness, relational and structural 
embeddedness. Relational embeddedness refers to the ego-network properties, while 
                                                     
37
 Binmore and Loewenstein present great summaries in their articles. They analyze experimental 
economics from multiple viewpoints, but their general approach is based on economics and behavioural 
economics..  
38
 pp. 482. 
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structural embeddedness is tied to the structural properties of the entire network. He also 
argues that the effects of network and embeddedness have to be taken into account 
when economic action, institutes and outcomes are analyzed. More than that, 
Granovetter also argues that embeddedness itself may be a key factor in either of these 
fields.39 
Another important conclusion of Granovetter is that even though assuming rational 
actions may be problematic, this assumption should not be abandoned. Embeddedness 
in fact is such a property of a person which makes determining ‘rational’ quite difficult. 
Economically irrational behaviour may be totally rational if embeddedness is also taken 
into account: ‘if we note that it aims not only at economic goals but also at sociability, 
approval, status, and power’.40  
If we think of situations which take place embedded in a permanent network, then 
the aforementioned phenomena do indeed occur. Also we have to add reputation 
formation to this list. People in the networks interact with each other much more 
frequently than with others, so in this context their reputation (fame/infamy) may be 
very important. This was proved in experiments as well. 
Clear evidence on that was presented by Buskens and Raub in trust game 
experiments (Buskens and Raub 2002). The theoretical approach of the authors gives 
two processes through which embeddedness affects trust: learning and control. The 
former is basically the use of players’ past experiences about each other in their present 
choices41. Simply put: if a trustee has been trustworthy in previous interactions, then he 
is likely to be trustworthy again42. Of course if negative information is revealed about 
the trustee then trust decreases (Coleman 1990). 
Control on the other hand refers to some facts of the future: namely that the long-
term well-being of the trustee is in the hand of the truster. Indeed it is quite clear that 
short-term interests of the trustee is abusing the trust of the truster, so if the interaction 
                                                     
39
 A review on the works of Polányi and Granovetter on embeddedness was given by Szántó (Szántó 
1994). 
40
 pp. 506. in (Granovetter 1985). 
41
 Buskens and Raub also extend learning to getting new information of the context of the game. Here that 
emphasis is omitted as I focus on the embeddedness, the role of other – related – people. 
42
 Szántó has denoted this kind of ‘trust’ in the other player’s ‘cooperational’ strategy as ‘strategy-trust’ in 
his model of buyer-seller relationships (Szántó 2008).   
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takes place repeatedly the truster may exhibit some control with the amounts given in 
the trust game. Of course this control can be interpreted as reciprocity as well. 
The presence of network adds some special features to these situations. If we assume 
that information is spread in the network, then ‘learning’ may take place even without 
actual interactions through reputation. Negative information may spread in the network 
as well, but the longer the information travels the more actors will doubt it (Buskens 
2002). So in this sense control can be exhibited through other actors in the network by 
providing them information about a trustee’s behaviour. 
Buskens and Raub ran survey (‘vignette’) experiments among car purchase managers 
and among students. They tested the effects of both control and learning in dyadic and 
network setting. Their simplest finding was that learning (past experiences) is used if 
future interactions are expected (in case of the purchase managers), thus control was 
found to be related to learning. Network effects exist in addition to control and learning. 
In their experiment the third-party information was also included in learning in case of 
students, which also played a role in exhibiting control. Note that in both experiments 
only positive information served as an input to learning, so the experiment of Buskens 
and Raub was very simple in this aspect as well. 
Despite that this experiment wasn’t a real lab experiment, but only survey, it has 
pointed out that indeed, the network effects – namely the third party information and the 
embeddedness in a network (out degree) – do indeed have substantial influence on the 
formation of trust. They also showed that the mechanisms defined being related to trust 
(learning and control) indeed are adequate to describe trust formation (Buskens and 
Raub 2002).  
In their newest experiment though, Buskens, Raub and van der Veer have put this 
theory under a test in the lab (Buskens et al. 2010). They had subjects play a repeated 
trust game with real stakes43. To include network effects the authors formed tryads of 
the subjects, having one trustee in a tryad with two trusters. Then the subjects played 
two player trust games (the trustee played one with each truster) repeated three times44, 
                                                     
43
 For the ease of understanding the game they have assigned eurocents to the points players could earn in 
the experiment. 
44
 The authors denoted dyadic repeated interactions as ‘dyadic embeddedness’. 
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so the network effects were modelled with a very simple network structure. There were 
two treatments in their experiments to test the effect of information spreading.  
 
Figure 1.8.: The three person embedded trust game used by Buskens, Raub and van der Veer 
(2010)   
In the first experimental treatment no information was shared among the trusters, this 
modelled a simple repeated interaction (also denoted as ‘partner matching’). By making 
trusters share information the network embeddedness effect may be observed. The 
authors found that the effects in dyadic games and network embeddedness are 
complementary. The no information treatment yielded less trustfulness (smaller 
amounts sent by trusters) and also less trustworthiness (smaller amounts sent back by 
the trustee). When third-party information was present, then both trustfulness and 
trustworthiness increased, but these effects were combined with endgame effects as 
well. In both treatments the last few rounds involved much less trustfulness and 
trustworthiness. 
From the point of embeddedness the network effects were substantial. The authors 
concluded that the third-party information had a very strong effect on both truster and 
trustee behaviour.  In case of the trusters it complemented the learning process (past 
experiences) and thus further increased trust, but in case of the trustees it keeps 
trustworthiness at high level (>90% of the games) excluding a strong endgame effect 
(decrease in both trustfulness and trustworthiness).  
This trust game experiment has clearly shown the importance of information 
spreading in the network even when a relationship is ‘restricted to’ information 
exchange (so no real social relationship exists). The studies shown here briefly by 
Buskens et. al. point out two important processes through which network effects are 
described: control and learning. When speaking in behavioural terms control means 
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reciprocity, but learning has no strict equivalent among the behavioural pattern 
discussed earlier in this section.  
The learning effect corresponds to the reputation of the actors. Servátka investigates 
this specific issue in a recent study (Servátka 2010)45 with pairs playing dictator games 
and information on a past decision was shared in one of the experimental treatments. 
First ordinary DGs were played among the pairs, and then in the following games the 
Proposers were given some information on the behaviour of the Responders in the role 
of the Proposer in an earlier game.  
It was assured that in the earlier game the players were not the same with their roles 
exchanged. This served to avoid the direct effect of reciprocity and to focus on the 
effects of reputation only. Of course anonymity was assured during the experiment. 
Servátka found that information on the reputation of the Responders in the DG was 
significantly influencing behaviour.46 One of the observations is quite confusing though 
– the dictator offers are higher when information is spread, irrespectively of the type 
(positive/negative) of reputation. The author concludes that identification effect was 
observed.47 So even though we can’t speak of a ‘network’ in Servátka’s experiment, it 
provides interesting evidence to support the importance of reputation. 
Embeddedness of course does not only mean that an information network is available 
to the actors. Network usually means much more than just plain ‘information source’. 
The other dimensions have been briefly mentioned – the most relevant feature of the 
networks in our context is that it assumes future social interactions and also some kind 
of tie (not necessarily economically based) exists between the actors.  
The kinship and the friendship effects were already briefly discussed in this section 
as an influential factor on DG behaviour (Ben-Ner and Kramer 2010). These effects 
have been thoroughly examined in trust games (Vollan 2011) and public good games as 
well (Haan et al. 2006). Ben-Ner and Kramer found (comparatively) high levels of 
                                                     
45
 Servátka addressed similar issues in an earlier study (Servátka 2009), but the results of the most recent 
work is briefly reviewed here. 
46
 They found a correlation of 0.35 with statistical tests showing significant difference between 
treatments. 
47
 Even less information is enough to arise identification effects.  Charness and Gneezy found that even 
revealing the family name of a player induces changes in UG/DG behaviour (Charness and Gneezy 
2008). Family name is completely irrelevant – or at least it should be – in such situations. 
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altruism in the DG when the players involved were friends or kin; Vollan’s experiments 
have shown increasing trust when family members or loosely related players played 
trust games; and Haan has made a clear distinction between being friends or simply 
belonging to the same formal group (school class). 
It is to be pointed out however that nor in these latter experiments (involving related 
players), nor in the former experiments (information networks) can we speak about a 
clear network structures, but that is not a prerequisite to call a game ‘embedded’. From 
the viewpoint of this research it is only important that the players are somehow related 
to each other. In the studies described herein no attempt was made to investigate this 
issue further – nor did the researchers have the opportunity to do so as most of the 
games (except for the public good game) were anonymous.  
But networks are complex and real-life situations are often played among players 
who are in a network. Then they have a certain tie between them, so that should 
definitely come into play when they make certain decisions. Current models on player 
behaviour do not (and cannot) take into account the strength of a tie between the 
players. One good reason for this is that the tie strength is very hard to define – as it was 
shown earlier – and that its influence depends on how it was defined.  
In the following section a novel model is introduced which gives a new meaning to 
the tie strength based on the behaviour of players. The model integrates fair behaviour 
and network embeddedness and is analyzed based on behaviour in ultimatum and 
dictator games. Thus it has multiple uses: it provides an explanation to the observed 
behaviour yet unaccounted for, and also opens up a new – measurable – way of defining 
the tie between two people.  
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2 The Integrated model of Fairness and Network ties – the 
IFN model 
Social networks and fairness theory became the object of sociological research only 
in a few decades before the millennium. As the previous section shows, numerous 
theories were born on both fields starting from pure theoretical approaches to practical 
applications. The focal point of both of these fields is the individual.  
People are handled by social network analysis as the nodes in the network between 
which relationships are defined.48 Relationships can be of various types – as mentioned 
before – starting from simple objective measures (e.g.: interaction frequency) to very 
complex subjective measures (e.g.: intimacy, closeness). Fairness theories on the other 
hand concentrate on the action and interaction of people. The presence of fairness 
concerns strongly influences interactions as the individual takes into account other 
individuals in his action. So simply put: the social network defines the social context an 
action takes place in and fairness theories describe the motive behind the action. Yet in 
the modelling approach their combined influence is not taken into account.  
When actions are influenced by fairness concerns most economic models fail to 
predict behaviour. Other behavioural models – social value orientation or fairness 
models – may take account of other-regarding preferences, but still, comparison with 
experimental results shows that certain parts of behaviour have not been uncovered yet. 
These models in general omit the effect (and presence) of embeddedness, so partially 
they do not take the social context into account.  
This deficiency highly constrains these models. Social norms – the focus of these 
models – come into play in an embedded context in most of the cases, in social 
networks. People are related to each other in many different ways and isolating 
interpersonal relations from the interactions (anonymity) deprives players from acting in 
a real context. On the one hand it is very important to be able to focus on individual 
norms and behavioural patterns – and of course the experimental evidence clearly 
indicated the existence of those norms –, but on the other hand it neglects such factors 
which are taken into account in every single interaction. We may think about either DG, 
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 Of course SNA deals with various units, nodes can be institutions, groups, firms etc. This thesis focuses 
on networks of people only.  
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UG or TG played with one of our friends, or a PG with our colleagues or family 
members.  
Friendships and family ties are not uniform; people have several ‘kind’ of friends and 
family members. Friendship and kinship – or more precisely the ‘obligations’, the 
norms related to these ties – are different for everybody depending on cultural and 
social background.  
It’s difficult to grasp the difference with experimental games, but social network 
analysis is capable to give an appropriate framework for differentiating between these 
relationships – that is the strength of the ties hypotheses (Granovetter 1973). However 
the connection between the behaviour towards a certain person and having a certain 
relationship with that person is bidirectional. So close – or in network terms ‘strong’ – 
relationship facilitates fair behaviour and also make people expect fair behaviour from 
others.  Stronger relationship means stronger emotional attachment – as it was also 
noted by Granovetter – and in such relationships the emotions related to unfairness are 
also different. Envy and guilt are usually associated with treating someone unfairly or 
being treated unfairly (Fehr and Schmidt 2000). Intuitively one can argue that stronger 
emotional attachment would lead to stronger envy and guilt so this further facilitates fair 
behaviour in stronger relationships. 
Earlier models of fairness omit this completely, although they include some internal 
concern for fairness. In this section I propose an integrated model of fairness and 
network ties (IFN) based on an earlier model.  
 
Figure 2.1.: The assumptions of the IFN model 
The basic assumption the IFN model describes is that behaviour is influenced by 
both fairness norms, and the relationship between actors. Further than that, the fairness 
norms are conditional, depending on the relationship between the actors. Putting it 
short: we perceive different behaviour as ‘fair’ depending on whom we’re interacting, 
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and sometimes we just disregard them as they are, if we don’t care for the other person 
enough. Fairness norms themselves are assumed here to be culturally determined and 
they depend on the personality (and socialization) of the person as well. (The arrow 
pointing at fairness means that.) The thorough description of these exogenous factors is 
not in the scope of this thesis. 
 
In the following part of this section I’ll give a description of the model and a 
thorough analysis for dyadic and n person situations focusing on behaviour in the 
UG/DG (and its three player variants). It will be shown that the proposed model 
explains the behaviour yet unaccounted for – in Section 4 I’ll use the model to explain 
experimental results as well.  
It is vital to mention the constraints of this model here. Earlier fairness models have 
been criticized because of the limits of their application and the predictions – they were 
tested in public good games to explain social phenomena – and the IFN model has its 
own constraints as well.  
First and foremost the IFN model describes interactions in which a certain amount of 
goods is being split. They may not necessarily be material goods, but goods which have 
a utility to the players. Second, the goods to be split are not the property of any of the 
players, and they do not form property rights. The explanation is very simple for this: a 
person may wish to share a piece of chocolate equally, but will not distribute his salary, 
or lend his car to anybody. Hoffman et. al. found in their early UG and DG experiments 
that if property rights are introduced into the game then even very unequal splits are 
totally acceptable (Hoffman et al. 1994). Since the IFN model is used to introduce 
friendship, the introduction of property rights may overrule the friendship effects by 
introducing new norms in the experiments so they are assumed to be nonexistent in the 
examined situations. 
 The third constraint is that the IFN model assumes the homogeneity of the players 
except for their fairness concerns (explained later), so relative material status of the 
players or the social status is not taken into account at all. As it will be shown in section 
4 the experimental groups consisted of subject with similar social status. 
All of these constraints are put to keep the IFN model simple enough for the 
investigation of friendship effects. In more lifelike situations these factors combine with 
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relationships to produce the complex behavioural patterns observed in real life. Such 
complex description is not in the scope of this thesis nor the IFN model at its current 
state.  
In this section I introduce the IFN model, and give an extended analysis on it (a 
shorter analysis is given in (Gulyás 2010, 2011b)). Then the model’s predictions are 
described for various games – from which the hypotheses are formulated in section 3 – 
and the boundaries of the model parameters are given.  
2.1 Model description 
In this section I introduce the Integrated model of Fairness and Network effects (I’ll 
refer to the model as IFN in the following). The proposed model is based on the model 
by Fehr and Schmidt (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) due to practical and theoretical reasons 
(I’ll refer to it as the ‘Fehr-Schmidt model’ in the following).  
The main reason for using the Fehr-Schmidt model as a starting point is that it is a 
very ‘clean’ utility model, with well defined terms; and also its explanatory power is 
robust.49 The background assumption of the Fehr-Schmidt model (inequity aversion) 
though does not permit behaviour seen in the experiments, neither is it a very good 
description of fairness per se. The maximum of an inequity averse individual’s utility 
corresponds to the equal split in each situation if his aversion is strong enough (he’s 
indifferent between keeping and giving away the good).  
Fehr and Schmidt argue that in the ultimatum game the proposals are motivated by 
‘guessing what is acceptable’ for the responder – if their concerns for avoiding being 
better off are high enough. This assumes that the proposers have an idea about the 
responders and excludes any other effects – implicitly it means that players are always 
‘gamesmen’. For such ‘guessing’ players the maximum of the Fehr-Schmidt model is 
always at the zero-offer. This explanation does not permit an intrinsic motive to non-
equal splits for inequality averse players and non-zero offers for non-inequalty-averse 
players.  
                                                     
49
 For a thorough analysis of the Fehr-Schmidt model and a comparison with other models see Engelmann 
and Strobel (Engelmann and Strobel 2000, 2004). 
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A much more important weak point of the model lies in the explanation of the 
dictator game. As mentioned before the maximum of the model is always the equal 
split, or the zero-offer, yet there are offers in between (as shown in the experiment). 
Their argument was the assumption of a non-linear inequality aversion. The assumption 
may be valid from a modelling perspective but the authors did not provide a solid 
background on the non-linearity (neither qualitatively, nor quantitatively).  
Also note that the Fehr-Schmidt model assumes that the interaction is anonymous, 
which – as it has been pointed out before – is not a valid assumption in a number of 
cases. When we assume that there is a certain relationship between the players then the 
clarity of the Fehr-Schmidt model turns into a drawback as it cannot account for 
different behaviour of the same player.    
The IFN model starts from the analytic form of the Fehr-Schmidt model: the 
assumption that people feel different regarding being better or worse off than others. So 
– retaining the terminology of Fehr and Schmidt – there is a difference between guilt 
and envy. The IFN model takes a step in the direction of including the strength of the tie 
into the utility of the individual thus giving an explanation for the different norms 
applied in different ties, and the ‘importance’ of adhering to these norms.   
There are two main assumptions of the IFN model: 
1. Conditional inequality aversion: people are inequality averse with others whom 
they are closely related to. In other terms people behave altruistically with friends 
and kin (as it was shown in earlier studies) and expect altruism from friends and 
kin. As the tie weakens the individual gets less and less inequality averse. In 
weaker ties the ‘fair’ distribution (at which the model takes its maximum) is not 
the equal split, but gets less and less.  
2. Conditional norm adherence: when a tie gets weak enough people are willing to 
deviate from the fairness norms by acting completely selfishly. 
These assumptions create a direct relationship between fair behaviour and tie 
strength. Simply put: the more important somebody to us is, the more equal we treat 
him/her. The tie strength is represented by a parameter in the IFN model. 
The structure of the IFN model for a dyadic interaction is the following: 
{ } { }jiijijiiijjijiii c0cc0cU pi−piβ−pi−piα−pi= ,max,max   (2-1) 
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In this model U
 
corresponds to the utility of player i; pi denotes the payoff of a given 
player; α is the parameter which describes envy; β describes guilt; and cij describes the 
strength of a tie between the players (from 0 to 1). 
According to the model, absolutely unfair behaviour means that the player 
maximizes his payoff regardless of the other’s – this is pure selfishness. Absolutely fair 
behaviour corresponds to inequality aversion, so a player wishes to share absolutely 
equally. However in terms of the IFN model ‘fairness’ means something else (discussed 
in detail later). 
The IFN model can be classified as a utility model. It describes the expected utility 
of a rational actor (or perceived utility depending on the stage of an interaction) taking 
into account the payoff of others and the relationship with others. Hence if a rational 
player is facing a decision of choosing a payoff, the choice will correspond to the 
maximum of the IFN model. 
In the IFN model ‘pi’
 
means the respective payoffs of players i., and j. These payoffs 
represent the decision set from which a certain player chooses the ‘optimal’ 
combination. The other parameters describe the players individually, and their 
relationships. The parameters αi, and βi describe the general attitudes (fairness) of player 
i. Practically they describe how ‘sensitive’ is a player to the fairness concerns. Fairness 
concerns trigger when someone has been treated unfairly, or others were treated unfairly 
(described in details in the next section):  
{ }iijjiji c0c pi−piα ,max  - Concern for treating someone unfairly   
{ }jiijiji c0c pi−piβ ,max  - Concern for being treated unfairly 
The parameters α and β are denoted as general attitude parameters as they describe 
the general attitudes. Parameter α describes how strongly a player’s utility is affected 
when treated unfairly – this corresponds to ‘envy’; and β describes the affection by 
treating someone unfairly – this corresponds to ‘guilt’. These parameters show 
individual preferences and in this form correspond to the parameters in the Fehr-
Schmidt model. 
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The envy and guilt parameters can be compared. The ratios of these parameters 
correspond to the feelings in reality too. It the value of  α is the twice of β , then this 
means that the player is twice as much disturbed by envy, than by guilt. 
The relationship between the players is represented by the cij parameter in the IFN 
model. This parameter has a value between 0 and 1, and is proportional with the 
‘strength’ of the tie. The strength of the ties has been discussed in many theoretical 
approaches, but hasn’t been used analytically. The proposed model does not fit into the 
classifications proposed by Granovetter (1973, 1983).  
Besides classifying the ties as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ Granovetter classified ties 
according to their ‘qualities’ (emotional, intensity) as well. He assigned such variables 
to strength, which can’t be handled in the proposed model due to the simple model 
structure. It is possible to classify all relationships by the parameters of the IFN model, 
but for example it is impossible to make a difference between a strong family tie, or an 
equally strong friendship – as both may result in the same fair behaviour – also every 
person separates these types of relationships differently50. 
The model structure clearly reflects the Fehr-Schmidt model, but by introducing the 
strength of a tie as a variable, or parameter, the notion of ‘inequality aversion’ changes 
to ‘unfairness aversion’. What a person denotes fair however depends on who’s the 
other participant of a given situation, how ‘strong’ their relationship is. The strength in 
the IFN model corresponds to the different application of different fairness norms in the 
interactions with the other players.   
According to this approach the extremes of fair behaviour are the following:  
Absolutely fair behaviour means that a player’s behaviour is guided by inequality 
aversion (or a preference for equality) – this corresponds to the principles of the Fehr-
Schmidt model, with the condition of cij=1. In case of this tie only equality is perceived 
as fair. 
Absolutely unfair behaviour means pure self-interest in an interaction. This 
corresponds to the zero-offer. This does not mean, that cij=0, it only means that it is 
low. It is shown in the following that depending on β the zero-offer is given at different 
                                                     
50
 For some people friends are more important than family. For others, quite contrary applies placing 
family above any other type of relationship. 
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cij values. So in terms of relationship: the zero-offer is never considered as a ‘fair’ offer; 
but if the tie is weak enough, we don’t simply care about violating the fairness norms, 
and we give a zero-offer. 
The cij parameter in the IFN model yields significant differences to the Fehr-Schmidt 
model, so further analysis of the model is required – using the assumptions above as 
guidelines.  
Note however that in this model the notion of ‘perfect stranger’ requires a bit 
different interpretation. A PS as a common term represents a person about whom a 
player has absolutely no information (gender, age, nationality, etc.). However a very 
important feature of a perfect stranger is that it is a human being and this fact is 
common knowledge. This results in the player having preconceptions about the 
existence of certain norms, behavioural patterns etc. in the other player, the perfect 
stranger.  
Thus in the IFN model the relationship to a PS is not described by cij=0, because in 
this case there fairness concerns are nonexistent. Assuming humans lacking any concern 
for fairness with similar creatures would be an invalid assumption.. 
In experimental setups however it’s possible to create interactions with cij=0. These 
are the situations, when players face computer opponents (Blount 1995; Sanfey et al. 
2003). In their study Sanfey et. al. conducted experiments also using scanning 
techniques (fMRI) to identify processes in humans – neuroeconomic experiments – 
during playing ultimatum games against both real opponents and computer controlled 
players. The responders rejected unfair offers from humans more frequently than from 
computer opponents. In fact the fMRI scanning revealed that the processes of the brain 
differ significantly when people get an unfair offer from a human being and from a 
computer opponent. The authors also concluded that rejecting when playing against 
computer opponents was a signal to the experimenter, not a reaction related to the 
experienced events only. In this regard the behaviour depends on the context as well.  
2.2 The analysis of the IFN model 
Since the IFN model contains multiple parameters, an extended analysis is required 
to describe model predictions and its explanatory power. Even when facing a stranger in 
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an interaction51, people do not act completely selfishly, if their fairness norms do not 
dictate so – in case if parameters α and β (their boundaries will be discussed later in this 
section) got the appropriate values. The meaning of the strength parameter is to be 
analyzed further.  
 
Figure 2.2.: The IFN model (drawn for specific tie strengths; αi=1.8, and βi=1.4) 
As Fig 2.2 shows the IFN model for various tie strengths. The maximum of the 
utility may correspond to an allocation between an equal split and a selfish split, or a 
selfish split itself. If the sensitivity to fairness is high, then the maximum is found at a 
given – maybe near the equal – split, but if it’s low, then the maximum is at the selfish 
split. In the case shown in Fig 2.2 the sensitivity towards treating somebody unfairly is 
strong until the tie strength reaches ~0.5.  
In this region the maximum of the IFN model corresponds to a payoff smaller than 
100%. In other words the player does not prefer keeping everything, but prefers giving 
something (with the actual parameters, this may be up to giving 32% at a tie strength of 
0.5). But if the tie strength is below ~0.5 then the player prefers to keep all of the goods. 
This corresponds to the norms of the society saying that friends’ well-being is just as 
important as somebody’s own, while one should not care as much for strangers.  
                                                     
51
 Still cij≠0 holds. In the experimental results people do not always behave selfishly in dictator games, 
and are always punished when doing so in ultimatum games. 
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The IFN model assumes linearity as it’s shown in Fig 2.2, as it’s easily handled 
analytically spoken. However reality often shows that non-linear utility functions may 
have higher descriptive power. Bolton and Ockenfels also suggested such a function in 
their model as mentioned before. Assuming non-linearity – and a concave utility 
function of payoffs as such – would mean a reasonable improvement to the IFN model, 
but such an improvement would yield a much more complicated analytical form, yet the 
improvement in the predictive and descriptive would not be that high.  
Using concave functions in two player situations is simple (as demonstrated by 
Bolton and Ockenfels) and it is easy to handle analytically, deducting predictions is not 
overcomplicated. In n player cases though it is quite complex as the maxima of the 
functions are much harder to find. So in this work only a linear model is considered.  
Fairness concerns in the IFN model  
The detailed explanation for the maximums of the IFN model can be given by 
examining when the fairness concerns ‘kick-in’ to decrease utility in case of a specific 
tie strength. Let’s transform the IFN model to the viewpoint of the individual, 
exchanging the payoff of the other player. 
{ } { }TotaliijijiiijTotalijiii c10cc10cU pi−pi+β−pi+−piα−pi= )(,max)(,max  (2-2) 
Due to the presence of cij guilt and envy play a very small role against a perfect 
stranger (low tie strength). The utility is maximal at a certain payoff combination. In the 
Fehr-Schmidt model this is always the completely equal split, while in the IFN model it 
also depends on the strength of the tie between the players.52  
The point where fairness concerns don’t decrease utility is found by examining when 
the negative terms in (2-1) and (2-2) equal 0. Given this condition the ratio of the 
player’s payoff compared to the total payoff is the following: 
)( ijTotal
i
c1
1
+
=
pi
pi
         (2-3) 
                                                     
52
 Note that this only holds, if β>0.5. If it is not true, then pure selfish behaviour emerges. 
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This expression defines what is perceived to be a ‘fair’ split depending on the tie 
strength. Simply put if we have a chance of sharing something with our friends (strong 
tie, close to 1), then we would be hurt if we wouldn’t share, but we pass by homeless 
beggars (very weak tie, close to 0) each day without a slightest feeling (or maybe a 
slight one) of guilt. In the former case we prefer equality, but in the latter case we prefer 
simply giving nothing.  
 
Figure 2.3.: payoff ratio preferred as ‘fair’ vs. tie strength 
Figure 2.2 shows (2-3), the payoff ratio where the fairness concerns (negative terms) 
have the value of 0. This does not correspond to the maximum of the IFN model in all 
of the cases, since if the tie strength is low, then the maximum will always correspond 
to a selfish split – as seen in Fig 2.2 when strength is below 0.5.  
Players only have abstract ideas about the strength of the tie between themselves and 
the other players. In the modelling perspective it means that individuals characterize 
their relationships with thresholds of cij rather than with one discrete value. So if a 
player approximates the tie to another player, then as a result a threshold of ‘fair splits’ 
is also determined, based on Fig 2.3. For example if a player has a tie to the other with 
strength between 0.75 and 0.85, then the optimal choice in a split is between 0.54 and 
0.57.  
In the following I’ll analyze behaviour in ultimatum and dictator games based on the 
IFN model. The analysis shows the differences between the Fehr-Schmidt model, and 
the IFN model, which further emphasizes the differences between the background and 
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basic assumptions of the classical Fehr and IFN model. Also note that I do only assume 
Proposer anonymity in the games – further explanation will be given in section 4. 
The IFN in n person interactions 
The IFN model can be formulated to describe n person interactions as well. Here an 
n person interaction means a case of splitting a given pile of good between n players. In 
these cases the terms representing fairness concerns have to be formulated for each 
other player in the interaction.  
{ } { }∑∑
≠
=
≠
=
pi−piβ−pi−piα−pi=
n
ij
1j
jiijiji
n
ij
1j
iijjijiii c,0maxcc,0maxcU   (2-4) 
This formulation is similar to the formulation of the Fehr-Schmidt model, but the 
fairness concerns are not ‘weighted’ for the other players. It would not be adequate as 
then the model would predict absurd utilities in some boundary conditions53.  
This formulation results in a more complex function compared to the dyadic form, so 
its analytical description is omitted here. The maximum of the model may be found 
using numerical methods for n person interactions. For demonstration purposes a triadic 
interaction is shown in the following figure. 
  
Figure 2.4.: The IFN model in a triadic interaction (α=1.6, β=0.9, left: c12=c13=1, right: c12=1, c13=0) 
                                                     
53
 For example in a triadic interaction if the payoffs are divided as 0.615; 0.385; 0; then the Fehr-Schmidt 
model would predict positive utility to the second player (in case of α=2; β=0.75). If we assume that the 
second player has to decide on such a split, then it would be accepted according to the Fehr-Schmidt 
model even though the inequality in this situation is huge.  It wouldn’t be accepted according to the IFN 
model though, as it will be shown later. 
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Fig. 2.4 shows a simple situation when a player has strong concerns towards both 
other players in the triad (left) and when their ties are asymmetric (right). The X axis 
corresponds to the ratio of goods given to player 3, and the Y axis corresponds to the 
goods given to player 2. The value (height) of the function is the utility calculated using 
the IFN model. It may be assumed that player 1 will prefer an allocation which 
corresponds to the global maximum of the function.  The borders between the darker 
and brighter parts present the local maxima. 
The global maximum of the function is at the 0.33-0.33-0.33 split (the equal split) if 
ties are equal and 0.5-0.5-0 if the player has ties only to one of the other players. Thus 
as per the initial assumptions of the IFN model the players differentiate between each 
other depending on their ties. If the ties in a three player interaction are between these 
boundary conditions, then the IFN’s maximum point changes accordingly. 
2.3 Model predictions 
2.3.1 Behaviour in dyadic interactions 
Behaviour in dictator games 
Dictator games are examples of voluntary sharing. In this game the decision is only 
made by one player, so it’s sufficient to analyze the IFN model for the proposer only. 
The Fehr-Schmidt model would dictate that players should split equally in DGs, but the 
experiments show that behaviour is different. Such proposals in fact do occur, but the 
median proposal is between 0 and 0.2. According to the Fehr-Schmidt model this would 
occur when β1<0.5. This would mean that a player would gladly give one unit of goods 
to the other player instead of keeping it.54  
The Proposers give different proposals depending on the identity of the Responder. 
The Fehr-Schmidt model does not offer explanation for such behaviour, since according 
to the model these decisions are based on internalized fairness norms. With the IFN 
model though both the fully egalitarian and absolutely unfair offers can be explained; 
plus those offers in between these extremes. 
                                                     
54
 Purely altruistic behaviour corresponds to this. In anonimous interactions with perfect strangers, this 
does not occur. 
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In the dictator game the Proposers maximize their utility, so according to the IFN 
model, they select their payoff so that it would correspond to the maximum of their 
utility function. In case of a DG offer the fairness concern which describes that the 
Proposer is worse off can be entirely omitted – it only plays a role when the Proposer 
would give more to the Responder than what is perceived fair.  
( )Totaliijijiii c1cU pi−pi+β−pi= )(      (2-5) 
As shown earlier, this does not necessarily correspond to the selfish split of 100-0, 
but other maximum can be found given the ties between the Proposer and the 
Responder.  
The offers depending on tie strengths can be obtained by calculating the maxima of 
(2-5). The calculations yield the following results as a prediction for Proposer behaviour 
in DGs (offer for the other player, the Responder). 
 
Figure 2.5.: DG Proposal offers vs. tie strength (αi=1.8, and βi=0.95) 
According to this figure the Proposer gives a non-zero offer over a given tie strength 
only. Above that tie strength (0.65 in Fig 2.5) the offer is proportional to the tie 
strength. The boundary value of the tie strength where non-zero offers are given 
depending on tie strength may be calculated by further examining (2-5).  
As it was assumed in (2-5) only β, and the concern against being better off than 
others should be taken into account in case of DG Proposer behaviour analysis. The tie 
  
90 
 
strength above which non-zero offers are given depends solely on the general attitude 
(β) of the Proposer.55 
( )12120 c1c
1
+
=β
  
      (2-6) 
If the general attitude toward being better off than others is stronger than the value 
given by (2-6), then the Proposer gives a non-zero offer.  
 
Figure 2.6.: DG Proposer offers depending on general attitude (β) and tie strength 
For example if β=0.95 but the tie is not very strong (<0.65), then a zero offer will be 
given. Above this value non-zero offers will be given proportionally to the tie strength – 
as shown in Fig 2.4.56 
Note that Fig 2.6 shows a weak point of the IFN model – namely that with given 
attitude parameters some offers frequently occurring in DGs (0.1-0.2) can’t be 
explained. Removing a condition describing the rational actors solves this problem 
though. As described before the rational actors are able to calculate the explicit values 
of their utility functions. If we relax the assumption of perfectly accurate utility 
calculations, this problem does not occur.  
                                                     
55
 On the deduction of (2-6) see the 7.2 in the appendix. 
56
 A further boundary will be given to β in section 2.4.  
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Figure 2.7.: DG Proposal offers vs. tie strength (αi=1.8, and βi=1.4) including 5% uncertainty 
In fact just by ‘allowing’ the proposer to make a 5% inaccuracy in determining the 
utility (IFN model) maxima these offers may occur. By taking a closer look at the IFN 
model the reason for this is clearly seen. 
 
Figure 2.8.: Low difference in utilities at selfish and non-selfish splits 
Fig 2.8 shows that in case of certain tie strengths the difference between the utility 
for a totally unequal offer and a less unequal offer is very small. So while the maxima 
are at 100-0 offers, a bit uncertainty may turn the offer into a much less unequal one. 
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As shown here the IFN model predicts that Proposers with strong ties to the 
Responder will offer an equal split in the DGs regardless of the lack of retaliation, 
because he’s driven by fairness concerns. 
If there’s a relationship between the Proposer and the Responder, then the Proposer 
will perceive the game as a situation which would occur in real-life. Due to the 
anonymity of the Proposer the selfish behaviour is tempting, but the feeling of guilt 
can’t be fully suppressed by the fact that the Proposer’s identity will remain unknown 
for the Responder. Thus it will drive the Proposer to act more ‘fairly’. As shown before 
stronger ties mean stronger preference towards equity. 
If there’s no relationship between the Proposer and the Responder, then the Proposer 
will perceive the game as getting goods for free. Without the chance of repetition and 
without any emotional bounds, the maximum of the utility will be at the 100-0 split. 
These assumptions are based on the structure of the IFN model. They will be formulated 
into testable hypotheses in section 3 and will be tested in section 4. 
Behaviour in ultimatum games 
Since the ultimatum game incorporates the decisions of both proposer and responder, 
the IFN model has to be analyzed in case of both players. For the sake of simplicity the 
IFN model is described to the responder first, as the payoff depends on the final 
decision of the responder. The most important predictions of the Fehr-Schmidt model 
are regarding the ultimatum responder behaviour, and market interactions. The latter is 
omitted in this thesis.  
Also note that anonymity is totally neglected in this analysis as well, since that would 
rule out the effect of the ties entirely. This goes against the rules of behavioural 
economics, but is in line with what we experience in real life. We rarely ‘play’ UGs 
with anonymous players. So the assumptions here will describe real life effects, but they 
will be extended to cover experimental behaviour as well. Responder behaviour in the 
ultimatum games gives information about Proposer behaviour as well, as the Proposer 
wishes to anticipate responder behaviour when making the offer. 
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UG Responder behaviour  
The Responder knows the offer of the Proposer, so the game for the Responder is a 
simple choice. He/she can accept the offer of the Proposer, (getting U2), or reject the 
offer, both of them getting 0 (thus having U2=0). 
Rejecting an offer is practically a costly punishment of the Responder. Its utility 
‘covers’ the negative utility caused by an unfair offer. This utility is not dealt with in the 
IFN model (or in the Fehr-Schmidt model). Indirectly it can be measured, because the 
responder assesses both the relation of the internalized fairness norms and the proposal, 
and the strength of their relationship, or in other words, how much to ‘expect’ from the 
Proposer. The Responder faces the choice of MAX(U2, 0). If is U2 negative, then it is 
rational to reject the offer, if it is positive, then it is rational to accept it (0 represents the 
value, where a player is indifferent between accepting and rejecting). If U2 is negative, 
its absolute value corresponds to the utility ‘gained’ from the rejection.  
The responder’s utility can be formalized when accepting the offer (upon rejection 
it’s of course 0): 
))1(( 22121222 pipiαpi ccU Total +−−=      (2-7) 
So the decision is simple for the responder. Since rationality dictates utility 
maximizing, the choice is made evaluating the following condition. 
  
0
?
2 >U          (2-8) 
If this condition holds, then the offer is accepted (note that the responder is 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting if U2=0). Applying the utility function in the 
expression above, the condition for the payoff ratio at the acceptance is the following. 
( )21212
2122
11 cc
c
Total ++
>
α
α
pi
pi
        (2-9) 
Just as in the case of DG rejections, (2-9) is again a non-linear function of the tie 
strength.  
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Figure 2.9.: UG rejections (Responder’s payoff - %), α=1.8 
The function is strictly increasing with one maximum which depends on the 
sensitivity to envy only: 
2
21
1
c
α
=
        (2-10) 
When considering punishing behaviour, Fig 2.9 describes the willingness to punish 
depending on the strength of a tie. This figure shows that we get more forgiving with 
our close friends – note that the difference is not different. Furthermore, if we allow tie 
strengths to be > 1, then it says that people accept even more unfair offers. This 
assumption may hold for family ties and thus explains intergenerational redistribution – 
or why some parents allow their children to exploit them.  
Assuming asymmetric ties – and that they’re common knowledge – and abandoning 
anonymity it is possible to describe behaviour with the IFN model using the approach 
introduced by (Rabin 1993) – the importance of intentions. 
 The Responder may base his decision based on his beliefs about his tie to the 
Proposer from the view of the Proposer. In this case the Responder approximates what 
the Proposer would perceive as ‘fair’. This effect can be stronger, when the total payoff 
is so large, that the Responder would accept a quite unfair offer even from a stranger – 
the ‘stakes’ are high enough. In this case the decision is based on what to expect from 
the Proposer, or to put it differently, what kind of relationship the players have. So 
responders approximate the strength of the tie perceived by the proposer. 
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NOTE: This holds purely for asymmetric relationships in the case when the 
asymmetric property of the tie is common knowledge. More to that, the strength – as 
stressed before – is not a constant value for the players, but a threshold.  
The choice of accepting or rejecting an offer is formalized the following way:  
( )12122 1222 11 cc
c
Total ++
>
α
α
pi
pi
       (2-11) 
In this case the responder places him/herself into the proposer’s role approximating 
the tie the proposer perceives ( 12c ). Based on this assumption the choice is made. This 
approach is similar to the one introduced by (Rabin 1993), although in this case not the 
‘intentions’ play a major role, but a simple perception of the strength of the tie. In 
reality it is not always a conscious process, but one based on heuristics and intuition. 
Since this assumption is hard to grasp empirically, it is omitted in this thesis. If 
symmetric ties are assumed, then of course this approximation is replaced by the tie 21c . 
As briefly mentioned before, this analysis concerns real-life behaviour. In the 
experiments anonymity is used to prevent ‘repetition’, but in that case the tie strength is 
not known for the Responder. Still, some conclusions may be drawn taking a look at Fig 
2.9. Regardless of the perceived tie, the rejection threshold is usually ~0.35, so we may 
conclude that even if the Proposer is a PS (which means a low, but non-zero tie 
strength), the offers below 0.35 are likely to be rejected. As it was shown in the earlier 
results, this conclusion is valid. 
UG Proposer behaviour  
The behaviour of the Proposer is influenced by the general attitudes – parameters α 
and β. If the fairness concerns are strong (β is high), then the split is dictated by the 
internalized fairness norms. In the other cases the Proposer can maximize his utility if 
he gives the lowest offer accepted by the Responder.  
The offer in this case is given by approximating the envy parameter of the Responder 
(the α parameter) and considering the strength of their tie. This may be denoted as 
approximating the ‘acceptance threshold’ of the Responder and thus determining the set 
of eligible offers. If the tie is strong and dictates a better offer, than a simple 
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approximation of the Responder’s envy, then the Proposer gives that offer. If they’re not 
closely related, the offer is made by approximating the Responder’s envy.57  
The boundary when the fairness norms take over the role of simple selfishness – 
when the offer is driven by the fairness concerns rather than by guessing the eligible 
offers and selecting the most advantageous one is described by the following condition: 
( )12120 c1c
1
+
>β         (2-12) 
So the general attitudes of the Proposer mainly determine the motives behind a 
specific offer. A Proposer with high β values (strong concern for fairness) is driven by 
fairness concerns even at much smaller tie strengths. So such a Proposer gives an offer 
aiming to abide his own concerns of fairness even with those he’s not that closely 
related to, and not to exploit the weaker position of the Responder in the UG. In this 
aspect the same thing is observed with guessing-fair behaviour as it was seen in the DGs 
with zero-non-zero offers. Also (2-12) is the same condition as (2-6) and as seen in Fig. 
2.7. 
For example if we assume a Proposer with β=1 then he’ll be driven by fairness 
concerns and will try to give a fair offer even when the tie strength to the other person is 
higher than 0.62. However if for example β=0.5 then the Proposer would want to be fair 
with closely related Responders only (cij≅1); he’d give the lowest offer possible (to be 
accepted) to anybody else.   
If (2-12) holds, then the proposer is ‘sensitive’ enough at the fairness concerns so 
that the offer is guided by the fairness norms rather than guessing what the Responder 
would just accept. Figure 2.2 shows, that with fixed attitude parameters the IFN model 
may have a maximum at non-zero offers for the responder depending on the strength of 
the tie. This case corresponds to ties, which are strong enough to trigger fairness 
concerns.  
If (2-12) does not hold, then even though the Proposer’s utility would suggest giving 
a low offer to the Responder, but he’s aware that its utility may be negative for the 
Responder. The offer would then be refused, thus the Proposer won’t give that offer. 
                                                     
57
 This holds, when the guilt parameter has a lower bound of 0.5, which means that a unit of good yields 
in higher utility for the proposer than for the responder.   
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Instead the goal of the Proposer is to find an offer which would yield in the highest 
payoff for the Proposer and a very small, but positive utility for the Responder – and 
would assure acceptance. If we consider this case, then the condition of the offer is the 
following. 
0U 2
?
≈
         (2-13) 
This is different from the condition than the one for Responder behaviour. As per the 
fourth assumption the Proposer wants to give an acceptable offer, but to maximize his 
utility, the offer should be as ‘unfair’ as it can be (to provide the highest payoff). So the 
Proposer is goal is to approximate the point where the Responder would be indifferent 
between accepting or rejecting; and offer slightly above this level.  
Since the Responder parameters are not known to the Proposer, his offer is based on 
approximations: 
( )12122
1222
11 cc
c
Total ++
>
α
α
pi
pi
      (2-14) 
Formally it is also the same as the condition for Responder reaction (see Fig. 2.8), 
but it includes an approximation for the Responder’s envy ( 2α ). This condition also 
corresponds to the condition formulated with the Fehr-Schmidt model when assuming a 
strong tie (c12=1). The Proposer could also consider approximating the strength of his 
relationship to the Responder from the Responder’s point of view. In this case (2-14) 
would include another approximation on the tie strength c21 as well.  
Summary of UG behaviour 
As shown in this section the behaviour of the Proposers and Responders can be fully 
described by the IFN model. The Proposers are mainly guided by fairness concerns 
depending on their general attitude – this is an important deviation from the Fehr-
Schmidt model –, or may disregard them and would try to guess the lowest acceptable 
offer for the Responder.  
The Responders’ decision depends solely on their fairness concerns (which are 
composed of their general attitude and the strength of the tie to the Proposer). If we 
assume Proposer anonymity then the model is to be calculated with assuming a PS as a 
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Proposer. In this case the tie towards a PS should be taken when calculating (2-9), so the 
acceptance is based on the general attitude towards fairness only. Note that when the 
Proposer is assumed to have no fairness concerns at all (e.g. computers) then much 
lower offers are also accepted.   
A comparison with predictions of other fairness models 
A wide variety of fairness models was introduced in section 1, so it is an important 
benchmark of the IFN to give a comparison on what predictions the IFN has for two-
person DG and UG behaviour. 
Generally the IFN model has predictions in the DG on a wide scale starting from 
purely selfish offers (if the tie strength is low) to egalitarian splits (if tie strength is 
high). In the UGs the offers are expected to be near the equal split and the deviation is 
explained by players having a weak relationship and Proposers trying to guess the 
acceptance range of the Responder, and responders refusing based on the tie between 
themselves and the Proposer.  
In numerical terms the IFN is worthy of being compared in the DG and UG to the 
models by Fehr and Schmidt, and Bolton and Ockenfels. The Fehr-Schmidt model 
allows only 0 and equal splits in the DG, which is clearly not the case, so in this sense 
the Bolton-Ockenfels model does a better job. In doing that the lack of analytical 
expression in the Bolton Ockenfels model allows too much flexibility degrading its 
predictive power. In this sense the IFN model outperforms both Fehr-Schmidt and 
Bolton-Ockenfels models. This is easily explained by the extra component of the 
relationships. 
The UGs are different in this aspect as they’re well described by both Fehr- Schmidt 
and Bolton-Ockenfels models. Both models allow different acceptance thresholds but 
the proposer motive in both cases is exclusively guessing the lowest acceptable offer by 
the Responder. Adding the relationships as a motive for the offers enables the inclusion 
of altruism into the UG. 
In theoretical terms the IFN model shall be compared with the other models 
mentioned in section 1, including models, by Rabin (Rabin 1993), Charness and Rabin 
(Charness and Rabin 2002), Cox et. al. (Cox et al. 2007), and Cornelissen et al. 
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(Cornelissen et al. 2007). Each of these models offers the inclusion of other explaining 
phenomena resulting in higher descriptive power to the lack of predictiveness. One of 
the most important factors in behaviour is reciprocity, which is accounted for by 
Rabin’s model (incorporating intentions), Charness and Rabin (giving a simple SVO 
model including earlier behaviour), and in the model of Cox et. al. (who use their model 
specifically to analyize reciprocity). In terms of explanatory power each of these models 
outperform the IFN model. Cornelissen et. al. base their model on SVO and incorporate 
perceived interpersonal closeness, so it’s the closest to the IFN model in terms of 
explanation. The advantage of the IFN model versus these models is its analytical 
structure and thus its descriptive power.  
These models were used by the authors to provide explanations to existing data 
rather than to formulate ‘exact’ predictions, so they shouldn’t be compared to the IFN in 
this sense, but their validity was proven by the experimental results and model fitting. A 
similar fitting is attempted in section 4.  
2.3.2 Behaviour in triadic interactions 
Various three player games can be examined by the IFN model, but in this section 
only two very simple games will be analyzed: the three-person DG and UG. These were 
the only three player games used in the experiments for this research, so the explanation 
of other three-player games is omitted in this section.  
Behaviour in three person dictator games 
Assume that players play a simple type of three person dictator game. In this game 
the Proposer has to decide on a split between him and two Responders.58 The decision 
made by the Proposer consists of splitting the pie into three parts, one part for himself, 
and the other two parts for the two Responders – it is essentially the same as a dyadic 
DG, but the goods are to be split among three person by one of them. 
This behaviour may be described by using the n person form of the IFN model, (2-4). 
The DG offers are given based on the maximum of the function, which may be 
                                                     
58
 More thoroughly described in section 4 along with the three player ultimatum game used. 
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calculated with numerical methods. For example if we assume that β=0.9, then the DG 
offer predictions are summarized in the following figure for triadic interactions: 
 
Figure 2.10.: Predictions of the three-person DG offers  
Fig 2.10 shows that as the tie strength decreases (shown in pairs) the proposer keeps 
more and more with offers turning to zero offers only if the tie strength (towards both 
other players) decreases below 0.6. In analytical terms the payoffs where no fairness 
concerns are triggered (the third term in the IFN model yields zero) may be calculated 
similarly to (2-3): 
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Note that the values calculated in this manner do not correspond to the offers per se, 
as they ignore the effect that if the attribute towards guilt and the tie strengths are small 
enough, then the higher payoff for the proposer simply overrules the fairness concerns. 
So (2-15) may be used to approximate offers if the tie strength is high enough.   
Generally (2-15) summarizes the conclusion of the IFN model: the offers in the three 
person dictator game are expected to be shared depending on the tie strength (provided 
that the feeling of guilt is strong enough in the proposer). The Proposer will differentiate 
between the Responders giving more to the one closer to him.  
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Behaviour in three person ultimatum games 
The three person ultimatum game is an ultimatum game with a second Responder, 
who does not have any opportunity to take action during the game – it is denoted as the 
Passive player. Its presence is only to trigger fairness from both the Proposer and the 
Responder. 
In this game the Proposer wants to give an acceptable offer to the Responder given 
his own tie to the Responder, and his perception of the tie between the Responder and 
the Passive player. The condition for the acceptance of the offer is formulated by using 
the aforementioned form of the IFN model adhering (2-15) and assuming the piPr≥ piR1≥ 
piR2 and the ties are sufficiently strong (piPr>cRPr*piPr and cRPa*piR1> piR2). In this case the 
IFN model yields the following utility for the Responder: 
 ( ) ( )PaRRPaRPaRRPrRPrPrRRRR ccccU pi−piβ−pi−piα−pi=    (2-16) 
If this utility is positive for the Responder, the offer will be accepted. If the ties are 
weaker then these effects are also weaker. Weak ties correspond to unequal splits 
referred to as ‘fair enough’, thus the fairness concerns are much weaker in these cases59. 
So the Responder makes his/her decision based on (2-16) being greater than 0 and the 
Proposer wishes to give such an offer. Hence here it is enough to analyze (2-16) as the 
Proposer approximates this value when the offer is determined60.  
The Responder’s task is to evaluate (2-16) and decide on the acceptance of the offer. 
But unlike the dyadic situation the decision involves a third player, so it’s more 
complicated. It is more practical to describe the acceptance limit with the payoff ratios. 
The limit may be derived from the IFN model for the payoff of the Responder and the 
Passive player: 
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 Such a distribution also shows a weak point in the Fehr-Schmidt model. Calculating with their model 
results in 0.6-0.4-0 offers accepted by the Responder (α=2, β=0.75).  
60
 The Proposer also has to approximate the tie between the Responder and the Passive player. For the 
sake of simplicity it is assumed in this analysis that assumptions are correct. 
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This expression means that the Responder evaluates his/her own payoff ‘status’ 
compared to the other players given the proposed split61. If the Proposer and the 
Responder are indeed close friends (2-17) will converge to (2-9) as both b and the last 
term in the denominator of a becomes negligible (since β<α as well).  
A very interesting question arises when the Responder has a relatively strong tie to 
the Proposer, but a weaker tie to the Passive player. In this case where’s the threshold 
the Responder would refuse the offer? Which offer would be so unfair, that the 
Responder would punish his friend to ‘avenge’ the unfair behaviour versus the third 
person?  
If the tie between the Responder and both other players is strong, then b will 
influence this limit as well. In a sense this defines the ‘baseline’ of accepting an offer. In 
certain conditions the strong relationship between the Proposer and the Responder may 
overrule some fairness concerns. For example if all tie strength is 1, then such extreme 
offers may be acceptable as 0.5-0.42-0.08. This is highly unfair towards the Passive 
player, still the IFN model predicts that this offer is above the acceptance limits. Note 
that offers which contain a zero offer to the Passive player are still rejected – as opposed 
to the prediction of the Fehr-Schmidt model.  
As the relationship between the Responder and the Proposer player changes, the 
accepted offers become more equal (provided that the tie strength is high between the 
proposer and the responder. In the table below some extreme predictions of the IFN 
model are shown. The table shows the offers (green) which are on the verge of being 
rejected depending on tie strength (red), the structure of the triad. In this sense Table 2.1 
shows an ‘acceptance limit’ for the Responder. It also contains the a and b parameters 
defined in (2-17) and the accepted payoff ratio for the Responder. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
61
 The expression was formulated as a linear function for the sake of simplicity. The parameters a and b 
are used to refer to the more complex expression to simplify the explanation. 
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Payoffs Ties Payoff ratios Parameters (2-16) 
piRlim 
piPr piR1 piPa cPr cPa 
Pa
Pr
pi
pi
 
Pa
R
pi
pi
 a b 
0.5 0.42 0.08 1 1 6.25 5.22 0.89 0.333333 0.417778 
0.54 0.41 0.05 1 0.75 10.8 8.16 0.78 0.218182 0.408 
0.58 0.415 0.005 1 0.5 116 82.4 0.71 0.133333 0.411778 
0.599 0.4 0.001 1 0 599 399 0.67 0 0.399333 
0.46 0.46 0.08 0.75 1 5.75 5.73 1.09 0.545455 0.458182 
0.529 0.47 0.001 0.75 0.75 529 466 0.88 0.330275 0.465578 
0.425 0.425 0.15 0.5 1 2.833 2.78 1.33 1 0.416667 
0.56 0.43 0.01 0.5 0.5 56 42.4 0.76 0.285714 0.42381 
0.98 0.01 0.01 0 0 98 0 0 0 0 
0.98 0.01 0.01 0 1 98 -3 0 3 -0.03 
Table 2.1: acceptance limits of the Responder in the three player UGs (α=2, β=0.75) 
As seen in table 2.1 if the tie between the Proposer and the Responder are strong then 
a bit less fair offers are also accepted, while if the tie is weaker then the limits 
correspond to more equal splits with the most equal expectations arising at around the 
tie of 0.75. A similar effect was observed in the dyadic form of the IFN, see Fig 2.8.   
The most spectacular effect seen in Table 2.1 is the huge unfairness versus the 
Passive player. The Passive player hardly gets anything in the examples and still the 
utility of the Responder is positive in case of the IFN model – it is to be emphasized 
though that zero offers to the Passive player are still rejected.  
In common terms the predictions of the IFN model in three player interactions are 
dramatic. Taking a look at the accepted offers it is very clear that according to the IFN 
model if we are in a situation where we’re about to decide on accepting a split by a 
given person, we’re satisfied with the split even if it gets very unfair to others. Not even 
the strong relationship helps that. This is even further emphasized if the tie versus the 
third person is weak, in which case even a token share is judged ‘fair enough’. 
But also Table 2.1 shows that if we perceive that ‘we’re lucky to have anything at 
all’ (the tie strength to the Proposer is 0), then we’d gladly accept even very unfair 
offers. Here we may refer to Simmel’s grouping of third player’s roles in a triad, 
because we have a ‘laughing third’ (tertier gaudens) (Simmel 1967), but here the 
proposer may take this role according to the predictions of the IFN model, not the third 
player. 
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However here I have to make a critique on the IFN model’s predictions. People 
having strong ties, yet treating each other unfairly is not commonly observed behaviour. 
The very reason for this is that the IFN model lacks the dynamism of repetition 
excluding both positive and negative reciprocity. If people have strong ties, they expect 
to interact with each other frequently, and thus they expect to uphold these strong ties 
by punishing unfairness. So in this case reciprocity may be observed which is 
unaccounted for in the IFN model. 
Still the experimental results of this research are quite controversial as it will be 
shown later, as in the experiments the Responders in the UG3s always accept offers in 
which they’re better off than the Passive player. These results are found in section 4.    
2.4 Boundaries of the model parameters 
The extended analysis shows that the IFN model differs significantly from the Fehr-
Schmidt model, so the boundary values of model parameters also have to be 
reconsidered. The analysis of the IFN model has shown that the envy and guilt 
parameters have the following boundary values: 
β≥αβ<50.  
There are two more boundaries to be set for the parameters, as some values would 
predict surreal behaviour.  
21 ≤α≤β  
These boundaries are defined to make the IFN model correspond to rational 
behaviour as it will be introduced in this section. 
Boundary of the attitude towards being better off (β) 
The first bound gives a lower bound to the general attitude towards being better off – 
or treating someone unfairly. If this bound is not upheld, then the IFN model (and the 
Fehr-Schmidt model as well) produces maxima at totally selfish offers only. It means 
that in DGs there would only be zero offers. As seen in the experimental results, this 
does not happen. 
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One logical upper bound for β is α itself, which means that people are generally more 
hurt be being treated unfairly, than be treating someone else unfairly. This bound was 
also formulated for the Fehr-Schmidt model and is concluded based on earlier 
experimental results (Bolton and Zwick 1995). 
Note however that in some cases this would predict completely irrational behaviour. 
For example if β=1.5, then irrational choices can be made when choosing between 
different alternatives. Suppose, that the proposer in a DG played with his best friend 
(cij≈1) has to choose from the following splits: (0.6; 0.4) and (0.3; 0.3). In this case the 
IFN model yields the following utility.  
For the (0.6; 0.4) alternative: 
( ) 30306040605160U i ....... =−=−−=  
and for the (0.3;0.3) split: 
( ) 3030305130U i ..... =−−=  
When considering rational actors, this would mean that the Proposer would rather 
hurt both himself and the responder to achieve a fair outcome – these alternatives are 
equivalent! This assumption goes against rationality. We can’t neglect that there may be 
some people who prefer to be fair at all costs (both to themselves and others), but here a 
higher level of rationality is assumed, so a higher bound for β shall be found.  
In the previous example the (0.6; 0.4) split should have had more utility – in other 
words the concern for fairness should be smaller than 1.5. We may assume that there 
would be Proposers who would sacrifice their well being to come to a better offer, in 
this terms, they’d prefer an offer of (0.4; 0.4). It is to be assumed that in this case the 
utility from such a choice is bigger or equal than the utility of (0.6; 0.4). The upper 
boundary for β can be deducted by writing this equation with the IFN model. 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
402060
4040U404060604060U
=β
=β−
==−β−=
...
.;......;.
 
We can conclude that the acceptance of any lower equal split is not rational so this 
yields the upper bound for β: 
1≤β
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Boundaries of the attitude towards being worse off (α) 
The second bound is easier to grasp than the first one. It means practically that the 
envy felt by people when getting unfair offers is stronger than the guilt felt when giving 
unfair ones – this also corresponds to the Fehr-Schmidt model. Opposed to the Fehr-
Schmidt model however, the boundaries of the envy shall be stricter. According to the 
Fehr-Schmidt model, it’s impractical to put an upper bound on envy, since there are 
people grudging people without any feeling of guilt.  
The IFN model behaves differently in this regard as well. According to the IFN 
model the players are less sensitive to the same unfair offers gotten from strangers to the 
same gotten from friends. In other words responder behaviour is closing to pure 
selfishness (accepting nearly anything) when they play with proposers with low tie 
strength close to 0 (Sanfey et al. 2003). From friends, the unfair offers are mostly 
rejected. In other words friendship is an ‘obligation’ to fairness. 
 
Figure 2.11.: UG Rejection thresholds (multiple curves show dependence on α) 
This in itself wouldn’t suggest that an upper bound should be given to envy, but the 
interpretation does. If the envy was relatively low (α=1), then an offer of 1/3-2/3 was 
accepted when playing with friends, while if the envy is bigger (α=4), then even 
considerably larger offers were rejected (44%).   
In case of the IFN model though the effect of ties should be considered when giving 
an upper bound to α. As Fig. 2.11 shows, if we assumed α=4, then the UG rejection 
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values would be unreasonably high (it would even suggest, that equal splits would’ve 
been rejected in the UG at a tie strength of 0.5). The experimental results show that 
rejections were observed up to ~0.44, thus an upper bound shall be put to α keeping in 
mind this upper bound. Since this corresponds to α~2 this should be taken as an upper 
bound for α. 
The upper bound of the strength of the tie corresponds to the analytical limit, as in 
this case the IFN model is the same as the Fehr-Schmidt model. Between these two 
boundaries, the rejection limit and the strength of the tie are in non-linear relationship as 
shown before. So it would be practical to assign certain tie strength threshold to certain 
types of relationships (known from sight, pal, buddy, and friend). This assignment is not 
in the scope of this work yet, as it would require a deeper analysis of experimental 
results obtained from experiments described in the next section. 
The IFN model in an SVO perspective 
Let’s take the example of intergenerational transfers (Kohli and Künemund 2003). In 
these relationships giving more to another player (the child) is most often observed – 
and of course we all think it is rational. This corresponds to strength above 1 in the IFN 
model. If we take a look at it from the social value orientation perspective this can be 
defined as altruistic behaviour. In this case SVO measures can be put to parallel with the 
strength of the tie in the IFN model. That means if SVO is denoted with an angle on the 
space of payoffs (Doi 1994), then the strength of a tie cij can be interpreted as:  
)45sin(1 o−Θ+=ijc
  
This would explain social orientation and when the individual is altruistic, it yields a 
number above 1.  In this case the IFN model dictates giving most of the resources to the 
other player, and accepting unfair offers. Correspondence is not perfect though. If the 
expression holds then at an altruistic player having a SVO angle of 90 degrees cares 
solely for the other’s well-being. In case of the IFN model the proposal in the dictator 
games is 36%, and people are not willing to give everything to the other player, they 
care for their own well-being, so they’re not purely altruistic. 
In the modelling perspective the lower boundary given explicitly means that one is 
indifferent between sharing equally and keeping everything with the people closest to 
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him/her (c12=1). When the tie is not this strong, and concern for being equally off (guilt) 
is not that strong either, self-interest is a dominant strategy. This would correspond to 
the behaviour of a sociopath except that sociopaths are usually guided by self-interest 
(Widom 1976)62. The upper bound – as it was stated in the assumption – is essentially 
the same as of the Fehr-Schmidt model with the exception that the utility of one unit of 
extra good decreases with the weakening of the tie. So it does correspond to the 
assumption of the Fehr-Schmidt model when the tie is strong. 
                                                     
62
 Practically the IFN model does not describe ‘fairness’ anymore at these β values. Sociopath behaviour 
can not be described by models incorporating the well being of others. 
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3 Research hypotheses, relevance 
3.1 Main hypothesis – fairness and tie strength 
The purpose of my research is to present an empirical approach to the definition of 
the ‘strength of a tie’. To achieve this I have introduced the Integrated Fairness Network 
model (IFN). In the previous section I have thoroughly examined the IFN model 
analytically and explained observations in earlier experiments. The strength of the tie is 
included explicitly in the IFN model as a dimensionless unit.  
It is a simple numerical value between 0 and 1, but the idea that it may exceed one is 
not rejected (it was a possible extension to the model to incorporate intergenerational 
distribution and family ties). A higher value means stronger tie or in other words more 
importance. It is thus assumed that the tie strength influences behaviour in bargaining 
and sharing situations.  
As per the IFN model the tie strength influences behaviour in ultimatum games and 
in dictator games. In the dictator game the proposer should give offers depending on the 
tie strengths and in the ultimatum game refusals also depend on tie strength. 
  
Figure 3.1 (2.7, 2.9).: DG offers (left) and UG Rejection thresholds (right) 
In case of stronger ties the offers will be above 30%, but in case of lower ties the 
offers will converge to the zero offer. The ultimatum game responders will not refuse 
unfair offers that frequently when they’re not related to the proposer. If the proposer is 
anonymous, then the proposer will give an offer considering the rejection thresholds.   
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Hypothesis: 
H1. The behaviour in bargaining and sharing situations is influenced by the strength 
of the tie between the actors. Thus if a actor has a friendship tie towards the other one, 
then in a dictator game he will likely give a non-zero to the other actor. If there’s no 
relationship between the players in the dictator game, then zero offers and unfair offers 
will be observed. Also if the tie is strong between players, then the ultimatum game 
offers will be slightly smaller than when the tie is weaker. This is the conclusion of the 
IFN model. If the Responder is known in the ultimatum game, then lower rejection rates 
will be observed.  
3.2 Differentiation between friends 
Examining the IFN model it can be assumed that the friendships can be ‘tested’ using 
DGs. When somebody plays a DG with a friend then the offer will be influenced by the 
tie between them. If the situation is repeated with another friend, then depending on the 
tie to the other friend a different offer may occur63.  
 
Figure 3.2 (2.10).: Predictions of the three person DG offers  
But if an actor plays a DG with multiple Responders, then the Proposer differentiates 
between friends. The ‘fair’ split is perceived differently for each tie combination as seen 
                                                     
63
 However due to the repetition of the game, learning effects, or temporal effects may influence the 
offer as well. 
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in Fig 2.10. If the Proposer remains anonymous, then – given sufficiently strong 
concerns towards guilt and envy – depending on the ties with the two players different 
splits may be observed. In case of weaker ties highly unequal splits may also be 
observed. For example, if a player plays with a friend and a stranger, then the stranger 
may get a zero offer, while the friend may get a substantial – even equal – amount. It is 
more interesting if a player plays with a close friend and another friend not so close. In 
this case the close friend should get proportionally more to their tie strength. 
 Hypothesis: 
H2. When playing three-person dictator games (two Responders) with Proposer 
anonymity the Proposers will give a different offer to the Responders. The difference 
depends on the reported (or determined by earlier results) tie strengths according to the 
predictions of the IFN models. 
3.3 General attitudes towards  friends 
As it was concluded in the analysis of the IFN model people have a general attitude 
towards being better or worse off. In other words it means that two people having the 
same tie towards a third one may give behave completely differently in different 
situations. There are people who are generally more concerned towards treating others 
fairly or being treated fairly than others.  
Hypothesis: 
H3. Those Proposers who give higher DG offers in general, refuse higher offers 
when playing the role of the Responder in UGs, Proposers giving low DG offers tend to 
accept lower UG offers as well.   
3.4 Punishing friends to help strangers 
As the IFN model says the UG offers are refused if they are perceived as unfair 
depending on the tie strength. However in some situations more complex phenomena 
may occur. In three person ultimatum games fairness concerns may be superposed if the 
Responder is being much better off than the third party (a Passive player), but worse off 
than the Proposer by the offer.  
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In this case these concerns strengthen each other as both terms may substantially 
decrease utility as per the IFN model. Of course in this case much lower rejection 
threshold will be observed as the smaller split will be perceived as ‘fair’. As per the 
prediction of the IFN model highly unequal offers given to the Passive player may be 
observed.  
Hypothesis: 
H4. In a three person ultimatum game the Responders are willing to punish even if 
they’re substantially better off than the Passive player. They will do so even if they may 
think that one of their friends has given such an offer. Thus they punish their friends 
when they treat strangers (playing as Passive players in the 3 person UG) highly 
unfairly. 
3.5 Relevance 
3.5.1 Theoretical relevance 
The approach of tie strength presented in this thesis cannot be fit into currently used 
fairness models. By proving these hypotheses it’s possible to define the ‘strength of a 
tie’ differently than it is in the current literature. The definition based on the IFN model 
is analytically strong – as it is a numerical model parameter, and also it contains the 
subjectivity of the individual. A certain relationship can be perceived to be of different 
strength by the two participants even though they apply the same norms to each other. 
The individual relation to the norms also influences behaviour. This is in accordance 
with the SVO literature, but in this case it corresponds to the individual’s preferences 
toward guilt and envy (the parameters in both the classical Fehr and the IFN model). 
 On the other hand defining the strength of a tie this way connects fairness theory to 
social network theory. This definition means that even though we have preferences and 
fairness concerns, we care for whom we’re interacting. Thus we ‘value’ the relation to a 
person we’re interacting in some way, and this can be perceived as the strength of a tie 
in a network. So the notion of ‘strong and weak ties’ – as written by Granovetter – are 
explained in a different, analytically more accessible way. Thus when mapping 
interpersonal networks the network strength can be denoted by a numerical value. 
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Also such a value given to the strength of a tie may yield new results in the cases of 
structural balance theories. In the classical theories (Cartwright and Harary 1956; 
Heider 1958) the formation of the structural balance was a crucial question concerning 
unbalanced and balanced tryads. The conclusion says that people always tend to be in 
balanced tryads. But what happens during balancing? Shall a negative relationship turn 
into positive or a positive turn into negative? Am I going to make friends with my 
friend’s friend if he was my enemy before, or am I going to express negative behaviour 
towards my friend and get ‘disconnected’ from them? These questions are hard to 
answer, but if we know the strength of the ties, answers can be sought. Thus giving a 
more accurate definition to the strength of ties which is centred on the interactions 
between people may contribute to structural balance as well. 
3.5.2 Practical relevance 
To confirm the hypotheses several types of fairness-network experiments are 
required. The term ‘fairness-network experiment’ refers to two and three person UG and 
DG experiments – the latter explained more extensively later – with participants being 
friends to some degree. The introduced experimental methods in this paper are working 
with dyads and tryads with existing relationship – always retaining proposer anonymity 
to give way to self centred behaviour too and suppress the possible effects of repetition 
in real life.  
Besides supporting the hypotheses the three player experimental games introduced in 
this paper show a new method to analyze networks. Many fields can make use of these 
games either as a sociometric method, or as a method to explore latent networks. There 
were many studies explaining the importance of informal networks for example in 
companies. One of the most robust studies was (Lund 1985), showing that caring only 
for the formal networks of a company is not enough. In the study the authors have 
drawn the trust network, as the informal network behind the company structure to solve 
the crisis evolving in the company.  
Using the experimental games to map organizational networks has more uses than 
that (Friedkin 1982). Partially it says something about the individual’s preferences for 
fairness, and it also supplies information about the network structure itself. Thus it can 
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be used not just to solve trust crises, but to help in the design of effective formal 
networks. 
It has long been established that the informal networks play a very important role in 
the efficiency of organizations as well (Krackhardt and Hanson 1993). Multiple types of 
networks may be found in a company starting from simple communicational networks 
(advice networks) to deeper relationships, such as trust networks. Some of these 
networks overlap, some of them are separate. Also the perceived network was found to 
be determinant in efficiency – misperception of the network of key employees at higher 
hierarchical levels by themselves results in decreases in efficiency. 
Informal networks may work against efficiency in organizations as well, but in this 
case we may speak rather about conflict between lower and higher sections in the 
organizational hierarchy (Marschan, Welch, and Welch 1996). It emerges as employees 
at low hierarchical levels develop a strong informal network in which the negative 
opinion about higher hierarchical levels (particularly management) spreads. This yields 
negative attitudes towards the higher levels and decreases compliance with their orders. 
(Because of this very reason does management try to constrain informal networks in 
some cases.) 
Networks often take each others’ places as well. For example in a recent study it was 
shown how formal networks are disregarded in favour of informal ties in a hierarchical 
company (Rank 2008). Rank found – examining the data of two German multinational 
companies – that the managers at higher level effectively use informal networks even 
disregarding their contacts prescribed by their formal networks. Moreover, a higher 
number of vertical ties were found to be built than horizontal one, still horizontal formal 
ties are more frequently disregarded in favour of the informal ties. 
Another proof of the importance of informal networks is the field in network 
analysis, which deals specifically with the issues of organization – that is Organizational 
Network Analysis. ONA focuses on communication and trust networks mostly, it is 
used to explore the potential in the organization and to improve efficiency (Cross et al. 
2007, 2008). 
‘Interactional’ and ‘distributional’ fairness and its perception is very important in the 
efficiency of the organizations (Lamertz 2002; Schminke, Cropanzano, and Rupp 2002). 
It was shown in these studies that at higher levels of organizations and more formalism 
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facilitates distributional fairness and interactional fairness is positively related to an 
employee having multiple relationships to higher hierarchical levels (to managers). Note 
though that these studies were addressing the issue of fairness from the ‘justice’ 
perspective, so the interpretation of their results is different from what was done in this 
research.    
Another practically relevant outcome of this research are the novelty in the 
experimental tools used. They enable a new way of analyzing the informal network by 
providing a new measure (what is perceived as fair with the other person) to the ties. 
This may enable uncovering another layer of relationships without actually affecting the 
relationships themselves.  
From the viewpoint of experimental economics this research provides some 
experience concerning the anonymity effects. Anonymity effects have been breached to 
some extent, but real life networks have not been tested with UG or DG so far, and also 
the applied information settings haven’t been used in experiments yet. The next section 
discusses the experimental method in details along with the results.     
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4 Methodology and results 
Using the tools of behavioural economics the model can be validated and the 
parameters can further be explored. The analysis of the IFN model shows that in the 
experiments various types of relationships shall be represented. The experimental tools 
used in this research are – partially because of comparability and the available results – 
the ultimatum and dictator game.  
These games are in use since decades and have been explained earlier, so deeper 
analysis is omitted here. Besides conducting ‘simple’ bargaining experiments, the use of 
three person ultimatum and dictator games proves useful, when examining ties between 
people. Certain variants of these games have been used in behavioural economics 
(Büchner et al. 2004), but for validating the models I use three person games with 
special features. 
In this section I’ll give a description on the tools used in this research, the 
experimental design, and finally the results themselves. I give a review on the rules of 
the experiments focusing on the specific features enabling the investigation of the 
research hypotheses and the possible biases in the experiments. The presented 
experimental method is new in the sense of applying one-sided anonymity – an artificial 
information asymmetry with repeated interactions.  
I use the results of the experiments to test my hypotheses formulated in section 3. 
Due to the low number of cases (64 players, ~1600 played games in total) I do not aim 
to give a strict proof to the hypotheses, but only to test them with simple means to raise 
new questions and research directions.  Also I used several kinds of treatments and 
games – this presents a limit to the data usability and clarity, and the experimental 
focus.64 The exact case numbers are given at the analysis of the results. 
                                                     
64
 Note that the total experimental budget was app. 750 EU, which of course presented a constraint to 
sample size. 
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4.1 Methodology 
4.1.1 The experimental design 
There are only a few golden rules in experimental economics which have to be kept 
in mind when conducting games regardless of the specific game being played. The 
experiments described in this section abided most of these rules (exceptions are 
explicitly mentioned). 
The first one is that the game should be played with real stakes. Players shall be paid 
in hard currency at the end of the experiment. So the players’ goal is to get a good sum 
at the end of the game in the experiments. Giving real money in a game makes 
individuals behave selfishly, so it really makes fairness sometimes a painful option. Still 
if fairness concerns are strong, people will behave altruistically, they will reward and 
they will punish.  
Another golden rule is that the rules have to be common knowledge. Practically 
every player has to know the rules and that every other player knows the rules65. 
Otherwise some players would take advantage over others and that would result in 
negative attitude between players or generally towards the experiment itself.  
Also anonymity may be very important – in some cases this can also be taken as a 
golden rule. In some situation researchers are concerned about internalized norms and 
behavioural patterns regardless of the presence of others. These cases require that no 
emotions are present between the players. Anonymity assures that. In such games the 
notion of a ‘Perfect Stranger’ (PS) is used. A PS a person about whom no information is 
available to a given player – not even partial information about the identity such as 
gender, age, ethnic group, etc. Only one information is shared about the PS – that it is a 
human being. This causes those norms regarding interpersonal exchanges to trigger in 
game situations.  
These rules may be violated in order to investigate interesting effects – as it will be 
shown in several studies in this thesis. These methods are used by social psychology 
rather than pure economics. The effect of violating these rules introduces various norms 
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 In literature deviation from that is referred to as information asymmetry. 
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into a simple experiment – the investigation of the effects of these norms is our purpose 
in this case; a common research task in social psychology.  
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate behaviour in situations where the 
players are somehow related (mostly simple friendship with a few exceptions only) to 
each other. To do this two and three player ultimatum games (UG2 and UG3) and 
dictator games (DG2 and DG3) were played (see details later in this section). Earlier 
experiments have been conducted with groups of related players, but in those 
experiments the effects of ‘being in the same group’ were investigated (Henrich et al. 
2004; Vollan 2011). To test my hypotheses and validate the IFN model another 
approach is required, so some golden rules of behaviour economics have been ignored 
(discussed later).  
The experiment was conducted in a computer lab where players were separated in a 
way they couldn’t communicate (they sat far enough) and their decisions and current 
roles were not visible to the others. At the beginning of the experiment all players were 
asked to choose a nickname and enter it in the experimental software. The nicknames 
were written on the blackboard. These nicknames were used through the whole 
experiment – they were mostly the real first names. 
The number of game rounds varied between the groups from 50 to 80. In each round 
the players were randomly (or semi-randomly – see experimental treatments) formed 
into dyads or tryads with roles randomly (or semi-randomly) assigned. The players did 
not know how many rounds are there exactly in total (however they knew that the 
maximum number of rounds), nor at which round they’re currently at. The players were 
informed about their own payoffs in the round, and of those whom they played with, but 
not of the other players’ payoff (nor of their identity).   
The players were not allowed to communicate during the experiment (nor before) in 
any way in order to maintain the PSs anonymity. Unfortunately the PSs couldn’t be 
completely separated from the friends in the experiment due to technical and logistical 
barriers.  
The players were paid at the end of the experiments in HUF depending on their 
payoffs in the experimental games. 6 rounds were randomly chosen from the 50-80 
rounds they played, and they were paid according to their payoff in those rounds (in 
some cases the average was paid, in other cases they were ranked, and a fixed sum was 
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distributed based on their ranking). The average payoff was 3200 HUF (~11.5 EU), 
which is a non-negligible value for a student. (In the experiments they were asked to 
share 8000 HUF in each game type.) 
The most important feature of the experimental games not abiding the rules of 
experimental economics was one-sided anonymity. This means that in the UGs and 
DGs the Proposer was anonymous, but all Responders (in three-player games there were 
two) were known to the Proposer and each other. Non-anonymous games raise several 
questions, as if somebody hurts the other person in the games, then the conflict may 
evolve in their real relationship – this effect is even more emphasized since the 
experimental groups were in a network in real life. This could be a problem if a 
Responder accepts a very unfair offer in an UG3 where the Responder and the Passive 
player are friends66. In other cases the Responders may feel being treated well or badly, 
but since the Proposer is always anonymous, this does not yield the continuation of the 
game in real life. 
 
Figure 4.1.: Information asymmetry in one-sided anonymity 
The information asymmetry introduced by one-sided anonymity gives the upper hand 
to the Proposer. To counter its negative effects, each player played numerous rounds of 
UGs and DGs in random roles. Hence one-sided anonymity was once a drawback, then 
an advantage.  
Being anonymous was relevant for Proposers to trigger ‘real’ decisions. There was 
no possibility of a re-match in the experiment, as the Proposers’ identity was always 
kept hidden. So it might have occurred that two players had a re-match, but they were 
not aware of it. The first-proposer knew who he’s playing with, but once becoming a 
Responder, he was not aware that the roles were switched. 
                                                     
66
 This issue will be investigated later in this section. 
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So one could ignore the possibility of retaliation (as his/her identity was not revealed 
during the experimental round), and make the ‘most selfish’ decision (keeping 
everything) possible – the boundary of these decisions were the feelings induced by 
thinking about not giving anything to the other player. Even though it is not common 
knowledge, the Proposer ‘would know’ that he acted unfairly. That itself was enough to 
deviate from the selfish split even in DGs.  
Responders were also asked in some turns to guess whom they were playing with 
(this information was important in evaluating UG rejections and acceptance). In total 
the Responders gave a right guess in 32% of the cases. Due to the length of the 
experiment, they weren’t asked each turn. Still, 21.9% of the players reported that the 
experiment took too long, and 12.5% reported that it was too exhausting. 
In the proposed experimental design the number of the players should be a common 
multiple of two and three. This is practical, because this way dyads and tryads can be 
formed from the whole groups who play two and three person games. Also one has keep 
in mind that since the IFN model can be validated by network strength mapping, the 
size of group shall be able to be handled in a relatively low number of experiments. A 
practical group size keeping this in mind is either 6 or 12. Since the IFN model is also 
used to map existing networks, a number of players shall be an existing network. 
Depending on the ratio of different games played, the players in the network can be 
different. In the experimental groups consisted of 6 subjects. With this treatment both 3 
person and 2 person games can be played simultaneously through the whole group 
resulting in shorter experiments. 
Four among the group members were ‘friends’. They were asked about their network 
via a pre-experiment survey. The other two players were ‘perfect strangers’ in the sense 
that they knew neither each other nor the group. Each of the players was given a pre- 
and post-experimental survey. The pre-experimental survey included the network 
survey for the friends (in which they had to evaluate their ties from 1 – acquaintance to 
5 – closest friend; strangers were coded as a 0 tie), and data about general attitudes 
towards risk and fairness. The post-experiment survey was designed to collect 
experiences regarding the experiment. This is required to evaluate the adequacy of the 
experimental data. Also demographic data was collected. The players had to give their 
names at both of the survey, but were assured that no data is used by third parties, or 
outside of the analysis of the experimental results and this research.  
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Possible biases  
As mentioned earlier, there were many rules of behavioural economics violated 
during the experiment. Some of these violations were intentional (one-sided 
anonymity), while some were caused by the logistical and technical barriers (size of the 
computer lab). There were some biases within the experimental groups as well.  
One-sided anonymity: 
One-sided anonymity may initiate feelings of exposedness and subservience in the 
Responders. The effects of one-sided anonymity were not investigated in this research, 
since they were countered in the experiment by having players play each role randomly 
multiple times. Thus it wasn’t a drawback to neither of the players – it was specifically 
pointed out in the explanations, that every player will be playing in all of the roles. 
Personal contact: 
The experiments were conducted in a single computer lab, thus there was no way of 
visually separating players from each other. It was large enough to deny the possibility 
of communication, but players were able to meet the PSs in person, so they weren’t 
‘perfect’ PSs anymore. Since there were only two of them, their behaviour may be 
affected by the fact that they may be recognized by their offer, and thus gave higher 
offers than they would in real anonymous situations. Seeing each other during the 
experiments may have triggered sympathy and gender effects as well. 
Also since the groups were composed of friends, we can assume that they’ll keep on 
‘playing the game’ in real life, or also they may ‘share the sum’ at the end. This may 
caused some intention to work on a profit maximizing strategy for all of the players, but 
the random structure of the experimental payoffs omitted the use of such strategies. 
Group behaviour bias: 
There were some experimental groups where considerably more zero-offers were 
observed than in other groups – see the analysis of the results. It may have been caused 
by numerous zero offers in the first few turns. The same may apply to ‘overly fair’ 
groups. 
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Group composition bias: 
There were three groups consisting entirely of girls, and five groups having only one 
male player. As shown in earlier experiments women are less selfish than men (Eckel 
and Grossman 1998), so this may present a bias to general results – but does not affect 
individual analyses. More than that, two of these groups were game theory class 
students (unaware of the actual game type played though). These groups also have 
provided interesting information, but to have their data pooled with the rest, their 
behaviour has to be examined independently.  
4.1.2 Experimental games and treatments  
The experiments consisted of multiple rounds of two and three player ultimatum and 
dictator games. As mentioned earlier the average payoff of 6 randomly selected rounds 
were paid at the end of the experiments and the payoffs of players participating in the 
same game (but not their identity) were revealed at the end of an individual turn. So in 
this sense these games should not be interpreted as repeated interactions, as the pairing 
was random – and it was told the players that randomness is always assured. 
One-sided anonymity was used through the whole experiment for all groups in each 
game. There were two and three person games of both UG and DG. The games were 
conducted in a computer lab using networked PCs. The group members were 
simultaneously playing with each other. They entered the offers and the decisions via 
their keyboard, there were no other interactions during the experiments.  
In two person ultimatum or dictator games they do not really have to explicitly think 
of their relationship to the other player. They just do rash classifications on the 
relationship and decide accordingly also including their internalized norms.  
Three player UGs and DGs in turn were applied to force Proposers to compare two 
of his/her relationships, and in this case more thought shall be given to the relations; 
they have to be compared. Decisions given in these circumstances, and differences in 
the offers reveal relevant information about the two relationships. In three person DGs 
for example even the smallest differences in the offer for the two Responders matter, it 
signals a difference between the tie towards the two of them. 
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One of the assumptions of the IFN model and the strength of the tie were that people 
have only assumptions on their tie strength – cij. They implicitly define thresholds of the 
tie strength, which are relatively hard to grasp. In three person games however it may 
occur that these thresholds may overlap. Still people are always able to decide whom 
they like more in a situation like that, or if the evaluate them as equals.  
These three person situations are important not only in the fairness and network 
perspectives, but also in the structural balance perspective – yet the latter is omitted in 
this research, but could be a future aim of this research.   
Three player ultimatum game 
In a three person ultimatum game there’s a third person, who’s deemed to be 
‘passive’. The passive player does not have to make any choices, but his presence is 
very important.  
In the game the Proposer proposes a split of goods among them, also knowing their 
identity. Both Responder and the Passive player get to know the offer instantly. Then 
the Responder is asked to accept or refuse the offer. As per a simple ultimatum game, if 
the responder accepts, the payoff in the offer is given to the players. If the responder 
rejects, neither of them gets anything. After the decision of the Responder each player 
gets to know the payoffs of himself and all other players.  
So in this case the proposer has to approximate not only the fairness preferences of 
the responder, but also on the preferences regarding sharing with a third person. The 
proposer has to approximate if the responder cares for fairness toward the passive 
player, and if in itself the offer is fair enough for the responder. 
In this game according to one-sided anonymity only the Proposer had perfect 
information, he knew the identity of the other two players. The other players only knew 
each others’ identity but not the Proposer’s. As the offer was given by the Proposer, it 
was made available to the other players. 
Nor Responder, nor the Passive player had the opportunity to punish, as the 
Proposer’s identity is kept hidden. It may be important to share the identities of the 
Responder and the Passive player, as in our experimental framework guessing the 
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proposer’s identity was also included. So guessing is not about ‘blind’ guesses in this 
case, but one done by knowing whom the proposer was asked to split.  
Three player dictator game 
The three person dictator game is much simpler. In this there is a Proposer, and two 
Passive players. As per the normal dictator game the Proposer decides how to split a 
given pool of goods among them. The identity of the Responders is given to the 
Proposer and to each other. Only the Proposer’s identity is hidden in this game – just as 
in three player UGs. Once the Proposer decides on the split, it is made available to both 
Responders. 
So this game serves information about the relation of the two relationships. If the 
proposer wishes he/she may give more/less to one passive player than to another one. 
Thus the purpose of this game is to uncover the differences in the relationships of the 
Proposer and the Responders. One-sided anonymity is kept in these games as well, so 
guessing the Proposer’s identity may give information about the ideas about the norms 
of the Responders. Practically if the guess right, then they know who they had been 
playing – but their ‘guess’ was still a guess. 
Guessing Proposer identity 
When Responders play the ultimatum game in such a small group, they inevitably 
guess the identity of the Proposer (in the experiment the Responder was asked to guess 
one of the other five people - only four in case of three player games). As mentioned 
before each player selected a specific ID at the beginning of the experiment, which was 
used through the experiment (usually a name, or a nickname). This was specifically 
implemented in this experiment as the Responders (and Passive players) were asked to 
guess the Proposer’s identity in some games after the payoffs have been determined. 
The players were asked by the experimental software to guess the name of the Proposer. 
There was no feedback on the outcome of the guessing (nor was the Proposer informed 
about the guesses), it was only used in data analysis. 
Responders give their decision (acceptance/refusal) depending on if they would 
accept the offer from the Proposer they guess. In the dictator game ‘guessing’ is not 
  
125 
 
important in this sense, the Responders are not urged to do so, as there’s no choice to 
take. But what the Responders think also gives information about their network – more 
precisely from who would they get such an offer they got in the DG. 
In three person games the same process takes place in a different context. Since 
Responders are aware of each other’s identity, only the Proposer is hidden from them, 
their guess is based on their perception on the Proposer’s connection to them. If they 
perceive that the Proposer ‘equally’ likes them, they would expect an equal offer for 
both of them (not necessarily equal with the Proposer’s payoff). So Responders guess 
the Proposer’s identity keeping this in mind.   
In the DGs, guessing was done after the Responders got the offer from the Proposers. 
In UGs it was entered simultaneously with the decision about the offer. There’s no 
reason to expect any effect of the timing of the guessing on the Responders’ choice in 
the UGs. 
Treatments in triadic interactions   
Due to the mixed relationships within a group purposefully assigning the roles may 
help in determining the relationship between the group members and the norms applied 
in similar situations. For example if Responder 1 is a friend of the Proposer and 
Responder 2 is a PS, then it’s expected from the Proposer to give an offer reflecting this 
difference, for example 50-50-0. A very interesting situation occurs when the proposer 
plays with two friends. In this case the offer clearly shows if the Proposer feels 
differently towards the Responders – the most interesting phenomena occur if the 
Proposer reports the two Responders as equally important in the survey. In this case 
even the slightest difference between the offers has a meaning. 
Of course the game type again mainly influences the offers. In DGs we can observe 
clear differentiation, while in UGs more complex strategies may be examined. The 
norms triggered depend generally on the composition of the tryad playing the game. To 
be able to investigate research hypotheses the tryads were created sometimes artificially 
(but still randomly). The methods of creating these triads are denoted here as treatments. 
The tryads may consist of friends, strangers, and two friends and one stranger. 
During the experiments the players play in random tryads to avoid adaptation and 
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learning. Interactions among perfect strangers are suitable to explore the fairness 
concerns of the players and in interpreting the results of the three person games.  
Taking into account that an experimental group consisted of ‘friends’ and ‘strangers’, 
there are two possible types of dyads in two player games: ‘friend’ dyad, or ‘stranger’ 
dyad depending on if it contains a strangers.  
In three player games the situation gets more complicated. There are 5 combinations: 
‘friends’, ‘strangers’, ‘proposer stranger’, ‘responder stranger’, and ‘passive stranger’. 
The combinations are determined by which role the stranger fulfils. 
 
Figure 4.2.: treatments in the three player experimental games 
Treatment – Friends (3FND) 
The 3FND treatment is a very simple treatment, as the triad involves friends only. If 
the participants of the triad are friends, and have equally strong attachment to each 
other, then equal split and acceptance is expected in the UGs. In DGs equal shares shall 
be paid to friends equally close to the Proposer (but maybe unfair in terms of Proposer 
share). The relationships can be symmetric or asymmetric. It would be convenient to 
allow symmetric ties only, but reality dictates otherwise. 
The purpose of having friends interacting in a triad in a three player dictator game 
(DG3) is related to network mapping, or simply put, evaluating their friendship. As 
mentioned the participants are asked to fill a survey before the experiment takes place. 
This survey includes questions regarding the network the players are in and it serves as 
a control for the games, and also as a subjective measure of network strength. 
Comparing the answers with the results provides us both with information on network 
and data to help applying the IFN model to the people in the network. 
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The three player ultimatum game (UG3) shows how control is exhibited in a 
relationship. In this treatment the Responder and a Passive player was told that one of 
their friends gave the given offer, so the Responder had a real ‘control’ in deciding upon 
refusal, and this may be interpreted as a control (since it is committed against a friend) 
to avoid unequal offers in the upcoming games.  
Treatment – Strangers (3PS) 
The 3PS treatment corresponds to the experimental conditions in classical 
experimental economics including PSs only. Using this treatment gives information on 
what people perceive as a ‘perfect stranger’ in terms of norms, and how they handle 
them. In other words, what do they expect from an unknown human being? What norms 
and what expectations were internalized by the person? In the terms of the IFN model: 
what tie strength does a perfect stranger correspond to?  
In three player dictator games this treatment shows the general attitudes of players, 
the α and β parameters in the IFN models. In three player ultimatum games this 
treatment lets Responders exhibit control by punishing very unfair offers and shows the 
Proposer’s assumptions on what ‘tolerance’ can be expected from the Responder.  
Treatment – Proposer strangers (3PSPR) 
In this treatment a stranger is located in the proposal location, and friends are located 
at passive/responder positions. Note that this treatment is different from the 3PS 
treatment, as the Proposer is interaction with people who are somehow related to each 
other. Playing DG3 in with this treatment shall provide information regarding the self-
group effects if the stranger is given the information that the passive players are friends. 
In this case we would expect more selfish behaviour, giving less to the individuals in the 
‘group’ – as a result of not-belonging to the group. If this information is not given, then 
this treatment is equivalent with the 3PS treatment. 
UG3 played with this treatment provides information of in-group solidarity of 
friends. The most important information extracted from experiments like this is the 
situation when the friends know each others’ identity, and the stranger does know that 
the other players are friends. The stranger will have to contribute a substantial amount 
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to both other players, as the Responder shall reject the unfair offers where the Passive 
player (a friend) is not offered anything because of their friendship. The best offer from 
the Proposer (stranger) is the equal third split. In this game the Proposer’s task is to find 
out the accepted threshold.  
Treatment – Responder stranger (3PSPA1)  
Playing DG3 with this treatment shows the emergence of the in-group vs. out-group 
(stranger) norms. It shows how much more a proposer prefers his own kind versus a 
stranger. This game does not give explicit information regarding the IFN model 
parameters, but it certainly supplies information regarding the subjective tie strength – 
subjective in this case means preference of one player vs. the other. Or in other words it 
shows how much ‘unfairness’ is tolerated by the proposer, how ‘unfairly’ can a friend 
or a stranger be treated. This is clearly shown in this game, as here the relationships are 
‘compared’. 
In UG3 this treatment is quite important. When the proposer gives an offer, a 
dilemma emerges. The proposer has preferences for the Passive player (friend), but the 
acceptance of the offer depends on the Responder (stranger). How much should one 
propose? The Proposer wishes to have the offer accepted, so it has to be large enough 
for the responder. In the same time the Proposer has to care for his/her friend. Other 
than that, this treatment also shows a self-group effect on the side of the Responder, as 
the rejection is a punishment to both other players (the members of the group the 
responder does not belong to). 
An interesting situation is when the Proposer proposes less to the Responder 
(stranger) than to the passive player (friend). In this case it would be interesting to see if 
there is an amount when the stranger accepts the offer which is a bit unfair, but 
understandable given that the Proposer and Passive players are friends. Also rejection of 
relatively fair offers may be observed if the Passive player’s payoff is judged too high 
by the Responder as an indication of strong self-preference.  
Treatment – Passive stranger (3PSPA2) 
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In this treatment friends are in the proposer and responder role and a stranger is the 
passive player. In case of dictator games this treatment is equivalent to the 3PSPA1 
treatment. 
When playing UG3 though, the proposers may have different choices. One choice is 
to completely neglect the presence of the Passive player (stranger), and play the UG 
only with the Responder (friend). But will the Responder agree to this? Will the 
Responder allow to the Proposer (friend) to give an absolutely unfair offer to the 
Passive player (stranger)? The most important feature of this treatment that it can show 
when the responder punishes his/her friends when unfair offers are given to the stranger 
(for example an offer of 50-50-0). 
This treatment gives information on in-group vs. out-group solidarity. When the in-
group solidarity is high, responders tend to accept those offers unfair with the passive 
players. If the out-group solidarity is high enough, then punishing behaviour will 
emerge as well.  
Summary of the treatments 
Depending on the number and the role(s) of the PS-s in the three player interactions, 
various treatments may be applied as shown in the table below. 
  Observed phenomenon 
Treatment DG3 UG3 
3FND Network mapping Control 
3PS General attitudes Control 
3PSPR Self vs. group effects In-group solidarity 
3PSPA1 In-group vs. out-group 
solidarity 
Self vs. group effects 
3PSPA2 In-group vs. out-group 
solidarity 
In-group vs. out-group 
solidarity 
Table 4.1.: the use of three person games 
As seen the three person games are capable of producing group effects. Some of 
these do not contribute to the validation of the IFN model, or the explanation of the 
strength of a tie, but they do introduce important phenomena in structural balance 
theory, and network mapping – a practical application of the IFN model. 
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The predictions of the IFN model vary across these treatments. In 3FND treatments 
the DG3 predictions are given in section 2.3.2 – summarizing it, the offers in the DG3 
correspond to the tie between the Proposer and the two other players.  
In UG3 the predictions of the IFN are mixed. Even if both friendships are strong, 
unfair offers may be accepted – note however that such offers won’t necessarily be 
given.  A general prediction of the IFN model is that a low number of rejections may be 
expected if the offer of the Proposer is not too low for the Responder (but may be very 
low to the Passive player). This prediction does hold for situations where friends are in 
the role of the Proposer and the Responder. 
If the stranger is in the role of the responder in the UG3 then even very unfair offers 
may be accepted when the Passive player gets nothing. The IFN model predictions for 
the Responder in this case are similar to the two player games, so even less fair offers 
are accepted (the Passive player is generally neglected). 
4.2 The experimental groups 
Using these games along with survey methods the networks can be explored in a 
different way, asymmetries and relations can be explored with different treatments as 
described here.  
In the experimental sessions 11 groups were tested in total. Each group consisted of 6 
players, in total 64 subjects participated in the experiments (two players participated in 
two separate groups). The only requirement for the groups was that they contained a 
group of 4 friends, and 2 PSs.  
The experimental groups consisted of university students – each subject was 
currently participating in a programme or has already obtained a degree. The mean age 
was 22.17 years with a std. deviation of 2.979, so the subjects were of a homogenous 
age group. (There were only 2 subjects above 30.) 
In terms of gender the experimental groups were non-ideal (as previously mentioned 
at the biases), as the ratio of female and male subjects was 71.2% and 28.8% as opposed 
to the current distribution of 52.53% and 47.47% (KSH 2005).  
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In total there were 3 groups consisting only of girls. As shown in earlier experiments, 
the dominance of women in the experimental groups does have a significant effect on 
the results (Eckel and Grossman 1998).  
Besides gender effects, the cultural background and the perception of the individual’s 
material status also affects behaviour in UGs and DGs. More data on the demographic 
variables of the subjects may be found in the appendix. 
To further control adequate behaviour – meaning that subjects understood their task 
and the consequences of their behaviour – a test experiment of 4 experimental rounds 
was ran with the groups. After the experiment they were also asked some questions 
about their experiences and their opinion about certain details of the experiment. This 
has shown that subjects understood their task and acted accordingly. Only one subject 
reported finding the experiment too complicated and too complex; the majority (81.3%) 
reported not having any problems with the experiment in this sense. 
A strong critique of the UG and DG is that it may be harder to compare it to real 
situations than for example the trust game. A substantial ratio of the subjects (34.4%) 
reported that the experimental games were not like a real situation, they did not 
encounter similar situations in life. It’s hard to draw conclusions from such a statement 
regarding the reliability of their behaviour, but no experimental evidence suggests that 
this factor should be taken into account.67 
In the following I will analyze the experimental results first giving an overall 
comparison to earlier experimental results, and then focusing on testing the hypotheses 
formulated earlier. Some details of the calculations may be found in the appendix. 
4.3 A general result compared with earlier experimental results 
The general results of the experiments with give an overall picture of the 
experimental performance and biases (Gulyás 2011a).68 Besides two-person dictator and 
ultimatum game (DG2 and UG2 in the following) offers and performance discussed 
here, three player game (DG3 and UG3) are described shortly as well. For 
representational purposes (and for simple calculations) the offers have been recoded 
                                                     
67
 This question was used rather to improve the experimental description handed to the subjects. 
68
 Note that all results referred to in section 4 are found in the electronic appendix of this thesis.   
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into centiles. Thus for example 0.4 in the following figures represents all offers between 
0.4-0.4999. So in this particular dataset there are numerous fair offers in the 4th centile 
as well.  
Also note that in the experiments with which current results are compared with the 
steps of offers was 0.1  of the total offer, while in the current experiment it was 0.00013 
– so in these terms the players had a much wider scale to choose their offers.   
4.3.1 Two person dictator game results 
First, the DG2 offers are shown in Fig 4.3 (N=594).69 The results are recoded so that 
centiles are shown (for example 0.5 corresponds to offers between 0.5-0.599). It’s 
clearly seen, that there were many offers around the equal split. Compared to the 
experimental data (with (Hoffman et al. 1994)) the ratio of fair offers is spectacularly 
higher. 
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Figure 4.3.: Two person DG offers  
The explanation of this phenomenon is quite simple. In the experiments the 
anonimity was violated (on the proposer side) and the players were in the same room. In 
case of perfect anonimity (as in Hoffman et. al. – see pp. 365) people are only partially 
motivated to share – they’re influenced by only knowing that they are nice or mean to 
another human being. In the current experiment the proposers actually knew the 
                                                     
69
 In case of the first two groups some players indicated that they perceived 2 person DGs as UGs (66 
games). Checking the means has shown that this had a significant effect only at group 1. After these 
experiments the experimental software was updated with a clearer description of the task. 
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responders (but they were anonimous to the responders!), so here even personal motives 
mattered.  
Also note that it was shown in earlier experiments, that women are generally less 
selfish than men. This has a strong effect in this experiment, as the majority of the 
subjects were girls. In an earlier study, ~5 times more women offered an equal split in 
the DG (Eckel and Grossman 1998).  
Since the groups were mixed of strangers and friends, a strong effect of the ties can 
be anticipated. There’ a significant difference if people played with strangers or friends. 
When played with strangers the ratio of the equal splits decreased dramatically, 65% of 
the offers were below 40%; while when playing with a friend this value was 32% - so 
players were much less willing to give relatively unfair, or zero offers. The latter cases 
decreased even more. While zero offers were given in 25% of the cases when playing 
against a stranger, this decreased to ~5% when playing against a friend. There’s a 
significant statistical relationship (Spearman’s ρ=0.383, p<0.0001) between the DG2 
offers in the experiment and treatment (2PS/2FND)..   
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Figure 4.4.: DG offers: played with a stranger (left, N=421) and when played with a friend (right, 
N=173) 
Due to the lower number of male players, no correlation is found between the offer 
and the gender of the proposer. This is not improved even when the treatments (2PS and 
2FND) are examined individually. Comparing the means of the offer shows that the 
difference is minimal – 0.3 for female Proposers and 0.27 for male Proposers. 
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Figure 4.5.: DG offers: women (left, N=416) men (right N=178) 
These robust differences shown that the relationship to the other player has a huge 
impact on the DG offers. Also note that there were groups of game theory students as 
well – in their case, the offers were even more unequal. Compared to earlier results we 
can conclude, that the results are in-line with earlier experimental results. Low sample 
sizes doe not enable us to test the hypotheses, but is enough for an evaluation and an 
attempt to fit the IFN model to the data.  
4.3.2 Two-person ultimatum game results 
The UG behaviour shall also be influenced by the ties between players. The general 
results of UG offers are shown in Fig. 4.6 (N=546)  compared to earlier results 
(Forsythe et al. 1994). Note that the column assined to 0.4 also contain the 0.475 (fair) 
offers as well.  
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Figure 4.6.: UG offers (left) and the results of Forsythe et. al (1994) (pp. 354) – Pooled UG offers, 
experiment with pay  
Analizing the data in details we can conclude that the experimental results are in line 
with earlier results. In this case again the identity of the players should be an influencing 
factor as per the assumptions of the IFN model. Results show, that friends indeed have 
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preferred the equitable outcomes compared to when playing with strangers. The UG 
offers and the Treatment (2PS or 2FND) are correlated (Spearman’s ρ= 0.366, 
p<0.0001). 
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Figure 4.7.: UG offers accepted/rejected in case of playing against strangers (left, N=392) and 
friends (right, N=154) 
Low offers were observed in both treatments, but they were rejected in both cases. If 
friends were playing though (right), the rejection rate is much higher in case of more 
unfair offers (below 40%). Also note that when playing against strangers (left), the 
offers are geneally lower and even not very fair offers were often accepeted.   
Rejections were quite frequent in case of lower offers and gender effects were not 
significant. Offers given by women had a mean of 0.404 and those given by men had a 
mean of 0.39, there’s no significant correlation between gender and UG offers.  
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Figure 4.8.: UG offers: women (left, N=401) men (right, N=145) 
The same applies to the acceptance rates. As seen in figure 4.8., both women and 
men rejected all the offers below 0.2., but even higher – still unfair – offers are often 
rejected. The experimental data shows, that the refusal is not associated with gender at 
all. 
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Figure 4.9.: UG acceptance: women (left, N=401) men (right, N=145) 
So the general results show, that in both UGs and DGs friendship ties indeed matter. 
Friends generally preferred equity in their offers regardless of game types, but no 
gender effects were shown in UGs. Partially this may be due to improper gender ratios, 
or women dominated groups. The results are in line with earlier experimental results for 
both UGs and DGs, thus they’re adequate to test the hypotheses and fit the IFN model. 
4.3.3 Three person game results 
The three person games were ran in the treatments described earlier, but here only 
their overall results are shown. In case of both DG3 and UG3 games there was a wide 
range of offers. There were many offers in both games which both responders got equal 
offers (but generally less than what was given to the Proposer.  
In the UG3 games (N=220) nearly no double-zero offers were observed. In most of 
the cases the Responder was offered at least 0.2, but no such statement can be 
formulated for the offers to the Passive players. Taking a look at possible correlations 
between the acceptance and the offers we may find that there’s a significant correlation 
(Spearman’s ρ=0.409, p<0.001) between acceptance and the offer to the Responder. 
The other players’ payoffs are disregarded when making a decision on acceptance. Also 
a logistic regression shows the same result – the only significant term is the ratio offered 
to the Responder70. 
                                                     
70
 On the details of the logistic regression, see the appendix. 
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Figure 4.10.: UG3 offers and acceptance (N=220) 
The UG3 results shall be compared to the study of Kagel and Wolfe (Kagel and 
Wolfe 2001), and Güth and van Damme (Güth and van Damme 1998). In the study of 
Kagel and Wolfe the reacting Responder was chosen randomly. That context is very 
different from the current one, yet it shows Responder preferences. In these 
experimental sessions relatively unfair offers were observed of in which the rejection 
ratio was low, and only very low unfair offers were refused frequently.  
The results of the UG3 in our experimental sessions were different, acceptance 
mostly related to the offer to the Responder. Still, due to the different context the results 
of Güth and van Damme, and Kagel and Wolfe cannot be explicitly compared with our 
results. 
  
138 
 
0,50,40,30,20,10,0
DG Offer Responder 2 %
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0,0
DG
 
O
ffe
r 
R
es
po
n
de
r 
1 
%
 
Figure 4.11.: DG3 offers (N=270) 
The DG3 results (N=270) showed a much clearer picture. In Fig. 4.11 below a strong 
tendency of equality is found. Several equal offers are found, but differentiation is clear 
in several cases. Only a low fraction of offers (3%) resulted in the Proposer having 
actually less than the other players. 
Unfortunately DG3 results can’t be compared to the results in the literature as the 
context was different. The DG3 introduced earlier used other treatments, but anonymity 
was assured in each sessions. This in itself yields a huge difference to the experimental 
settings in this research making the DG3 results of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) non-
comparable to the current results.   
4.4 Testing hypotheses 
4.4.1 Main hipothesis, fairness and tie strength 
H1. The behaviour in bargaining and sharing situations is influenced by the strength 
of the tie between the actors. Thus if an actor has a friendship tie towards the other one, 
then in a DG he will likely give a non-zero to the other actor. If there’s no relationship 
between the players in the dictator game, then zero offers and unfair offers will be 
observed. Also if the tie is strong between players, then the UG offers will be smaller 
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than when the tie is weaker. This is the conclusion of the IFN model. If the Responder is 
known in the ultimatum game, then lower rejection rates will be observed.  
To investigate this hypothesis one has to look at the DG2 data in the experiments. In 
this sense this hypothesis means that there is a correlation between DG2 offers and 
Treatments (2PS and 2FND). So generally we’d expect higher DG2 offers in the 2FND 
treatment.  
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Figure 4.12.: DG offers in the 2FND treatment (N=173) 
The offers in the 2FND treatment were very high compared to data from earlier 
experiments, with a mean of 0.4324 and a std. dev. of 0.15762. Only roughly ten 
percent of the offers were below 0.3.  
.
75
.
56
.
50
.
50
.
49
.
48
.
47
.
45
.
44
.
43
.
42
.
41
.
39
.
37
.
35
.
33
.
33
.
32
.
31
.
31
.
28
.
25
.
25
.
23
.
20
.
15
.
14
.
13
.
10
.
06
.
05
.
04
.
03
.
00
.
00
.
00
Two person DG offers - 2PS Treatment
20
15
10
5
0
Pe
rc
en
t
 
Figure 4.13.: DG offers in the 2PS treatment (N=421) 
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The 2PS treatment shows quite a different picture though. Here the mean offer was 
0.2784 with the std. dev of 0.18698 – so the mean was considerably lower, but the std. 
deviation increased a lot.  
These data show, that there’s a difference between 2PS and 2FND offers. This is 
further backed up by the results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and that the 
treatment (2PS and 2FND was used only) is significantly correlated with the offers 
(Spearman’s Rho ρ=0.383, p<0.0001). The following tables show the results of these 
tests.   
All these tests are significant, and they support the first statement in H1. 
The second statement of H1 describes the connection between ties and UG proposer 
behaviour. In the 2FND treatment the friends shall get better offers than strangers. As 
shown earlier there is a correlation between UG offers and treatments.  
Analyzing the results individually, the offers are not particularly unfair, and as seen 
in the previous section, the refusals are mainly observed at levels below 0.4.  The mean 
of the offers is 0.4119 with the std. dev. 0.08375. The offers are relatively high with a 
low std. deviance. 
 
Figure 4.14.: UG offers in the 2PS (N=392) and 2FND (N=154) treatment 
In the 2FND treatment the offers were even higher (with less rejections of course, as 
there’s no correlation between rejection thresholds and treatments) with a mean of 
0.4881 and a st.dev. of 0.12157.  
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Note that there are a number of very high, overly fair offers in the UGs. This was 
observed in case of siblings, and in cases of very close friends only. As it was discussed 
in the analysis of the IFN model these cases correspond to totally altruistic relationships.  
Again there is correlation between the UG2 offers and the treatment (2PS/2FND) and 
the Wilcoxon test also confirms this (Spearman’s Rho ρ=0.331, p<0.0001). Thus it is 
concluded that since these correlations and the Wilcoxon test are significant they 
support H1.  
The results of 2 person DG and UG offers show that, H1 should not be rejected, 
meaning that there may be a statistical relationship between friendship and 
UG/DG behaviour. Due to small sample sizes H1 may not be accepted per se, but it is 
already proved that H1 would worth a more thorough investigation in further research. 
4.4.2 Differentiation between friends 
H2. When playing three-person dictator games (two Responders) with Proposer 
anonymity the Proposers will give a different offer to the Responders depending on the 
tie strengths. 
The IFN model assumes that people are influenced in their decisions by the well-
being of others depending on their tie. This also means that when more than two are 
involved in an interaction, different ties affect a person differently. So when somebody 
is interacting with a friend and a stranger at the same time, a differentiation process 
takes place.  
As mentioned before, a pre-experimental survey was run where the subjects had to 
report their ties to the others. In the following tests this data is used as a measure for tie 
strength, as the model fitting (see later) is done by examining behaviour in the 
experiment. Of course it is not assumed that the answers given to the survey can be used 
explicitly, so here only the differentiation between two subjects (reporting different 
‘strengths’ of friendship) is used.  
In the UG3s and DG3s differentiation means that different offers will be given 
depending on the reported ties of the Proposer to the Responders. This effect is 
relatively simple in three player DGs. Here the Proposer has a very easy way to make 
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this differentiation; he simply gives different amount of goods to the others (if he gives 
any).  
In the experiments the DG3 (N=270) results show, that there’s indeed a connection 
between the tie strength difference and giving different amounts to the Responders71. As 
Fig. 4.15 shows if the Proposer has reported different relationships towards the 
Responders in the pre-experimental survey, then the offers were mostly consequential.  
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Figure 4.15.: Unequal offers and ties in DG3 
When reporting different ties, the results are not so ambiguous, as there are still more 
equal offers in the DG3-s as Unequal. Note that these also contain zero offers for both 
Responders. Still, removing double zero offers (N=21) from the sample does not change 
this connection significantly. The results of the statistical tests are shown in the table 
below excluding double zero offers. 
Taking a look at tie differences reported in the pre-experimental survey and 
differences in the offers we can find a significant correlation confirmed by the 
Wilcoxon test as well (Spearman’s Rho ρ=0.470, p<0.0001). This significant 
connection supports H2 despite that the correlation is weak. Again we have to note 
here that small sample size does not allow a thorough test of H2, but as in the case of 
H1 the data gives a solid base for further research. 
 
                                                     
71
 Cramer’s V=0.279 with the significance level of p<0.000 for these variables.  
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Besides examining DG3 results in this aspect, the UG3 results may be of interest. In 
the UG3 (N=220) the task of the Proposer is more difficult, as he has to give an offer 
which is accepted by Responder 1. The offer has to be fair with Responder 1 and not 
‘too unfair’ with Responder 2 to have it accepted by Responder 1.  
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Figure 4.16.: Unequal offers and ties in UG3 
Generally the Proposer played with Responders towards whom he had different ties. 
The connection between having different ties and giving different offers is also 
significant, but in this case we cannot find relationship (Spearman’s Rho ρ=0.144, 
p<0.033).  
This is very easy to explain though. There are many cases, when the Pr-R1 tie is 
much weaker than the Pr-R2 tie (the 3PSPA1 is specifically this treatment N=70), and 
in these cases the Proposer has to give a substantial amount to the PS (Responder 1), but 
does not want to give much less to his friend either (Responder 2).   
4.4.3 General attitudes towards fairness 
H3. Those Proposers who give higher DG offers in general, refuse higher offers 
when playing the role of the Responder in UGs, Proposers giving low DG offers tend to 
accept lower UG offers as well.   
In order to check this hypothesis first it’s required to see what UG offers were 
rejected. In UG2-s the refusals (N=83) are strongly connected to the level of the offer – 
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as it is expected72. As H3 states, those players giving high DG2 offers should be those 
refusing higher UG2 offers.  
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Figure 4.17.: Two person UG offers 
Calculating correlation between the refusals and the average DG offers of the 
Responders refusing the offer shows that there is a significant relationship between 
refusing an unequal offer and being kind with others at other times (Spearman’s 
ρ=0.333, p<0.002). 
The correlation is significant and supports H3.  
We have to check H3 for the cases of UG3-s as well, though UG3 responder 
behaviour will be further examined when testing H4. Refusal was experienced in 25% 
of the UG3-s (N=55). No significant correlation can be found in this case73, so the UG3 
refusals cannot be used to support H3.  
Based on these results H3 holds for UG2, but not necessarily for UG3s. UG3 
behaviour is investigated when testing H4, so an explanation for this phenomenon will 
be given shortly. 
4.4.4 Punishing friends to help strangers 
H4. In a three person ultimatum game the Responders are willing to punish even if 
they’re substantially better off. They will do so even if they may think that one of their 
                                                     
72
 Cramer’s V=0.519 with a significance of 0.000 for the UG2 offers and acceptance. 
73
 Spearman’s Rho takes a value of -0.124 significant at the p<0.368 level. 
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friends has given such an offer. Thus they punish their friends when they treat strangers 
unfairly. 
The test of H3 has shown, that the general attitude (DG offers) does not determine 
UG3 Responder behaviour. So another effect has to be taken into account in this case, 
which is implicitly stated in H4. Namely that Responder 1 in the UG3 does care for 
Responder 2. Thus if Responder 2 is treated badly compared to Responder 1, then 
Responder 1 will refuse the offer.  
This phenomenon can occur in the 3PSPA2 treatment only (N=37), with the Proposer 
and Responder 1 being friends. H4 says in other terms, that we shall experience refusals 
even when Responder 1 gets substantially more than Responder 2. 
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Figure 4.18.: UG3 acceptance/refusal vs. payoff difference in the 3PSPA2 treatment 
As Fig. 4.18 shows there practically no refusals if Responder 1 gets more than 
Responder 2 in the UG3 in this treatment. In fact we may observe quite the contrary, 
Responder 1 exploits the passive position of Responder 2 – 0.50 corresponds to the 
case, when the Proposer gave a 50-50-0 offer.  
Despite that these results are in line with the predictions of the IFN model, the 
experimental results may not be used to investigate H4, due to the low number of 
cases (N=37) and the extremely low number of refusals (N=5). Note that these results 
do not suggest that H4 holds. 
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4.5 Model fitting and calibration - using experimental data 
4.5.1 Methods of model fitting 
The research hypotheses of this work emphasized, that if people are closely related 
with each other, they act more fairly as well. It is intuitively logical, that this 
phenomenon works the other way around as well – if somebody treats others fairly, he’s 
probably more closely related to him/her or/and his general concerns for fairness are 
strong.  
So in this section I describe how the general attitudes of subjects and their ties may 
be determined using the IFN model, using data from experiments gathered with the 
methodology described before. Here I do not aim to compare the IFN model to any 
other models, since the measure proposed here – the strength of a tie – is too different in 
nature for a reasonable comparison. 
The advantage of the IFN model is that it describes behaviour taking into account the 
general attitudes of people and their relationships. Thus using the experimental data the 
behaviour of the subjects may be used to determine the subjects’ general attitude 
parameters and evaluate their relationships. 
By fitting the IFN model we’re able to map the ego-network (limited to the 
experimental group of course) of each player. This means that based on experimental 
results we can approximate the strength of the tie between people. The experimental 
games with treatments proposed here force people to make choices (offers) according to 
their intrinsic attitudes and their relationship between people.  
Here the IFN model is fit to a set of experimental results – due to low answer rate to 
a post-experimental survey and unavailability of contacts not all the subjects are able to 
be included in fitting the model adequately. In their cases approximations are done on 
their experimental parameters only when determining their relationships (in their cases 
symmetric ties were assumed and their attitudes were approximated using other 
subjects’ data as well). 
In this section the ways of obtaining the general attitude parameters are described 
first. Some survey questions are given and translated into the terms of the IFN 
methodology, and general remarks will be given about the parameters. Then the exact 
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methodology of model fitting will be described for the different game types (both two 
and three person) with a group level model fitting attempt found in the appendix for the 
current experimental groups. The section concludes with some interesting phenomena 
observed in different experimental groups. 
In case of such a complex model the interpretation of behaviour is very difficult. 
Before fitting the data from the individual experiments though, the general attitudes of a 
player should be investigated to improve the accuracy of fitting the model. These 
attitudes were obtained by using rather complex surveys. 
The survey questions are not easy to answer and this presents a serious barrier in 
model fitting. Also these surveys were post-experimental surveys and the response rate 
was ~50% (including that the email addresses of some subjects weren’t available).  
Obtaining α 
The first attitude parameter describes how envious a player may be. In terms of the 
experimental methods used in this thesis it corresponds to ultimatum Responder 
behaviour. In the UG envy plays a role when the Responder gets an offer different from 
the non-equal split. If envy wouldn’t influence behaviour, then the responders would be 
willing to accept whatever offer and would even accept zero offers (indifferent in this 
case). In other words, without feeling envy nobody would be concerned to get the ‘fair’ 
split. 
According to the IFN model envy takes over rationality, when the offer is so unfair, 
that its acceptance would yield negative utility – as described in (2-8). Finding this 
specific limit for an individual player gives his α parameter.  
  
148 
 
 
Figure 4.19.: The UG acceptance limit when playing with a friend 
When a subject is playing with his/her best friend (c=1) then the Fig. 4.19 describes 
the IFN model. As seen the slope of the model is determined by the envy and the 
intersection of the IFN model with 0 (the x-axis) shows the point what helps in 
determining α (as the maximum of the model was predefined by assuming c=1), the 
limit of acceptance/refusal. 
Thus if a survey method is used to determine this limit, questions with the following 
properties should be formulated: they should focus on UG refusals; they should assume 
playing an UG with the best friend. For example:  
‘Suppose you’re playing the following game with your best friend: there’s 10000 
HUF to be distributed among you, and your best friend. Your best friend will make an 
offer of the split. If you like the offer and accept it, then both of you gets the money. If 
you don’t like the offer and refuse it, neither of you gets anything. The only other rule in 
this game is that you can’t redistribute your winnings after the game. What offer would 
you find so unfair that you’d refuse it?’  
However as experience shows, such complex questions can hardly be answered by 
whole numbers as the question itself shall be interpreted into attitudes first. Even though 
we have brain functions similar to utility calculation, they rather calculate ‘desirability 
of choices’ (Glimcher, Dorris, and Bayer 2005). This means that a person can choose 
between two outcomes by their desirability, but asking somebody to create for example 
the most desirable split of the pie only in theory (not in real action as in experimental 
games) may be misleading and overly difficult.  
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To counter for this effect yet obtain the required limit, the following questions were 
asked in the post-experimental survey:  
‘Suppose you’re playing the following game with your best friend: there’s 10000 HUF 
to be distributed among you, and your best friend. Your best friend will make an offer 
of the split. If you like the offer and accept it, then both of you get the money. If you 
don’t like the offer and refuse it, neither of you gets anything. The only other rule in this 
game is that you can’t redistribute your winnings after the game. 
The following table contains the possible choices. Please indicate if you would accept 
such an offer!  
Also please think how you would feel given such an offer! Does the offer hurt you 
enough to refuse – and thus punish – the proposer if you weren’t playing with your best 
friend? 
 
Offer Accept? (y/n) 
Would it 
hurt? (y/n) 
(5000; 5000) 
  (5200; 4800) 
  (5400; 4600) 
  (5600; 4400) 
  (5800; 4200) 
  (6000; 4000) 
  (6200; 3800) 
  (6400; 3600) 
  (6600; 3400) 
  
 
If you have answered only ‘yes’ to the first question then please indicate the value 
where you’d refuse this offer from your best friend!:       ..........‘ 
It is important to notice that it was asked how individuals would feel. This is very 
important as ‘envy’ is a feeling triggered by the unfair offer. In many surveys the first 
‘no’ for acceptance corresponded with the first ‘yes’ for the second question. In some 
other cases all offers were accepted, but also subjects reported that the offer would hurt 
them. This indicates that people fight their negative feelings, likely because of the 
perception that games will continue in real life. Thus the second question contains the 
information to use in determining α.  
The subject’s answer (theoretical behaviour) is described by using the following 
form of the IFN model: 
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(4-1)  
The boundary condition of the UG refusal is the following: 
(4-2)  
Assuming that the total pool of goods is 1 (calculating in relative units) the following 
α can be calculated using the answer for the question above. 
(4-3)  
If the offer to be refused is close to 0.5 (the equal split), then the envy is very strong 
in the player. In other words being better off would hurt him so much, that even 
relatively high offers would be refused as well.  
Generally the boundaries given to the IFN model in section 2.4 hold, as the values 
exceed both the β values and are mostly bigger than 1 (the average is 1.58). There were 
some subjects who did not turn in usable answers. Looking at the model boundaries it’s 
seen, that very few α is above 2, this would mean that the offer of 0.4 is refused even 
from the best friend by most of the subjects.  Higher values correspond to subjects who 
indicated that even less unfair offers would hurt them.  
Obtaining β 
This general parameter describes the attitude towards ‘guilt’ – if somebody is better 
of then another person, then he’s hurt by it. Of course being better off does not yield 
negative feelings towards others, if there’s no relation to the others. For example we’re 
giving zero offers to strangers without any second thought. But if there is a connection, 
being better off doesn’t always feel good. 
Obtaining this value however is much more difficult. In the games used in the 
experiment guilt influences the DG Proposer behaviour. Proposer behaviour in the DG 
is mainly influenced by the relationships between players, so it can’t be used to obtain β 
– since players maximize their utility and the maximum is influenced by the 
relationship. 
( )1tot1 20 pi−piα−pi=
( )1tot1 2U pi−piα−pi=
( )1
1
21 pi−
pi
=α
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Figure 4.20.: DG offer, the maximum of the IFN model, if cij=1. 
The slope of the IFN model – and thus the value where it crosses the payoff axis – is 
determined by β. So if this value could be obtained, then the attitude could be 
calculated. The player should be forced into a situation where the guilt would drive 
behaviour rather than the relationship. Keeping the maximum of the model fixed – 
making the player behave as if he’d be playing with his best friend – is still useful as 
thus one point of the model is exactly known. 
After that either a point on the slope (indicated in fig 4.19.) should be ‘found’ as 
through that the slope can be determined, which gives an explicit value of β. Such a 
situation is choosing between situations where a player can be fair, or unfair with others, 
but introducing different stakes. It means that a player has to choose between accepting 
an unfair offer (for example 80-20), or a fair offer with considerably less payoff in total 
(for example 40-40).  
In a post-experiment survey the players were asked the following:  
‘Suppose you’re playing the following game with your best friend: a third person – 
unknown to both of you – proposes different splits of 10000 HUF among you, and your 
best friend. The decision of choosing from the offer is yours. Your best friend is not 
aware of your possible choices; he/she’ll only be notified of his/her winning. The only 
other rule of the game is that you can’t redistribute your winnings after the game. Which 
choices would you make in the following games?  
a.) (7000;3000) or (3000;3000)? 
b.) (7000;3000) or (3250;3250)? 
c.) (7000;3000) or (3500;3500)? 
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d.) (7000;3000) or (3750;3750)? 
e.) (7000;3000) or (4000;4000)? 
f.) (7000;3000) or (4250;4250)? 
g.) (7000;3000) or (4500;4500)? 
h.) (7000;3000) or (5000;5000)?’ 
 
Which decision was the most difficult? (a-h)    
 
Please think in exact amounts now. What would be the equal split what you’d choose as likely 
as you would choose (7000;3000)? (E.g. (2345;2345) ). 
 
 
The games continue. Which would you choose? 
  
a.) (6000;4000) or (3000;3000)?   
b.) (6500;4500) or (3250;3250)?   
c.) (7000;3000) or (3500;3500)?   
d.) (7500;2500) or (3750;3750)?   
e.) (8000;2000) or (4000;4000)?   
f.) (8500;1500) or (4250;4250)?   
g.) (9000;1000) or (4500;4500)?   
h.) (9500;500) or (4750;4750)?   
i.) (10000;0) or (5000;5000)?  ’ 
 
When answering these questions the player will opt for the unfair offer (left choices) 
up to a certain value, and then he’ll stick to the fair split (right offer). Denoting the first 
choice set (a-h) as ‘game 1’ and the second set (a-i) as ‘game 2’, it’s likely that no 
player will choose the equal split in the first few choices in game 2, as it’d decrease only 
his own payoff, but wouldn’t mean gain for the other player. It would be a senseless 
sacrifice in terms of payoffs.  
Also it’s likely that the players would prefer the fair split in the last two choices in 
game 1 – their sacrifice ‘pays off’ in these games. The value of β can be approximated 
by finding the point where the players turn from the unfair offers to fair offers. In terms 
of the IFN model this game corresponds to the following expressions in game 1:  
( ) ( ) β−=−β−= 40007000300070007000unfairU     (4-4) 
 
( ) 7000fairU ff <pipi=        (4-5) 
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The latter expression shows that a player is willing to stick to the half of the original 
offer just to make up for the difference with the other player, or to increase the payoff of 
the other player. The gains in game 1 can be described the following way: 
Choice 1 Choice 2 Sacrifice Gain Relative gain 
7000 3000 3000 3000 4000 0 0 
7000 3000 3250 3250 3750 250 0.066 
7000 3000 3500 3500 3500 500 0.143 
7000 3000 3750 3750 3250 750 0.231 
7000 3000 4000 4000 3000 1000 0.333 
7000 3000 4250 4250 2750 1250 0.455 
7000 3000 4500 4500 2500 1500 0.6 
7000 3000 4750 4750 2250 1750 0.778 
7000 3000 5000 5000 2000 2000 1 
 Table 4.2.: sacrifices and gain from the choices 
As table 4.2 shows choice 2 produces less total payoffs for all cases (except for the 
last). Relative gains show the ratio of the sacrifice done by the player and the gain of the 
best friend of the player – the ‘efficiency’ of the sacrifice. Of course the sacrifice is 
biggest in the last game, but then it’s the most effective.  
Suppose that a player chooses 1 in case if it is (7000;3000), but chooses 2 
(3750;3750) in the next game. Let’s suppose, that both of these games correspond to the 
case when the choices are near equal. So (4-4)=(4-5) has to be calculated. 
 
4000
7000
40007000
f
f
pi−
=β
β−=pi
       (4-6) 
So for this case we can conclude based on (4-6) that β=0.81. The same calculations 
are omitted for game 2, the games are shown analytically instead. 
Fig. 4.21 is not easy to interpret though. The dashed lines represent the IFN model 
for various β values and the solid lines important lines representing games. Game 1 is 
represented by the simple vertical line its intersection with the IFN model containing 
important information. 
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Figure 4.21.: Analytical representation of game 1 and game 2 and the IFN model, if cij=1. 
The choice of an individual is the hardest when the utility of the offered equal split is 
similar to the utility of the offered unequal split. The twist lies in the fact that the 
offered equal split is always less (in total) than the unfair offer which is about splitting 
(10000 HUF). So Fig. 4.21 in case of game 1 explicitly tells what equal payoffs yield 
the same utility as the 7000-3000 split. For example with a β=0.9 the player will assign 
similar utility to the split of 3400-3400 than to 7000-3000; with a β=0.6 this offer will 
be 4600-4600.  So if the equal offer is below these values, the player would choose 
7000-3000 instead. 
Game 2 is visualized similarly, but in that case the unequal offer changes. The blue 
line shows the utility of the equal split offered as an alternative to the more and more 
unequal split. For example the value at 6000 shows the utility of the choice given as an 
alternative to the 6000-4000 split – in this case 3000-3000. The intersection of the IFN 
models in this case explicitly show which choice is made, depending on β. For example 
if a player with β=0.7 would face the choice between 7500-2500 and 3750-3750, he 
would choose the latter one – in Fig 4.21 the IFN model for this player gives a lower 
utility (3000) at 7500 than the line representing game 2 (giving a utility of 3750). 
Note that in case of game 2 the existence of different pools in the splits may be 
confusing for this figure, but note that the absolute utility is shown in all cases making 
the different pools comparable in utility terms. 
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The results of these two games were used to determine the β-s of the experimental 
subjects. Taking a quick look at the data, the condition, that β<α holds for each subject 
who answered the survey questions to determine α adequately. Also β≤1 holds for most 
of the players. Those who indicated otherwise answered irrationally to the first question 
in both game 1 and game 2 in the survey. 
Model fitting using DG and UG results 
According to the IFN model behaviour in the DG and UG can be described by 
formulating the IFN model for a given player. So if the general attitudes of the player 
are known and also the strength of the tie between the players is known, the IFN model 
can predict the offers in the DG and the acceptance limit in the UG.  
The IFN model works like this in theory only, the practical application is quite 
different. While it was shown how the behaviour can be fit to the IFN model, in real 
applications we have to fit the model to the behaviour to obtain information regarding 
the ties between players.  
Different information can be gathered from UG and DG data. Proposer behaviour is 
used in case of DGs, while Responder behaviour is used practically in case of UGs. As 
it was shown in section 2, the IFN model describes these behaviours if the general 
attitude parameters are known.  
As discussed above both general attitude parameters can be determined using surveys 
for a given subjects, thus there is only one variable left in the IFN model: the tie 
strength.    
{ } { }jiijijiiijjijiii c0cc0cU pi−piβ−pi−piα−pi= ,max,max    (2-1) 
In DGs the payoff represents the maximum of the IFN model for the Proposer, so the 
tie strength can be determined based on the behaviour. It can be assumed that the offer 
given by the Proposer corresponds to the maximum of the IFN model. In this case the 
second term in (2-1) is assumed to be 0 (the offer is <0.5), and the same holds for the 
third term. The Proposer aims to ‘set’ the third term to zero as it corresponds to the 
maximal utility. Obtaining the tie strength from (2-1) and (2-3): 
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=
         (4-7) 
 If the pool is normalized then this expression is even simpler. Suppose for example 
that the offer is 0.55 – in this case (4-7) results in cij=0.81. Of course it is difficult to 
determine the relationship if the Proposer gives a zero offer. In this case only a 
condition can be formulated based on the condition of the zero offers.  
As described in section 2 the zero offers depend on the attitude towards being better 
off than others, the β value of a player. So the zero offers can be expressed using (2-5) – 
see 7.3 in the appendix.  
β++−<
1
4
1
2
1
c12         (4-8)  
This expression gives the upper bound for tie strength. For example if the Proposer 
having a β=0.85 gives a zero offer than we can conclude that the tie strength between 
them is less than 0.694 – the latter value calculated with (4-8).  
The UG results can be used from the Responder side mostly as the UG Proposals are 
influenced rather by strategies (the perception of the fairness norms of the Responder) 
than the fairness norms of the Proposer. The most important feature of the UG is the 
refused offers. We cannot give an exact tie strength value based on UG rejections, but a 
limit can be given according to (2-8). 
( )21212
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         (2-8) 
The method of calculating this limit is deducted from this expression - see appendix. 
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Again, if the payoff is normalized to 1 then the analytical function is simpler. This 
yields that there are two tie strength values for each payoff, but this is due to that (2-8) 
is concave and (4-9) is practically its inverse. 
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It is easier to use a graphical method to determine the limit than the analytical 
solution of (4-9). Fig. 4.22 shows (2-9) for a fixed α, from which the limits can be 
determined.  
 
Figure 4.22 (2.7).: UG rejections (Responder’s payoff - %), α=1.8 
Let’s suppose for example that such a player has refused an offer of 0.3875.  Thus 
we can conclude that the tie strength is higher than ~0.45. If the same player has 
accepted an offer of 0.41 then we can conclude that the tie strength is above 0.85 or 
lower than ~0.6. Naturally using UG refusals (and acceptance) in this manner should be 
used in conjunction with DG results, but in some cases only such results were available.  
4.5.2 Summary of the group level fitting 
The experimental groups in this research were quite diverse. Unfortunately the post-
experimental survey response rates were poor (40%), so the exact model fitting is 
difficult. The reported attitudes are also quite diverse and many responders could not 
answer all the questions adequately.   
Still there were many quite interesting phenomena uncovered in the experiments and 
accounted for by the general attitudes – as predicted by the IFN model. The overall 
results of fitting the IFN models show that the ties may be compared and that players 
are consistent in their behaviour. Players gave PS-s much less in the DGs, while some 
PS-s exhibited positive reciprocity in some cases (due to one-sided anonymity this was 
misplaced in some cases). Also an interesting ‘common grudge’ was shown in case of 
group 6 of two siblings versus a member of the group. In the experimental results family 
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and partnership ties (2 cases) proved to be very different from the friendship ties, as 
very generous offers were generated. This may well be interpreted a simple bias (as the 
relationship is a repeated game), but the strong tie (in the Granovetterian term) may also 
have played a role. The detailed results of model fitting may be found in the appendix. 
Even though the lack of data does not permit an in-depth statistical analysis of the 
IFN model the general observations are promising. The boundary conditions for the 
general attitudes (α and β) were fulfilled with a few extreme values only.  
The results give good guidelines for further experiments as well. The key question of 
model fitting is the connection of behaviour in the experiments and the reported 
relationships expressed in network surveys. Both methods have biases as discussed 
earlier, but their results were in line in the introduced results. The general attitude 
parameters are hard to determine and sometimes hard to interpret. In this research the 
only tool used was a survey which may prove inaccurate. So in further research its 
update is required as well. The games included in the survey though are quite useful for 
determining the attitudes, thus they should be included in the experiment. 
The exact results of fitting should be compared to the pre-experimental survey results 
as well in which the subjects ‘rated’ their relationship with the other players. Ideally the 
pre-experimental survey and the ties calculated using the experimental data and the IFN 
model would be in correspondence. 
But there’s a contradiction between the survey results and the experimental 
behaviour in several cases (also taking into account the general attitudes) – group 6 is a 
good example for that. This shows that the ‘declared’ relationships may differ from the 
‘materialized’ ones, and that suggest that the experimental methods used in this research 
may represent an improvement to currently used network mapping methods.  
 
So while current data from these groups (low response rate for the post-experimental 
survey) are inadequate for examining the fitting methods for the IFN, the results point in 
a good direction. The major point of improvement in this research methodology should 
be the application of an improved pre-experimental survey, and adaptive research 
software. The pre-experimental survey should include the questions uncovering general 
attitudes in this section, but as the experiences show, simpler questions should be 
phrased. The ‘adaptive’ research software means constant monitoring of the 
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experimental behaviour and determining ‘random’ pairs based on the result. The pre-
experimental survey may point out interesting relationships, or interesting triads which 
would be interesting to examine. In the current research software totally random dyads 
and tryads are created (using the treatments of course), so in some cases important 
pairings were not included in the experiment. Also if the research software is capable of 
uncovering discrepancies in the decisions and the pre-experimental survey results, then 
certain rounds may be ‘repeated’ to investigate causes and extents of the discrepancy. 
Certainly the extent of this research sets solid barriers to the validity of the results, 
but all the results show that the introduced experimental methodology may be used 
effectively in investigating ties. 
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5 Conclusion and discussion 
5.1 Summary of results 
The purpose of my thesis is to connect two formerly detached fields – social 
psychology and experimental economics. Both of these fields neglect the embedded 
environment that the social interactions take place in. Two approaches compose the 
theoretical framework of this thesis: embeddedness in social networks – namely the 
importance and characteristics of ties –, and fairness theory. Social network theory is a 
sound approach to describe this embeddedness from the structural perspective, and 
fairness theory describes several motives behind human behaviour. By merging certain 
aspects of these theories embedded social interactions can be explored by experimental 
methods as well.  
In social network theory a fundamental notion is the definition of the strength of a tie 
between the members of the networks. The strength of a tie can be defined in numerous 
ways. In former studies it was defined according to the requirements of research – 
frequency, intimacy etc. They were either objective measures – missing some subjective 
properties of the perceived relationships which may change behaviour – or subjective 
measures – which are often incomparable and may suggest asymmetric networks even 
in case of symmetric tie.  
Another definition of tie strength is given in this thesis, which is based on the 
perception of ‘fair’ behaviour with others. With the methods introduced in this thesis the 
tie strength may be measured. The importance of this objective measure is that it 
contains several objective components, yet its underlying processes (fairness concerns) 
involve subjective motives.  
A new model of fairness and embeddedness was introduced – namely the integrated 
fairness and network model (IFN) – incorporating network strength into an existing 
fairness model (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). The model defines fairness concerns as the 
motivation for ‘inequality aversion’ which does not hold in all cases. Due to that the 
fairness concerns in the IFN model corresponds rather to the ‘unfairness aversion’ – 
unfairness meaning the individual’s perception of unfairness. While in the classical Fehr 
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model the equal split was considered to be the fair behaviour, the IFN model takes the 
strength of a tie into account.  
To test the model an experimental method was developed incorporating experimental 
games used in earlier research played in networks with various dyadic and triadic 
settings. These methods may be used not just to test the group but also to examine 
informal networks, in real-life settings.  
The model was tested with the developed experimental framework on a small sample 
group of 64 people with a relatively high number of interactions (N=1630). The main 
results of the experiments have shown, that friendship and fair behaviour are indeed 
related – a result which is logical even for the first sight, yet there was no method to test 
it up to now. Also it was shown that with a thorough method, the individual tie strengths 
may be compared.  
The hypotheses tested in this thesis concerned fairness and tie strength. The simplest 
such statement was tested first, the relationship between the tie strength and the fairness 
norms applied. The tie strengths were taken from pre-experimental surveys and it was 
shown that the reported tie strength indeed correlates with the offers gotten and given in 
two-person dictator and ultimatum games. 
Three person games were used to test behaviour in more complex situations. Such 
dictator games have shown that in triadic interactions people indeed differentiate based 
on their perceived ties. The results have shown, that if people feel that there’s a 
difference between the ties to the other two parties in an interaction – and the 
differentiation is ‘free’ –, then they differentiate depending on their perceptions.  
Using three person ultimatum games enabled the investigation of the extent of 
fairness concerns if strangers participate in the triadic interaction. The results have 
shown that fairness norms are in effect even against strangers, and in the ultimatum 
games the presence of a Passive player does not trigger significant fairness norms. No 
relationship was found between rejecting offers and the offer to the Passive player, but 
there was a relationship between offers to the Responder in the three person ultimatum 
game, and its rejection.  
Also the general fairness concerns were investigated. A relationship was found 
between the refusals in two person ultimatum games, and the offers given in the dictator 
games. Those who were giving higher offers in the dictator game – who were willing to 
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give more voluntarily – had higher expectations in the two person ultimatum games. 
Such relationship was not found in three person ultimatum-games, but this may be 
explained by the different context as well. 
Also – besides not having it formulated into hypotheses – the model introduced in 
this research was used to check the relationship with the reported ties and what has been 
reflected through the behaviour in the experiments. This methodology is very complex 
and needs more improvement before it may be applied, but the initial results highlight 
its potential.  
All of these results point out that fairness concerns and the ties the individuals have 
determine the selection and use of fairness norms in both dyadic and multi-person 
interactions. However the novelty of the methods and the sample size limit the 
conclusions of this research. 
5.2 Limitations 
The multiplicity of the factors influencing human behaviour naturally gives 
limitations to both the proposed model and the conducted experiments. There are 
several cultural determinants, specific norms which influence behaviour and that 
automatically causes diversity in behaviour. In terms of using such models it means that 
several experimental sessions for the same person may yield different results for general 
attitudes and tie strength to others.  
Also the IFN model neglects several phenomena due to modelling constraints. A 
possible extension of the IFN model should be the inclusion of reciprocity in the model. 
Currently the strongest initial assumption of the IFN model is that behaviour is 
influenced by the tie between the actors and their general attitudes. Although this allows 
differentiation between people – as it was shown in the experiments and what other 
models lack – this also means that there’s no dynamism in the model.  
‘Memory’ is not included in the IFN model. If there’s an asymmetric tie and the 
actors interact repeatedly, they would wish to balance their ties. The strength of their tie 
changes so that they could make such offer which corresponds to what they experienced 
earlier – they’d reciprocate. Balancing may be observed if multiple interactions are 
examined with the IFN model, but in this case the model will not be able to serve with 
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an explanation for the balancing mechanism. The balancing mechanism in this case is 
reciprocity. So the most serious constraint on the IFN model is the assumption the ties 
are ‘constant’.  
Other constraints of the IFN model concern its application. It was pointed out that an 
important feature of the IFN model is its capability to be used to map tie strength in the 
network. Model fitting is a very difficult process, because the model is very complex 
and finding reference points is problematic, since the tie strength parameters is 
essentially higher than zero in case of humans. So the first challenge of applying this 
model is determining the general attitude parameters and the set which describes the 
relationship to a perfect stranger – for which a survey method was suggested here. Once 
these parameters are found, the model can be applied, but the dynamism of the 
relationships – temporal changes in the relationship – may confuse results.       
As for the current experimental tests of this model it’s vital to note that the sample 
size was not adequate for a thorough test for the model, it only suits the requirements of 
preliminary testing. Thus the research hypotheses were ‘evaluated’ rather than tested 
with them. 
The experiments also included some types of bias. First of all, participants were at 
the same room, thus sympathy effects could have come into play. Also the experimental 
rules were relatively complex, but it was mostly controlled by having groups play test 
rounds before the actual experiment. The experiment was also quite lengthy which was 
reported by several players. Still we have to note that the experiment complied with 
most of the rules of experimental economics.  
5.3 Applications 
This leads us to the applications of the IFN model outside the lab. First of all its 
theoretical relevance and explanatory power is to be mentioned. The IFN model 
connects social psychology and fairness theories. Interactions are described in an 
embedded context, and a very important feature is modelled: the fairness norms applied 
in the interactions. The current fairness models lack the inclusion of embeddedness, and 
current network models do not consider fairness norms, so in this sense this model is a 
‘bridging tie’ by connecting the ‘norms’ and the ‘networks’.  
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Once data is fit, this model may be applied on many practical fields. The general use 
of the IFN model is mapping an existing informal network. Mapping a network has 
many uses; we may mention networks in schools, where concerns of fairness are in the 
process of development in children. It also has uses in mapping the informal ties in 
formal organizations. Informal ties have multiple layers and they influence operational 
efficiency in an organization, so they are very important in the management perspective. 
Organizational network analysis currently focuses on collecting objective measures of 
networks – communication, advice networks and trust networks –, but besides them the 
fairness and perceived fairness at workplaces is very important. As it was mentioned 
earlier, the strongest advantage of the IFN model is that it describes norms and ties yet 
uses measurable – if not objective in the strict sense – quantities. 
The methodology applied in this research is also novel as the rules of experimental 
economics were manipulated to include those interpersonal effects which are to be ruled 
out in standard economical experiments. This allowed using certain treatments which 
may correspond to real world situations through the use of ‘manipulated’ triads. Such an 
approach is not uncommon in the behavioural sciences, but in the context of fairness, 
such an attempt was not made yet. Also the findings underline the importance of this 
method, as the behaviour exhibited in the experiments differed from earlier results in a 
way entirely explained by the IFN model. Hence the methods introduced here shall be 
considered in other areas of experimental economics and behavioural game theory – still 
the importance of the context can’t be underemphasized.   
5.4  Further research 
The results and the main findings of this research point towards several further 
directions. First and foremost the experimental methodology has to be refined. The 
methods introduced here are applicable per se, but the way they are implemented, and 
the network settings and anonymity settings applied hugely influence results. Due to the 
sample size and a small methodological laxity the model fitting has to be further tested 
and the experiments should be ran with bigger samples in order to obtain valid and 
accurate results.  
Secondly the multiplicity of relationships has to be taken into account. There was 
one family tie and a partnership tie included in the experiments and interesting 
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behavioural patterns were observed in both cases. As it has been widely known since 
the thorough work of Granovetter the importance of the multiplicity of the relationship 
dimensions cannot be overemphasized. First the experiments shall concentrate on one 
individual relationship type. Having a group consisting of mixed family and friendship 
ties may lead to confusing results without adequate experiences – just as it was seen in 
two experimental groups including partners (group 1) and siblings (group 6). Once 
friendships and family ties are analyzed adequately, networks including multiple types 
of relationships may be examined. 
A third direction worthy to mention is organizational network analysis. As it was 
discussed briefly the IFN model may be applied to map informal networks in formal 
organizations and these networks may have interesting properties in terms of fairness 
norms. It would be interesting to examine the relationship of people at specific roles 
(centres of stars, those on periphery) and their internalized fairness norms, and the level 
of embeddedness.  
Due to the same properties would it be another possible direction of applying the 
experimental methods and the IFN model the context of school, or other public 
educational institutes, where children or teenagers are in the process of socialization. 
Fairness norms are shaped drastically in these years as children become parts of larger 
networks and learn the different roles in the networks by being in them themselves. The 
methods here also allow t9he research of this area.  
These were just a few examples where the IFN model and these experimental 
methods may be used to uncover newer layers of social behaviour and fairness norms. 
Nowadays as social network analysis is improving, advanced managerial approaches are 
available and the organizations grow larger and larger aiming for higher efficiency the 
introduction of novel methods and the exploration of the network phenomena is crucial.  
The purpose of this work was of course to provide such methods in which I hope I 
succeeded. Despite the weaknesses of the model and the methods discussed here and in 
earlier sections the approach presented here may be an important step in further 
widening the scope of experimental economics by including more and more social 
properties which were until the last decade intentionally omitted.   
So connecting two such distant approaches as fairness theories and embeddedness in 
social network with the modelling and experimental approach described in this thesis 
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has an important message. Besides the fact that social interactions shouldn’t directly 
handled as economic interactions – even if the interaction itself involves economic 
decisions – the embeddedness should not be left out of the picture. Ties indeed matter, 
as the ties serve as a source of internalized control mechanisms. Despite that the current 
research did not aim to demonstrate which overrules the other in a specific interaction, it 
was shown, that they coexist, they influence each other, and they influence behaviour in 
all of our interactions should it be at our workplaces or at our homes with our family.    
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7 Appendix 
7.1 Experimental results of UG and DG  
Study Payment method 
Number of 
observation
s 
Stake size 
(country) 
Percentage 
of offers with 
s ≤ 0,2  
Percentage 
of offers 
with 
0,4 ≤ s ≤ 0,5  
Cameron [1995]  All offers paid 35 40 000 Rp (Indonesia) 0 66 
Cameron [1995]  All offers paid 37 200 000 Rp (Indonesia) 5 57 
Forsythe et.al  
[1994]  All offers paid 67 
5-10 $  
(USA) 
0 82 
Güth et.al  [1982]  All offers paid 79 4-10 DM (Germany) 8 61 
Hoffman–McCabe–
Smith [1996]  All offers paid 24 
10 $  
(USA) 
0 83 
Hoffman–McCabe–
Smith [1996] All offers paid 27 
100 $  
(USA) 
4 74 
Kahneman–
Kentsch–Thaler 
[1986]  
20% of the offers 
were paid 115 
10 $  
(USA) 
? 75a 
Roth et.al  [1991]  random payment 
method 116
b 
App 10 $ 
(USA, 
Slovenia, 
Israel, Japan) 
3 70 
Slonim–Roth 
[1997]  
random payment 
method 240
c 60 kr 
(Slovakia) 0,4
d 75 
Slonim– Roth 
[1997]  
random payment 
method 250
c 1500 kr 
(Slovakia) 8
 d
 69 
Aggregate results e  875  3,8 71 
a
 Percentage of equal splits. b Observations from the final period only. c Observations of all 10 periods. d 
Percentage of offers below 0,25. e without Kahneman–Knetsch–Thaler (1986)  
Table A1.: Percentage of offers in various studies (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) pp. 827. 
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7.2 Extended analysis of the IFN model  
 Proposer behaviour in DG 
The IFN model is described for the Proposer taking into account the concern against 
being better off. In these expressions pitotal=1. The question in this case is the maximum 
utility for the Proposer, as he’ll make an offer corresponding to this maximum. First the 
IFN model is described for the Proposer in this case. It is assumed that the offer would 
be disadvantageous for the Responder (the terms with α are neglected, they’re 0).   
( )Total11212111 c1cU pi−pi+β−pi= )(      [(2-5)]74 
( ) ( ) 1211212121111212111 ccc11c1cU β+β−β−pi=−pi+β−pi= )(  
We’re looking for the maximum of this function depending on the payoff – so which 
payoff should the Proposer choose to maximize payoff, zero, or non-zero? 
0
d
dU
1
1
?
=
pi
  should be evaluated. As it is seen it depends on the general attitude and the 
tie between the players. 
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( )1212122121 c1c
1
cc
1
+
=
+
=β       [(2-6)] 
So if the individual’s concern for fairness is higher, then the IFN model predicts a 
non-zero offer. Otherwise the concerns are not strong enough, and thus the maximum of 
the IFN model will be at the zero-offer – this condition is formulated graphically in 
Figure 2.5.   
 
                                                     
74
 In the deductions here the notation of the different expressions are taken directly from the main text. 
Those expressions without notation are steps in the deduction 
  
181 
 
7.3 Model fitting  
Obtaining cij using DG zero offers and β values 
Tie strength may be obtained by observing DG offers given that β is known for the 
proposer in the DG. The limit where zero offers are given is defined with the following 
expression:  
    ( )12120 c1c
1
+
=β        [(2-5)] 
From this expression tie strength may be expressed as the following: 
    
( )
β+±−=β
β+β±β−
=
=−β+β
=β+
1
4
1
2
1
2
4
c
01cc
1c1c
2
12
12
2
12
1212
  
Then assuming that tie strength is always positive (this does not mean neglecting 
spitefulness though) the tie strength is given by: 
β++−=
1
4
1
2
1
c12        [(4-8)] 
So this limit may be used to define an upper bound to a tie strength if a zero offer is 
observed in the DG.  
UG refusal behaviour      
The UG refusal is influenced by the concern for being worse off than others (α) and 
the tie strength as well, given by the IFN model. The limit of refusal is defined by the 
following expression: 
( )21212
212
Total
2
c1c1
c
+α+
α
<
pi
pi
        [(2-8)] 
From this expression tie strength may be expressed based on the refused offer and 
the value of α. 
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Finally the boundary condition of the refusal is the following given the offer refused 
and the general attitude assumed to be known: 
Total
TotalTotalTotal
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  [(4-9)] 
This gives an upper bound for the tie between the players. The exact value of the tie 
can’t be determined solely by using UG refusal data. 
7.4 Background variables of the experimental subjects 
The following demographic data was collected from the subjects following the 
experiment: gender, age, father’s education, mother’s education, perceived material 
status. The gender distributions in the different groups are shown in the following table: 
Group Idx 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total: 
Total 
(%): 
Female 4 6 5 2 2 5 6 6 5 4 2 47 71.21 
Male 2 0 1 4 4 1 0 0 1 2 4 19 28.79 
Average age 23.2 21.7 23.5 20.7 23 21.8 21.2 22 20 21.7 26 22.24 0 
Table A2.: gender distributions in the experimental groups 
Besides gender effects, the cultural background and the perception of the individual’s 
material status may also affect behaviour in UGs and DGs. To be able to take these 
effects into account as well, the subjects were asked about their parents’ educational 
background and to give their subjective judgement on their own material status. The 
parents’ background showed that the groups were mostly homogeneous as in most of 
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the cases the parents had a higher educational degree (of course there’s a correlation 
between the mother’s and the father’s educational background75).  
  
Figure A1.: Educational background of parents 
As usual most of the subjects have reported that their material status is just average. 
Nearly third of the subjects reported having better than average material conditions. 
Material status Percentage 
Worse than average 3.03 
Average 60.60 
Better than avg 28.78 
Much better than avg 4.54 
Table A3.: material status 
These data show that the group of 64 subjects participating in the experimental 
sessions are quite homogenous both in terms of age and background. This means that 
the effects of age and cultural background are controlled for in the experiments, but this 
does not hold for gender, as the girl’s dominance probably distort the results.  
7.5 Model fitting using group level fitting 
The purpose of fitting the IFN model to the experimental data is twofold. First an 
attempt is made to determine the tie strength between players using calculations 
proposed in section 4. Then the IFN model may be numerically validated (the 
background assumptions are tested through the hypotheses) if these results are in line 
with the ties reported in the pre-experimental survey. Secondly the striking differences 
                                                     
75
 Examined with a Spearman test, the correlation is 0.655 and is significant. 
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between the ties reported in the pre-experimental survey and calculated using the IFN 
model should be further investigated. In some cases subjects may ‘lie’ in the surveys – 
even unintentionally – while the experiments will make ‘real ties’ emerge.   
To be able to do that of course the general attitude parameters are to be known. In the 
experimental groups it was difficult to determine the general attitude parameters due to 
low response rates to the post-experimental survey. In those cases the general attributes 
were approximated using experimental data adhering to the boundaries defined in 
section 2.4. 
The data indicated in the following tables represent the data obtained in the 
experiments and the pre-experimental surveys. In the pre-experimental survey the 
subjects were asked to indicate the strength of their ties on a scale of 1-5 (1 – known; 3 
– buddies; 5 – close friends). The survey results are included in the analysis.  
The DG offers are generally used to determine tie strength using (4-7) for the 
calculations. So for example an offer of 0.75-0.25 means tie strength of 0.33, an offer of 
0.66-0.33 means 0.49 etc for non-zero offers. In case of zero offers an upper bound can 
be given to tie strength using (4-8). A similar method can be used for refused UG offers 
if α is available for the given subject. 
 The data is represented as ‘survey/experimental’ to make comparisons easily (e.g. 
‘3/0.83’), the Perfect Strangers are denoted as PS. The interesting phenomena are 
indicated in different ways for each group. 
Group 1 and 2 can be classified as pilot groups as in those groups the explanation did 
not prove to be detailed enough – as it was verbally indicated by some subjects. Some 
subjects indicated that they couldn’t distinguish between UGs and DGs from the 
description of the games (despite the presence of the practice session).  
Still in case of group 1 an interesting phenomenon was found.  (‘S’ columns 
represent the answers given in the pre-experimental survey, ‘E’ represents the calculated 
tie strength with the IFN model.) 
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Group 1 F1 (C) M1 (C) M2 F2 F3 (PS) F4 (PS) 
S E S E S E S E S E S E α β 
F1 (C)     5 0.5 3 1 4 1   0.5     2.1 1.04 
M1 (C) 5 11     5 0.967 3 1.143       0.69     
M2 4 1.069 5 3E-04     3         1     
F2 5 1.174 0.9 1.001 3 1.609       0.905   1     
F3 (PS)   1   1   1   1       1     
F4 (PS)   0.875           0.935   0.905         
Table A4.: Group 1 results 
As the results indicate there was only one zero offer in this group (M2-M1), and 
most of the offers were equal (or near equal) splits resulting in high tie strengths (~1). 
This was the case of both PSs as well further indicating irrational DG behaviour.  
Despite the methodological problems at this group a partnership effect was observed 
(highlighted in red, players marked with (C) = couple). Unexpectedly a couple was 
included in this experimental group and their behaviour was interesting. The man in the 
couple gave nearly everything to the girl twice during the experimental session, but 
received ‘only’ an equal split in return. There may be many explanations to this 
phenomenon, but this suggests that strong ties (in the Granovetterian sense) should be 
further investigated with this methodology, as redistributional norms may be in effect.  
The second pilot group (Group 2) consisted only of female students. The groups 
were organized by the subjects – one subject was asked to bring 3 of his/her friends to 
the experiment for a relative small amount of extra payoff (500 HUF). 
Group 2 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 (PS) F6 (PS) 
S E S E S E S E S E S E α β 
F1     5 0.6 3   3 1   1   1   0.58 
F2 4       5 0.596 5 0.6   0.905       0.53 
F3 3 0.6 5 0.29     3 1   0.739         
F4 3   5 0.778 3 0.6                 
F5 (PS)   1   0.966               1 1.58 0.65 
F6 (PS)   0.999       1   0.99   0.974     1.58 1.25 
Table A5.: Group 2 results 
In this group F2 was the ‘organizer’ of the friend group. As seen the others knew 
each other, but probably weren’t from the same closely knit group. The interesting 
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phenomenon in this group is the behaviour of F2 (small offers given and gotten). In the 
post-experimental survey she reported low general attitudes (α was very low, off the 
measurement scale for F1 and F2). She was a ‘gamesman’ in classical terms, less 
affected by norms (β< 0.5 would predict only zero offers in the DG). It seemed that the 
others also behaved like gamesmen when playing with her giving less. The group was 
generally less altruistic among themselves than with those not from the group. No 
explanation can be given to this behaviour from the experimental data. 
The third group consisted of a group of girls, a male and a female PS.  Group 
members were more altruistic among themselves than with non-group members. 
Especially M1 was treated relatively cruelly getting numerous near-zero offers from F1 
(exactly 3). There was another phenomenon observed in the behaviour of F3 and M1. 
After giving an ‘over fair’ split to F5 (PS), F3 was asked to give an explanation. She 
specifically stated that she believed she got an earlier offer from F5 when she wanted to 
reward. In reality though, it was M1 who consciously gave the offer to F3.  
 Group 3 
F1 F2 F3 F4 M1 (PS) F5 (PS) 
S E S E S E S E S E S E α β 
F1     5 0.6 5 1 3 
 
  0.043   0.333     
F2 3 0.951     5   3 1   0.843     1.17 0.81 
F3 5 1 5 1     4 1   0.455   1.286     
F4 2 0.778 3 1 3 1       0.818   0.92 1.58 0.81 
M1 (PS)           1.286           0.441     
F5 (PS)   0.6   0.28   0.455       0.6         
Table A6.: Group 3 results 
This is an exact proof of reciprocity. M1 on the other hand got to be the Proposer in 
the DG only three times through the experimental sessions (twice with the other PS). He 
did not express any specific motives. His results show that he generally got near-equal 
splits right before his overly fair offers.  
Group 4 and 5 were mixed groups not following the 4 FND, 2PS structure. The 
members of these groups were students attending a language class (from various 
faculties). Their pre-experiment survey did not reveal useful data about their 
relationships, so that data was simply omitted.  
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Group 4 
M1 M2 M3 M4 F1 F2 
E E E E E E 
M1   0.143 0.778 0.538 0.111 0.322 
M2       0.143 0.087   
M3 0.03 0.182   0.143   0.41 
M4 0.067 0.524 0.067   0.103 0.333 
F1 0.6           
F2 0.333 0.758         
Table A7.: Group 4 results 
Group 4 was composed of 4 male and 2 female students. As their results show they 
gave each other relatively low offers. Due to the relatively low numbers of DG in their 
experimental session it’s not practical to draw complex conclusion from their 
interaction. It is very clear though that the lack of friendships among them is seen in 
their actions. They gave many lower offers. In the UG sessions the offers were around 
0.4 with a few rejections of offers around and below 0.375. In this sense this group 
reproduced earlier UG results.  
Group 5 was created from the same language class with six other students. Unlike 
group 4 they reported differences in their relationships. Especially one of the subjects 
(M4) was reported to be ‘relatively unknown’ to the others – as he did not attend the 
class frequently. Despite this difference the offers she got from the others weren’t lower 
neither in DG nor UG sessions. Their detailed data does not provide explicit 
information. They’ve also reproduced the UG results of earlier experiments. (Their 
detailed results are omitted here.) 
Group 6 consisted of a usual setup of 4 friends and 2 perfect strangers. The group of 
friends had an interesting composition as it included siblings (brother and a sister – 
denoted with (S) in table A8) which presents a bias. There was also a member who 
barely knew two of the others – so this group was far from the ideal group. Note that it’s 
hard to gather adequate groups, as the subjects interpret ‘friendship’ differently. (For 
some subjects ‘friends’ were indeed close friends, for others they were simple 
classmates or acquaintances).  
The reported relationships also show that the experimental group was not perfect. 
There were two real PSs (F4 and F5), but to some extent F2 can also be classified as a 
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PS, as she only knew one other person in the group, F3. Also their tie as they report it is 
not very strong.  
Group 6 
F1 (S) F2 M1 (S) F3 F4 (PS) F5 (PS) 
S E S E S E S E S E S E α β 
F1 (S)         5 1 4 0.143   0.333       0.65 
F2   0.2         3 0.6   0.333   0.143     
M1 (S) 5 1000   0.231     3 0.194   0.548   1     
F3 5 1 4 1 2 6E-04       0.333         
F4 (PS)   0.6                   0.263 1.58 0.71 
F5 (PS)   0.778   0.778   1   0.778   0.455     1.58 1.25 
Table A8.: Group 6 results 
It’s important here to point out the results of F5. Despite being a PS she consistently 
exhibited strong fairness concerns towards the group members, and weaker towards the 
other PS. So she consistently did not behave as a PS, which has to do with her general 
attitude towards other humans – as it is shown by her high β obtained from the post-
experimental survey. 
Another important behaviour pattern was shown by F1, M1 (sister-brother) and F3. 
The survey has shown, that the brother and sister had a good relationship, and a less 
strong one with F3. In the experiment though, it seemed that they had a common grudge 
against F3 – denoted with red. They consistently (twice) gave unequal share in the DG 
to F3. Also F3 did give a low amount to M1 – still we have to emphasize that Proposer 
anonymity was assured during the experiment.  
The behaviour of the brother and sister was also very interesting (highlighted in 
green). In the survey, they reported a strong relationship, but DGs proved that it’s 
biased in favour of the sister. She gave an equal split in the DG, but the brother gave all 
of the goods to the sister (that’s the reason for the 1000 value of cij in this case). Clearly, 
this couldn’t have been shown using the survey. 
Groups 7 and 8 again were female student groups from a game theory class. Their 
relationships were quite mixed they reported ties from non-existing to strong. In case of 
group 7, emphasis was placed on UGs (only a few DGs were played), while in case of 
group 8, there were mostly DGs played. 
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Group 
7 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
A R A R A R A R A R A R α β 
F1     0.375 0.313   0.313 0.5   0.375   0.375 0.313     
F2 0.25 0.288     0.347   0.375         0.313     
F3 0.354 0.25 0.375 0.25     0.375   0.313 0.313 0.344   3.67 1.25 
F4 0.375   0.313   0.324       0.312       6.79 1.25 
F5 0.375 0.288 0.333 0.25 0.314   0.375       0.313       
F6 0.313   0.25 0.238 0.344   0.5   0.313 0.25         
Table A9.: Group 7 results (Acceptance and Rejection in the UGs) 
Table A9 shows accepted/rejected UG2 offers (column players gave the offer, row 
players reacted: A- smallest accepted; R- highest rejected). The offers are rarely above 
0.4 and sometimes even below 0.3. Note that there was only one offer accepted below 
0.3. The relatively low offer shows that the players weren’t close knit in this group 
which is also confirmed by the pre-experiment survey.  
Group 7 ties (pre-
exp survey) /DG 
offer 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
F1 
 
1 2 4 0 3 
F2 1/0 
 
1 2/0 0 3 
F3 2/0 1 
 
2/0.344 3 3 
F4 4 2 1/0.375 
 
1 5 
F5 1/0.325 1 3 1 
 
1/0.03 
F6 3 3/0.375 1 5 0 
 
Table A10.: Group 7 ties (scale: 0; 1-5) reported in the pre-experimental survey and the DG offers 
Since there were only a few DGs, the offers are indicated in table A10. It’s seen that 
the results mostly reflect the reported ties. The behaviour of F3 and F4 are the most 
interesting in this aspect. In the post-experiment survey both of them reported 
irrationally high β values and it seems to be reflected in their behaviour as well. As seen 
they gave relatively high offers for weak ties (0.375 and 0.344). The offers of F3 to F1 
and F4 show that there is a difference between the ties despite the reported equal ties.  
The players in group 8 were as diverse in their ties as the players in group 7 (they all 
knew each other). Unlike in group 7 all players reported ties towards the others – even 
though relatively weak ones (the S columns). The list ‘liked’ person in the group was 
F5. It is also clearly seen in the offers given to her. There was no other player who got 
such low offers.  
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Group 8 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
S E S E S E S E S E S E α β 
F1     4 0.243 3 0.519 3 0.044 4 0.013 2 0.013     
F2 3 0.371     5   5 1 1 0.046 1 0.185 1.58 0.62 
F3 3 0.27 4 0.5     5 1 1 0.111 3 0.281     
F4 3 1 4 1 5 1     1 0.032 2 0.768     
F5 3 0.096 4   5 0.013 1 0.103     1 0.124     
F6 3 0.905 4 0.174 5 0.6 3 0.333 1 0.351 
 
  1.58 0.65 
Table A11.: Group 8 ties reported in the pre-experimental survey and the DG offers 
It is also clearly seen that the calculated results do not directly correspond to the 
reported ties. Experimental behaviour was much more unfair than one would predict 
from the pre-experiment survey. Since this effect may be observed at all of the players 
(except at F4), this is probably a bias of the survey – there weren’t very close 
friendships in the group so their classification in the 5 value scale may have been 
biased. 
The behaviour of F4 on the other hand is very interesting as it mostly corresponds to 
the reported ties. Similar pattern may be observed F2 and F3 if the survey results are 
rescaled.  
Group 9 was a mixed gender group with only one PS. As seen from the post-
experiment surveys the players had low concerns for being better off, so lower offers 
can be expected. Theoretically F5 was included as a PS in the group, but it was found 
that F1-4 knew F5 from elsewhere (thus it is not marked as a PS here). 
Group 9 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 M1 (PS) 
S E S E S E S E S E S E α β 
F1     5 0.839 4 0.653 5 0.655 2 0.333   0.231   0.63 
F2 4 0.5     4 0.649 5 0.905 2 0.614   0.231 1.31 0.75 
F3 5 0.842 5 0.778     5 0.714 1 0.702   0.616     
F4 5 0.919 5 0.951 5 0.949     1 0.411   0.379     
F5 1 0.231 1 0.185 1 0.176 1 0.28           0.63 
M1 (PS)   0.379   0.595   0.566   0.46   0.691       0.88 
Table A12.: Group 9 results 
Results show that reported relationships mostly correspond to the experimental 
results. M1 was indeed treated as a PS and handled others as if they were PSs as well. 
His results are similar to F5, who also gave and got low offers despite her existing weak 
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tie to the others. Among the players the behaviour of F4, F5 and M1 was consistent 
(survey and experimental), the behaviour of F3 was nearly consistent, and it indicates 
that she has a stronger tie to F5 than reported. The same applies to F2 whose tie to F1 
and F3 is weaker than reported and F1’s behaviour is not consistent with reported data – 
having low concern for being better off accounts for her low offers.  
The remaining two groups were ideal in terms of group composition: 4 friends and 2 
PS in both groups. Group 10 was a mixed gender group, with male subjects in the friend 
group and two female PSes.  
Group 
10 
F1 M1 F2 M2 F3 (PS) F4 (PS) 
S E S E S E S E S E S E α β 
F1     5 0.778 5 1 1 1   0.73   0.333     
M1 2 0.684     5 1 3 0.778   0.882   1.667     
F2 2 0.983 5 1.078     3 1   0.882   0.916 1.43 0.98 
M2 2 0.778 4 0.684 3 0.846       0.067   0.103   0.65 
F3 (PS)   0.811   0.951   0.793   0.951       0.803     
F4 (PS)   0.185   0.333   0.067   0.255   0.032     2.1 1.25 
Table A13.: Group 10 results 
Their results show that the reported ties correspond to the experimental behaviour in 
most cases (inconsistent behaviour is marked).  In these results the behaviour of F2 is 
interesting as she reported strong concern for being better off in the post-experiment 
survey, so her high offers in the DGs are backed up by that. F4 shows quite the contrary, 
despite her strong concerns shown in the survey she gave low offers – her behaviour 
was consistent with her role, being PS.  
As shown earlier (Fig 2.4) the IFN model predicts non-zero offers in case of weaker 
ties as well – this was exactly seen in the behaviour of F4 (also her concern for being 
worse off were stronger). The inconsistent behavioural patterns point out that the tie 
between F1-M2 and M2-M1 may be different than reported in the survey. Also note that 
the PSes got relatively high offers from the first three players – data do not provide 
explanation for this phenomenon. 
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Group 
11 
M1 M2 M3 F1 F2(PS) M4 (PS) 
S E S E S E S E S E S E α β 
M1     4 0.416 3 1 3 1   0.27   0.117   0.91 
M2 5       2 0.8 3 0.939   0.003   0.117     
M3 3 1 1 0.18     2 0.92   0.111     0.64 0.65 
F1 4 1 3 0.6 2 0.352       0.231     2.1 0.88 
F2(PS)   1   0.064   0.846   0.224         1.29 0.55 
M4 (PS)   1   0.049   0.161   0.2   0.143         
Table A14.: Group 11 results 
The last experimental group (11) was the only 4 fnd-2ps group where there were 
more male than female subjects. The most significant result of this group was the in-
group and out-group behaviour.  
As seen in table A14 the group members gave low offers to the PS-es. The calculated 
ties are all below 0.3. Taking into account the relatively high β values of M1 and F1 the 
offers given to F2 can be explained. Only M1’s behaviour is inconsistent in this group, 
the other subject’s behaviour is consistent. This may be explained by the difference 
between real and reported ties, and also a higher concern for being worse off may 
provide an explanation here. 
Fitting the IFN model on this data proved to be difficult because of several reasons. 
One reason was a methodological laxity, distributing the post-experimental surveys 
(using to determine general attitudes) not immediately after the experiments. This meant 
lack of data in the fitting process. Also the post-experimental surveys show that the 
method is still to be improved, as the situation pictured in the questions is not always 
clear. Another reason is the difficulty of adequate groups in the sample. The groups 
were far from ideal, mostly mixed, only rarely being close enough to the specifications. 
In real life settings this is an advantage, but for calibrating the model, this was clearly a 
constraint.  
In light of that the analysis of the reported and fit data shows a weak relationship 
(Spearman’s Rho ρ=0.324, p<0.001), which is promising, since this correlation was 
obtained using 107 players’ data. When considering more data – with more accurate 
general attitude parameters, thus more accurate fitting – this value is probably much 
higher. Due to the current technical constraints however its improvement may only be 
the topic of future research. 
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7.6 Acceptance in three player ultimatum games – a regression model  
The acceptance of the UG3 offers (dichotomous) was modelled with a logistic 
regression having the relative offers as independent variables. The regression was run in 
STATA, the output of the logistic regression is shown below. 
. logit  OfferUGAccepted OfferUGR1Prop OfferUGR2Prop 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -123.71373 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -101.40148 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -99.820213 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -99.765808 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -99.765712 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        220 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      47.90 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -99.765712                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1936 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
OfferUGAcc~d |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OfferUGR1P~p |   15.56615   3.138636     4.96   0.000     9.414536    21.71776 
OfferUGR2P~p |  -.1595576   1.380944    -0.12   0.908    -2.866158    2.547043 
                 _cons |  -3.683772     1.0825    -3.40   0.001    -5.805432   -1.562112 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
As this regression shows the offers to the Passive player are not significant (nor have 
high coefficients) in the acceptance. The importance of the offer to the Responder is the 
highest. Logistic regression post-tests confirm the model. 
 
. linktest 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -123.71373 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -101.30343 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -99.88217 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -99.763973 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -99.762392 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -99.762392 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        220 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      47.90 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -99.762392                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1936 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
OfferUGAcc~d |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          _hat |   .9895838   .2279197     4.34   0.000     .5428694    1.436298 
      _hatsq |    .007716   .0940264     0.08   0.935    -.1765724    .1920044 
       _cons |  -.0038205   .2676552    -0.01   0.989    -.5284149     .520774 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estat gof 
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Logistic model for OfferUGAccepted, goodness-of-fit test 
 
       number of observations =       220 
 number of covariate patterns =        88 
             Pearson chi2(85) =       103.31 
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.0861 
 
